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India’s involvement in the Arctic has been gaining momentum for the past decade and a half. 
When India became the Observer of the Arctic Council, it was seen as the formalization of 
India’s engagement with the Arctic and its policy shaping body. India’s interaction with the 
Arctic has been studied from the lenses of Strategic affairs, economic and scientific interests 
but a study from the lens of International Law has not been widely documented yet. This paper 
documents the past, present and the future of India’s interaction with the Arctic in context of 
International Law and Policy issues prevalent in the Arctic. This study shall be performed by 
analysing the existing International Law framework operating in the Arctic and issues therein 
from India’s perspective. Such a study is necessary to remove past inconsistencies present 
among official Indian policy statements and views of Indian authors and the aim of this paper 
is to ascertain India’s state practice in the issues of international law affecting Arctic law and 
Policy and set up the grist vis-a-vis International Law for its white paper on the Arctic which is 
consistent with its state practice. This paper also attempts to assess the risks the Arctic 
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Chapter 1 Introduction:  
India’s engagement with the Arctic has been examined in the existing literature predominantly 
from the lenses of international relations, strategic affairs, and commercial interests. However, 
there has been limited engagement with India’s stance towards Arctic law and policy from an 
International Law perspective. There are very few comprehensive academic studies which 
have documented India’s actual state practice, both domestic and international, towards 
issues of Arctic law and policy, or India’s broader attitudes and approaches towards 
international law and the Arctic. In the past there have been some inconsistencies among the 
Indian authorities and academicians regarding the interpretation of Arctic under international 
law and India’s role therein. Some authors seem to have held revisionist aspirations1 for India 
that it should not join the AC and hence reject the sovereignty of the Arctic states over the 
Arctic and instead push for a ‘global commons’ in the Arctic, similar to the Antarctic treaty.2 
Indian authorities seem to have overlooked the applicability of the law of the sea convention 
in the Arctic.3 Subsequently the works of Indian academicians started to be in consonance 
with developments in the Arctic regime suggesting India steer away from advocating for an 
Arctic commons. Instead, India started featuring in their works as being scientifically important 
to the arctic to tackle global climate change.4 However some authors still hope for an additional 
framework for the Arctic5 despite the Arctic states declaring that the existing framework in the 
Arctic is sufficient to govern it and that no additional framework is required.6 A need has been 
felt by academicians for India to have its arctic policy and in absence of such a policy India is 
considered as a passive player with a policy of merely ‘wait and watch’.7 The ultimate aim of 
this thesis is to ascertain India’s state practice in the issues of international law affecting Arctic 
law and Policy and set up the grist vis-a-vis International Law for its white paper on the Arctic 
which is consistent with its state practice. This paper also attempts to find possibilities of 
convergence in approaches to tackling regional legal issues between the Indian Ocean Region 








1 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ‘India and the arctic: revisionist aspirations, arctic realities’ (2017) 8 Jindal Global Law 
Review 23, 37. 
2 Shyam Saran, ‘India's stake in Arctic cold war’ (The Hindu, February 01 2012) available at: 
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Indias-stake-in-Arctic-cold-war/article13290404.ece accessed 11 April 
2021.  
3 Ministry of external affairs government of India, ‘India and the Arctic’ (Ministry of external affairs government of 
India June 10, 2013) available at: https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?21812/india+and+the+arctic accessed 12 
April 2021. 
4 Devikaa Nanda, ‘India’s Arctic Potential’, ORF Occasional Paper No. 186, February 2019, Observer Research 
Foundation 1-13.  
5 Id at 13.  
6 Ilulissat declaration 2008.  
7 Anuradha Nayak, ‘Himadri and the Global Politics of Melting Ice: India's Arctic Presence and the March towards 
Global Governance’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law (Brill) 651.  
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Chapter 2 Scope, purpose, objectives, and research methodology:  
Purpose of this paper: the purpose of this paper is to understand the past, present and future 
of India’s engagement with Arctic law and policy framework.  
The objectives of this paper: to achieve its purpose, the paper delves into the existing 
dimensions of International treaty law framework applicable in the Arctic wherein India 
interacts with those provisions either substantively or incidentally on a domestic, regional, or 
international level. A study of the Arctic International Treaty law framework from India’s 
perspective is necessary to remove past inconsistencies and lay the groundwork for future 
vision. It is also important to determine Indian state practice vis-a-vis the Arctic to make sure 
no inconsistencies arise in the future and its statements and policies are not contrary to its 
state practice. India’s advent in the Arctic also brings considerable challenges and practical 
risks that should be comprehensively assessed and managed. Also that the future of India's 
interaction with the Arctic is founded on an informed and thoroughly assessed International 
Arctic Law and policy framework. 
Research Methodology: An overall assessment of India’s approaches towards Arctic law and 
policy will be attempted, having recourse to both primary sources and secondary sources. 
Doctrinal methodology, involving a deep study of the existing legal framework and 
supplemented by scholarly works, shall be adopted. No quantitative or empirical research shall 
be conducted for this work. To ascertain India’s domestic practice, reliance shall be placed on 
Indian parliamentary debates and questions, legislations, executive policy statements, foreign 
ministry records and court judgments. Ascertaining India’s international state practice will 
involve an in-depth study of the relevant international legal framework, and official statements 
and positions asserted by India in international fora which reflect India’s state practice on the 
issues of concern to the present work. Further, secondary literature such as books, research, 
and policy papers, reports etc. shall be consulted and referenced extensively throughout the 
work. 
Scope of this paper: Even though for the purposes of convenience, state practice has been 
divided into domestic and international, it is impossible to segregate and analyse them 
separately. It is the overall state practice of a country that gives us an idea about its outlook 
and dispositions on matters of international law relevant in the arctic. State practice under 
each chapter would reflect India’s relevant practice under: i) applicable International laws ii) 
agreements and interactions between India and other state/s, India and International 
Organizations (IOs)/Regional Organizations (ROs) or between IOs/ROs and ROs/IOs iii) 
domestic law and policy framework iv) proceedings before National and international courts 
and tribunals not necessarily involving India but relevant subject matter.8 In addition to the 
state practice, writings of scholars and experts will also be cited to explain and stress upon a 
particular standpoint.  
 
8 This concept of categorization into four categories is taken from a source and then has been built upon to make 
it relevant to the present paper. Source: MOM Ravin, ‘Law of the Sea Maritime Boundaries and Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms’, United Nations-The Nippon Foundation Fellow Germany, March-December 2005 p 48. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/mom_0506_cambo
dia.pdf  accessed 11 April 2021.  
11 
 
Chapter 3 An overview of India’s domestic state practice on issues of Arctic Law and 
policy: 
For the present purposes, domestic State practice has been determined to consist of the 
official practice of the three branches of the Indian State – legislative, executive, and judicial.  
At the outset, it is relevant to undertake a survey of India’s domestic State practice towards 
issues of Arctic law and policy to assess the relevance of and extent to which such issues 
have been officially considered by India over the years. Such an exercise would help ascertain 
how far India has factored in the Arctic and its related issues in its domestic and foreign policy. 
This would lay the foundations for the study of India’s State practice internationally and its 
stake in the international law architecture governing the Arctic, which would be the focus of 
the subsequent chapters.     
Legislative: Either for giving effect to its relevant international obligations in this regard, or for 
any other related aspects, India, currently, does not have a legislation regarding the Arctic. 
The parliamentary system in India provides for parliamentary scrutiny over executive 
functioning by means of parliamentary committees. Issues of Arctic law and policy are per se 
not high priority areas of the relevant government departments in India, yet some issues 
relating to the Arctic have been discussed in parliamentary committee meetings. Such matters 
have most prominently figured in discussions in the committees dealing with scientific research 
and the environment, particularly the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & 
Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate Change, which is responsible for scrutinizing 
the work of, among others, the Ministry of Earth Sciences. In the context of the Arctic, one of 
the long-standing issues that this Committee has been flagging is the slow progress made 
towards the acquisition of a Polar Research Vehicle (PRV) under the government’s Polar 
Science and Cryosphere (PACER) program.9 Issues relating to India’s engagement with Arctic 
law and policy have also been highlighted in parliamentary questions addressed by legislators 
of both Houses of the Indian Parliament to the various Ministries and Departments of the 
Government of India. For instance, questions have been addressed over the years seeking 
details from the government about India’s position at the Arctic Council10, about the exploration 
efforts and investment made by Indian oil and gas companies in the Arctic region11, and even 
about potential territorial claims over Arctic territory.12 India’s scientific research endeavours 
in the Arctic region and India’s quest to procure the use of icebreakers have also been the 
subject of various parliamentary questions over the years.13 
Executive: The executive state practice of India towards the Arctic has consisted of 
contradictions. The ministry of external affairs of India (MEA) policy statement on the Arctic 
first recognizes the sovereignty of the circumpolar Arctic countries over Arctic, but later goes 
 
9 332nd Report, Demands for Grants (2020-2021) of the Ministry of Earth Sciences, Department-Related 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, Environment, Forests and Climate Change, 
Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha (Presented to the Rajya Sabha on 6th March 2020).  
10 Lok Sabha, the lower house (house of the people) of the Indian parliament, Unstarred Question No. 3991, 6 
August 2014.  
11 Lok Sabha, the lower house (house of the people) of the Indian parliament, Unstarred Question No. 1741, 2 
March 2020 
12 Lok Sabha, the lower house (house of the people) of the Indian parliament, Unstarred Question No. 2005, 9 
March 2016 
13 See for example Lok Sabha, the lower house (house of the people) of the Indian parliament, Unstarred Question 
No. 1389, 4 March 2015, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question No. 4883, 13 August 2014. 
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on to draw an analogy to ‘global commons’ vis-à-vis the Arctic.14 The ministry issued a Draft 
Arctic Policy in 2021 and invited public consultations on the same, but the same has been 
inaccessible since then.  
Judicial: As far as the judiciary in India is concerned, it has never adjudicated a matter 




































14 Supra note 3.  
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Chapter 4 International Treaty law framework in the Arctic and India:  
This is the most important and nuanced chapter of the paper. Under this chapter the author 
has dived deeply into major Arctic Law and policy issues and India’s state practice on those 
issues. Even though the said issues extend beyond the ones covered here, the scope of this 
paper is limited to the issues with which India interacts at some level and hence Indian state 
practice can be ascertained. 
 
Section 4.1 A brief introduction to International Treaty Law:  
As an introduction to the chapter, it would be relevant to delve a bit into the meaning and 
functioning of International Treaties. There is no better place to look than ‘the treaty on 
treaties’1, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Article 2 (1) (a) of the 
convention defines treaties as: 
“ 'treaty' means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation”. Applying reductionism to this 
definition, we see that the critical elements of significance to the current paper are, ‘an 
international agreement’, ‘concluded between states’, and ‘governed by international law’. The 
international nature of an agreement is prerequisite for it to be called a treaty. The scope of 
the agreement should be beyond the jurisdiction of a single state and should have some 
international element to it. Even though the definition mentions only states, paragraph 11 of 
the preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations 1986 notes that 
“international organizations possess the capacity to conclude treaties, which is necessary for 
the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes”.2 Even though the 1986 
convention is not in force, its substantive provisions are accepted as the applicable 
international law.3 Hence we see that an entity possessing an international legal personality 
which is a subject of international law can enter into treaties with other subjects of international 
law. The most pondered upon part of the definition is the intention of such an agreement to 
create obligations under international law. Without attributing intention of creating obligations 
under international law, an agreement would not be recognized as a treaty. How this intention 
is attributed has been an issue of eternal debate among the scholars, academicians, and 
practitioners alike and it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into it. 4 
 
Section 4.2 A brief introduction to Law of the Sea convention:  
Before delving into the Law of the Sea (LOS) convention issues in the Arctic and India’s stance 
on them, it would be a good idea to have a peripheral look into the Law of the Sea convention 
and its relevant provisions. Also known as the constitution of the Seas, The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) which came into force in 1994. It is “an 
international treaty that provides a regulatory framework for the use of the world’s seas and 
oceans, inter alia, to ensure the conservation and equitable usage of resources and the marine 
environment and to ensure the protection and preservation of the living resources of the sea. 
 
1 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007) p 6. 
2 Id p 398. 
3 Supra note 1 at p 400. 
4 Supra note 1 at pp 16-21.  
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UNCLOS also addresses such other matters as sovereignty, rights of usage in maritime 
zones, and navigational rights”.5 The convention consists of seventeen parts and nine 
annexes. The relevant parts for the purpose of this chapter are i) Part II to Part XI concern 
with “the different maritime zones: territorial sea and contiguous zone, straits used for 
international navigation, archipelagic waters, the exclusive economic zone, the continental 
shelf, the high seas, the International Seabed Area, and special provisions on the regime of 
islands and of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas”. ii) Parts XII to XIV are about “specific 
marine activities and questions in all areas: the protection of the environment, marine scientific 
research, and the development and transfer of marine technology”. iii) Part XV and annexes 
5 till 8 concern the settlement of disputes.6  
In terms of jurisdiction, Parts II to VI deal specifically with the question of areas of national 
jurisdiction whereas the later parts deal with the common heritage of mankind i.e., the 
principles and regulations governing the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdictions. 
The convention also set up judicial, quasi-judicial and legislative bodies to enunciate, 
adjudicate and navigate eventualities generated from the application of the provisions of this 
treaty. The International Sea-Bed authority (ISA) was established to regulate the exploration 
and exploitation of the Area. It functions through a supreme policy making body, general 
assembly (akin to the board of directors of a public company7) and a council (functioning as 
an executive committee8) and has the power to not only regulate commercial seabed activities 
but also to engage in seabed mining. An autonomous adjudicatory body called the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) was established with a specialized 
chamber called the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber which has exclusive competence over all 
disputes involving the International Sea-bed Area.9 Last but not least is the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) which facilitates the establishment of the outer limits 
of the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline of a 
state. Such establishment of the outer limit is successful only when the commission 
recommends it. In the further parts of this chapter, these key provisions of the convention shall 
be contextualized and touched upon in detail.  
Before moving into the maritime zone of the continental shelf, it would be relevant to identify 
various maritime zones under the LOS convention and their salient features. The LOS 
convention divides the ocean into six different maritime zones. These zones are drawn using 
a baseline which is set to begin at the low-water line along the coast. Measurement is done in 
Nautical Miles (NMs). One nautical Mile is roughly 1.15 miles on land.   
The first zone is Internal Waters, which are waters that fall landwards of the baseline. Internal 
waters are equivalent to territory on land and no right of any kind of passage to other states is 
permitted. The second zone is the Territorial Sea, which extends to not beyond 12 NMs 
seaward from the baseline. The coastal state enjoys sovereignty and jurisdiction over its 
territorial sea. The rights of the coastal sea extend right from the water to the seabed and 
 
5 Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, The Netherlands. Available at https://pca-
cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos/ accessed on 11 March 2021.  
6 Tullio Treves, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 2008 p 3. Available at: 
https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/uncls/uncls_e.pdf accessed on 11 March 2021.  
7 Law of the Sea: A Policy Primer, chapter 2,  The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University available 
at: https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-two/ accessed on 11 march 2021.  
8 Ibid 
9 Bernardo Zuleta, “Introduction”, in The Law of the Sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with 
Index and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 
Published in cooperation with the United Nations (Sales No. E.83.V.5), 1983) pp xxiv-xxviii.  
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subsoil as well as into the airspace (no vertical limit for state sovereignty has been defined 
yet10). Other states have innocent passage rights through the territorial sea (but not through 
the air11) and transit passage through an international strait (both through water and air12) 
forming part of the territorial seas of the state. The third zone is the contiguous zone which 
serves as a buffer to the territorial sea to prevent and punish infringements of the state’s laws 
and regulations.13 It extends to not more than 24 NMs seaward from the baseline. This zone 
gives jurisdiction to the state only on the surface and floor of the ocean14 but not upwards in 
the air or space. The fourth zone is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This zone was 
created by the LOS convention unlike all the other zones that were in existence previously. It 
extends to not beyond 200 NMs from the baseline. As the name suggests, it gives exclusive 
rights to the coastal state to protect and exploit all the existing and potential resources in the 
water as well as the seabed. Other states enjoy complete freedom of navigation and overflight 
over EEZs save limited restrictions15. The fifth zone is the Continental Shelf. As a norm, a 
state has the rights on continental shelf not beyond the EEZ, i.e., 200 NMs of continental shelf 
belongs to the state as part of the EEZ.16  However when the continental shelf goes beyond 
200 NMs, a state can claim it “throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin”. Certain formulas are provided to calculate the outer 
edge of the continental margin.17 However it can’t extend beyond 350 NMs from the baseline 
or 100 NMs from the 2500-metre isobath18. Same rights and obligations follow here as an EEZ 
except that the state has the right to exploit non-living and sedentary living resources only. 
The sixth zone is referred to as High Seas, which is beyond the EEZ on the surface of the 
water and the water column. This zone when referred to on the seabed beyond the EEZ and 
the claimed continental shelf is known as the Area and is considered the “common heritage of 
mankind”19. The high seas and the Area are beyond national jurisdictions and all states can 
conduct peaceful activities in these areas including sustainable exploitation of commercial 
living resources. For non-living resources, resource exploration and extraction are possible 
only after obtaining a contract from the International Seabed Authority (ISA)20.  
 
10 H. Bertil Nordin, ‘U-2 and the Vertical Boundary of Sovereign Territory’, LinkedIn article, Published on April 24, 
2017. Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/u-2-vertical-boundary-sovereign-territory-h-bertil-nordin/ 
accessed on 12 March 2021.  
11 Supra note 7 chapter 3.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Supra note 7.  
14 U.S. Department of the Navy, Annotated Supplement for the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10), paras. 1.5.1 & 2.4.1 (1989). 
15 Article 234 of the LOS convention states that coastal states which are surrounded by ice covered water areas 
can make laws and regulations also in their EEZs to prevent, control and reduce marine pollution from vessels. 
See, Mark Nevitt, ‘Climate change, Arctic security and why the U.S. should join the U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea’, September 30, 2020, Penn Law. Available at: https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/10524-climate-
change-arctic-security-and-why-the-us/news/cerl-news accessed 12 March 2021.  
16 Article 76 (1), UNCLOS 1982. 
17 To calculate the continental shelf, the states have to determine how far their continental landmass extends under 
water by locating the outer edge of the continental margin. This exercise of locating the outer edge of the continental 
margin has to satisfy the test of appurtenance (showing that the continental margin is in fact appurtenant to the 
continental landmass of the coastal state). To locate the outer edge of the continental margin, the foot of the slope 
has to be ascertained according to the formulae in Article 76 of the UNCLOS. Furthermore, constraint lines must 
be applied so that the continental shelf doesn't extend indefinitely.  
18 Supra note 6. For an animated illustration of calculation of the extended continental shelf see, About the U.S. 
Extended Continental Shelf Project, Office of Ocean and Polar affairs, US department of state. Available at      
https://www.state.gov/about-the-u-s-extended-continental-shelf-project/  accessed on 12 March 2021.  
19 Article 136 LOS convention.  
20 Michael Lodge, ‘The International Seabed Authority and Deep Seabed Mining’, United Nations Chronicle, United 
Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/international-seabed-authority-and-deep-seabed-
mining accessed on 12 March 2021.  
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Section 4.3 International maritime disputes and the Arctic Continental shelf; mutuality 
with the Indian Ocean:   
      
4.3.1 Evolution of Continental Shelf under International Law:  
The maritime zone of Continental Shelf (extended continental shelf) is one of the most 
nuanced and complicated phenomena in the LOS convention. Legal Continental shelf is not 
the same as a geomorphological continental shelf and in fact both are intertwined, and one is 
as hard to determine as the other.21 Even though the concept of continental shelf can be traced 
back to as far as 191022. The earliest epoch-making mention of the Continental Shelf can be 
traced back to the US president Truman’s proclamation in 1945 on ‘United States Jurisdiction 
Over Natural Resources in Coastal Areas and the High Seas’.23 The first major effort to codify 
the scope of the continental shelf doctrine in international law was made in 1958 by the 
adoption of the Geneva convention on the Continental Shelf.24 The concept of continental shelf 
was further consolidated in the Northern Sea Continental Shelf Case of 1969, wherein the ICJ 
propounded the concept of ‘natural prolongation’ of the continental landmass into the sea. The 
court remarked that a coastal state has rights over  "the area of [the] continental shelf that 
constitut[es] a natural prolongation of its land territory”.25It further stated that the coastal state 
had sovereign rights to explore and exploit the continental shelf and that the rights don't 
depend on occupation or express proclamation but are ipso facto and ab initio by the virtue of 
its sovereignty over the area.26 Hence the court came very close to recognizing the sovereignty 
of a coastal state over its continental shelf rather than mere rights of ownership of the 
resources thereof. This sovereignty was ultimately recognized in the UNCLOS provisions.27 
Building upon this principle enunciated by the ICJ, article 76 of the LOS convention 1982, lays 
down the guidelines for identifying and claiming this extended continental shelf. As briefly 
 
21 Even though the legal definitions are adopted on scientific concepts, they are broader in scope such that they 
will accommodate the interests of coastal states with continental shelves of different sizes and features. The LOS 
convention subsumes all the three components of the continental margin, the shelf, slope and rise into one legally 
defined term called the ‘continental shelf’. Whereas scientifically speaking all the three concepts are distinct and 
the continental shelf is just one of the components of the continental margin. See, Baker, Betsy. "Law, Science, 
and the Continental Shelf: The Russian Federation and the Promise of Arctic Cooperation." American University 
International Law Review, vol. 25, no. 2, 2010, pp 264-265.  
In generic terms, the continental shelf can be defined as the extension of the continental landmass into the sea till 
it meets the deep seabed. The continental shelf is a part and parcel of the continental margin. The continental 
margin consists of the shelf which is directly adjacent to the coast and slopes down gradually; the slope which 
comes next to the shelf, is much steeper and drops down sharply; and the rise which is gently inclined and connects 
the slope with deep seabed. See, Cavnar, Anna (2009) "Accountability and the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf: Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 42: Iss. 3, Article 
4 pp 388-389. On continental rise see, Hay, William. (2016). Continental Rise, In the book, Encyclopaedia of Marine 
geosciences, pp 122-124.  
22 In 1910, Portugal prohibited trawling by steam vessels within the limits of the continental shelf of Portugal, up to 
a point where the waters were 100 fathoms deep and a few other later instances where this concept finds mention. 
See V.S. Mani, ‘India’s maritime zones and International Law: a preliminary inquiry’, Journal of the Indian Law 
Institute, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July September 1979), p 365.  
23 Ibid & ‘Proclamations Concerning United States Jurisdiction Over Natural Resources in Coastal Areas and The 
High Seas’, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic 
Matters, Volume II, Press Release Issued by The White House, September 28, 1945, Reprinted from Department 
of State Bulletin, September 30, 1945, P. 484. September 28, 1945. Available at: 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v02/d794 accessed on 12 March 2021. 
24 Young, R. (1958). The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First Impression. American Journal of 
International Law, 52(4), p 733.  
25 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 36, 19; see also id. 43-44, 95-96. 
26 UNHCR, Analysis of North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 20 February 1969, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4023a4c04.html [accessed 16 March 2021] 
27 Article 77, UNCLOS 1982.  
17 
 
mentioned above, the coastal states that intend to establish the outer edge of their continental 
shelf beyond 200 NMs from the baseline shall submit ‘particulars of such limit’28 along with 
supporting scientific and technical data to the CLCS upon which the CLCS will give its final 
and binding recommendations. The CLCS applies the ‘test of appurtenance’ for the states to 
be able to prove the natural prolongation of the continental shelf beyond 200 NMs from the 
baseline.29   
4.3.2 Arctic maritime disputes and solutions: 
Out of the five coastal Arctic states, four of them have submitted their claims of entitlement to 
the Continental Shelf of the central Arctic ocean.30 The US, not being a party to the UNCLOS, 
is not in a position to get recommendations from the CLCS.31 These submissions have 
generated overlapping claims on the Arctic seabed.32 These overlapping claims remain to be 
among the most significant territorial disputes in the Arctic, however, in the 2008 Ilulissat 
Declaration, the A5 states reaffirmed their commitment to solving all the outstanding issues in 
the Arctic through the already existing law of the Sea.33 The CLCS is not an adjudicatory body 
and hence doesn't have the mandate to resolve disputes.34 It works as a cushion against 
potentially manipulated or incorrect/incomplete data and provides independent assessment of 
data submitted by the states. It further makes an unprejudiced recommendation to the coastal 
states which lets the states determine the outer limits of their continental shelf. The delimitation 
of the continental shelves of the Arctic coastal states will have to wait till all of them, except 
the US, definitively establish the outer limits of their continental shelves after getting 
recommendations from the CLCS.35 Even though the coastal states have submitted their 
claims to the commission, nothing prevents them from resolving their claims without the 
recommendation of the commission, in fact they are encouraged to do so.36  
By far in the Arctic, scattered and incomprehensive maritime delimitation agreements vis-a-
vis the continental shelf exist. Denmark and Norway reached an agreement for delimitation of 
 
28 Excerpt from art 4 of Annex II to UNCLOS. 
29 Monahan, Dave; Van de Poll, Robert; and Cockburn, Sara, "Applying the Test of Appurtenance Globally: a new 
inventory of wide margin states from public domain data" (2005). International Hydrographic Review p 79. Available 
at: https://scholars.unh.edu/ccom/1013  accessed on 12 March 2021.  
30 Norway submitted its claims in 2006 and got recommendations in 2009. Russia submitted its original claims in 
2001 and revised claims in 2015, one of which increased the area claimed in the central Arctic ocean. Denmark 
submitted its claim in respect of the Northern Continental Shelf of Greenland in 2014. Canada most recently partially 
submitted its claims in 2019.  
31 The definition of continental shelf under article 76 is considered both by the US and the ICJ to be a part of 
Customary International Law and hence applicable to the US. see, ‘About the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf 
Project’, Office of Ocean and Polar affairs, US department of state. Available at https://www.state.gov/about-the-
u-s-extended-continental-shelf-project/ accessed 13 March 2021 & ICJ, Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment of 18 November 2012, para 118. 
Furthermore, the US has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted in Geneva in 
1958 by the virtue of which, inter alia, it is free to exploit its continental shelf. See, Bjarni Már Magnússon (2017) 
‘Can the United States Establish the Outer Limits of Its Extended Continental Shelf Under International Law?’, 
Ocean Development & International Law, 48:1, pp 2-5, DOI: 10.1080/00908320.2017.1265361 
32 Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in the Arctic Region,” Department of Geography, Durham University, July 
2019, available at https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/Arcticmap2019/IBRUArcticmapJune2019.pdf 
accessed on 13 March 2021.  
33 Ilulissat Declaration 2008.  
34 See CLCS, ‘Note by the Secretariat at Open Meeting of CLCS’, 1 May 2000, Doc. CLCS/26, 20 January 2005, 
para. 9.  
35 See, Gavrilov, V.V. "The LOSC and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean." International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 31, no. 2, 2016, pp. 322-323. 
36 ‘First Report of the International Law Association Committee established to study the outer continental shelf’ 
(2004) 23 pp 22-23 & Michael Sheng-Ti Gau (2009) ‘Third Party Intervention in the Commission on the Limits of 




the continental shelf between Svalbard and Greenland in 2006.37 Norway and Russia signed 
a treaty in 2010 named the ‘Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian 
Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the 
Arctic Ocean’.38 Canada and Denmark entered into an agreement in 1973 regarding the 
delimitation of continental shelf between Greenland and the Canadian Arctic islands except 
for the famous piece of barren rock dispute over Hans Island which remains unresolved till 
date. Among some other unresolved disputes are the Beaufort Sea dispute between Canada 
and the United States, some territories in the Chukchi Sea, the Bering Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean between the US and Russia.39 However it is relevant to note that these agreements 
largely extend only till the 200 NMs EEZ of the parties to agreement and none of them applies 
to the central Arctic ocean seabed. Furthermore, under the rules of procedure of the CLCS, it 
shall not consider or qualify any submission regarding a disputed maritime area.40 This limits 
the ability of the commission to make recommendations to the Arctic states on the outer limits 
of their continental shelf, though the Arctic states have decided to not let the commission be 
restricted by such a limit while making recommendations on the continental shelves in the 
Arctic Ocean.41 The Arctic states are likely to treat the future recommendations of the CLCS 
as tentative and non-binding42 even though they would wait for them before delimiting their 
maritime boundaries. As a matter of fact, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings before 
the CLCS, the decisive part of the delimitation process will be bilateral or multilateral diplomatic 
negotiations43 and the Arctic coastal states are already hinting that their submissions to the 
CLCS are their starting positions at the negotiating table.44 
 
37 Agreement between the government of the kingdom of Norway on the one hand, and the government of the 
kingdom of Denmark together with the home rule government of Greenland on the other hand concerning the 
delimitation of the continental shelf and the fisheries zones in the area between Greenland and Svalbard, 2006, 
UN Treaty collection Volume 2378, I-42887.  
38 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, 2010. English translation. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/NOR-RUS2010.PDF 
accessed on 15 March 2021.  
39 Even though Russia (through the former USSR) and the US signed an agreement on the Maritime Boundary in 
1990, it has not come into force yet because of non-ratification of Russia. Moreover, this treaty is provisionally 
applicable as under Article 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. See, Gavrilov, V.V. "The 
LOSC and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean." International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, vol. 31, no. 2, 2016, pp. 326-327.  
40 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Rules of Procedure 
of the Commission, U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1.  
41 The coastal states have circumvented this limitation by obtaining the consent of the other parties to the dispute 
that they will not object to the recommendations of the commission on the claims of the submitting state and that 
the recommendations will be without prejudice to the subsequent bilateral delimitation. For example, see the US, 
Danish and Russian diplomatic notes submitted with regard to the partial submission made by Canada to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Available at 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can1_84_2019.html accessed on 14 March 
2021.  
42 Supra note 30 at p 338 & McDorman, Ted L. "The Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM: Law and Politics in the 
Arctic Ocean." Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, vol. 18, no. 2, Spring 2009, p. 185.  
43 Under article 83 of the LOS convention, states will decide overlapping claims among themselves. Lev Voronkov, 
The Russian Claim for an Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic, Environmental Policy and Law, 47/2 (2017) p 
93.  
44 As mentioned by a Canadian boundary negotiator on negotiations with the US, “The negotiations have ... 
proceeded on the basis that strict legal principles should not stand in the way of an effort to seek a balanced, fair 
and equitable solution on the lines to be drawn”. See, Lorne Clark, Deputy Negotiator for Mar. Boundaries (Canada-
U.S.A.), House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and 
Forestry, Apr. 11, 1978, 3d Sess., 30th Parl., 1977-1978, Issue No. 15, at 8. For more on negotiations as the final 
dispute settlement mechanisms see, Gavrilov, V.V. "The LOSC and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the 
Arctic Ocean." International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 31, no. 2, 2016, pp. 337-338.  
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4.3.3 Indian state practice: 
India’s earliest position on the Continental shelf can be traced back to the president of India’s 
proclamation on continental shelf in 1955 wherein it is proclaimed that ‘India has, and always 
had, full and exclusive sovereign right over the seabed and sub-soil of the Continental Shelf 
adjoining its territory and beyond its territorial waters’. This proclamation is said to be made 
on the basis of an established international practice that ‘every coastal State has sovereign 
rights over the sea-bed and sub-soil of the Continental Shelf adjoining its territory’.45 Like the 
US president’s proclamation that merely ‘declared’ the sovereign right of a coastal state over 
its continental shelf, these ‘declarations’ as against ‘creation’ of a new right, inter alia, set the 
path forward for the subsequent international legal instruments recognizing the coastal states’ 
rights over their continental shelves.46 Earliest delineation of Continental shelf was done in 
The Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules, 1959, wherein continental shelf is defined as ‘the 
seabed and sub-soil or submarine areas adjacent to the coast of India including its island but 
outside the area of its territorial waters, to a depth of 200 metres, or beyond that limit to where 
the depth of the super jacent water admits of the exploitation of natural resources of the 
areas’.47 It is relevant to compare this definition to the one used in the LOS convention and 
see how far jurisprudence and science of continental shelf have evolved.48 The constitution  
of India, which is the supreme law of the land49, under article 297, demarcates different 
maritime zones of India, asserts India’s ownership over the resources therein in accordance 
with the International law of the sea and bestows upon the parliament of India to specify the 
limits of these maritime zones.50 The scope of the original article 297 was comparatively far 
narrower and included ownership of resources only in the territorial waters. It was amended 
twice to include EEZs and the continental shelf.51 An act of parliament of India passed in 1976 
asserts India’s sovereignty over its continental shelf.52 In light of the above discussion it can 
be reasonably concluded that India’s definition of the concept of the continental shelf and a 
coastal state’s sovereignty over it are in alignment with the prevailing international law of the 
sea regime.53 
Indian parliament enacted ‘the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone 
and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976’ to elaborate upon India’s maritime zones and the rights 
 
45 Ministry of External Affairs Notification, New Delhi, The Gazette of India Extraordinary pt. II, s. 3, (30 August 
1955).  
46 Supra note 22 at 366.  
47 Latest Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules, 1959 notification G.S.R. 1288. Government of India. Available at: 
http://dghindia.gov.in/assets/downloads/l2.pdf accessed 14 March 2021.    
48 This definition sets the depth of the water column as delimiting the continental shelf showing the primitiveness 
in understanding of the concept of continental shelf and restrictions of technology at that time. Whereas in the 
present time, due to technological innovations, the jurisprudence of continental shelf has evolved to be more in 
alignment with the geological and geomorphological science of the continental shelf and hence a position of 
comparative uniformity, clarity, and definiteness of international legal order on the continental shelf.  
49 Abhijit Bhattacharyya, Constitution is the supreme law of the land, Financial Express, October 22, 2015. Available 
at: https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/constitution-is-the-supreme-law-of-the-land/154982/  accessed 15 
March 2021.  
50 The Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976, Constitution of India. Available at: https://www.india.gov.in/my-
government/constitution-india/amendments/constitution-india-fortieth-amendment-act-
1976#:~:text=%22297.,to%20vest%20in%20the%20Union.&text=(2)%20All%20other%20resources%20of,the%2
0purposes%20of%20the%20Union  Accessed on 15 March 2021.  
51 The original text of article 297 read ‘All lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the 
territorial waters of India shall vest in the Union and be held for the purposes of the Union’. For later amendments 
see, the Indian Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, sec. 9 & Indian Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) 
Act, 1976, sec. 2.  
52 The territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, and other maritime zones act, 1976. Act no. 
80 of 1976, 25th August 1976, section 6 (2), government of India. Available at: 
https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1484/2/A1976-80.pdf accessed on 16 March 2021.  
53 See also, supra note 22 at pp 367-368.  
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and obligations arising thereof.54 This act also provides for the delimitation method of drawing 
maritime boundaries with neighbouring coastal states. Under this act, the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries shall be done by an agreement between India and the neighbouring 
coastal state, and by the principle of equidistance in absence of such an agreement.55 India’s 
maritime delimitation method seems to be in alignment with the prevailing international norm 
on the subject matter.56 Except for Pakistan, India has settled its maritime boundaries with all 
the other neighbours.  
4.3.4 Concluding observations: 
From the above discussions it can be inferred that both India and the Arctic states have had 
disputed maritime boundaries over their continental shelves (both continue to have maritime 
boundary disputes) and both have developed their unique approaches to solving them. While 
India has been a party to a major maritime boundary dispute settlement proceeding, the Arctic 
states have been majorly able to proceed on their maritime delimitation through bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations57. It seems likely that the recommendations of the CLCS will have 
minimal impact on maritime boundary negotiations (but hold significant scientific value) among 
the arctic states and mutual concessions will lead to successful negotiations. The ruling of 
CLCS in this case will be keenly watched by the non-Arctic states as to the determination of 
the ‘Area’ in the Arctic Ocean.  However, if the CLCS rules that the submarine elevations and 
ridges (that are now being claimed by the Arctic states to be a part of their continental margins) 
are not a part of the continental margins, the Arctic states effectively are restricted to 200 NMs 
of continental shelf maximizing the Area. Another takeaway from this discussion is how one 
region can learn and implement solutions from the other. For example the grey area in the 
Bay of Bengal among India, Bangladesh and Myanmar wherein the continental shelf 
jurisdiction lies with a state while the water column with another, could take some lessons from 
the tripartite agreement between Iceland, Denmark and Norway for joint exploitation and 
management of the continental shelf in the area between the Faroe Islands, Iceland, mainland 
Norway and Jan Mayen referred to as the Banana hole.58 India’s only so called claim on the 
Arctic seabed would therefore be in the ‘Area’ which would be explored and exploited under 
the supervision of the ISA.  
The LOS convention was negotiated in 1980’s when it was expected that continental shelves 
of the states will be a critical resource of huge value in the future to the states since they will 
54 Supra note 52.  
55 Id, section 9(1).  
56 The equidistant principle has been endorsed by the UNCLOS and has also been used widely around the world 
to delimit maritime boundaries for example between states of the US and also between the US and Mexico. See 
"Federal Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Administrative Boundaries Extending from the Submerged Lands Act 
Boundary seaward to the Limit of the United States Outer Continental Shelf," Federal Register, January 3, 2006 
(Volume 71, Number 1) pp. 127–131. 
57 All the major maritime boundary delimitation breakthroughs in the arctic have happened as a result of 
negotiations between the states, except for the ICJ Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway) (1993).  
58 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Norway, Norway signed maritime delimitation agreements with Iceland 
and Denmark/the Faroe Islands, 30/10/2019. Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norge-
undertegnet-maritime-avgrensningsavtaler-med-island-og-danmarkfaroyene/id2675744/ accessed on 16 March 
2021. 
See Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 22 October 1981. Available at 
https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/ISL-NOR1981CS.PDF 
accessed on 16 March 2021. Also see the treaty forming the joint follow up hydrocarbon regime, Agreement 
between Iceland and Norway concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits, November 3, 2008, available at 
www.nea.is/media/olia/JM_unitisation_agreement_Iceland_Norway_2008.pdf accessed on 16 March 2021.  
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provide oil and gas which will be the lifeline of the global economy.59 Almost half a century 
later, climate change research and awareness has pushed innovation away from oil and gas 
and towards more sustainable sources of energy such as electric, solar, wind etc. in this age 
of renewables, the issues of continental shelf seem to be outdated and are gradually being 
pushed to the periphery. Hence it is estimated that these conventional bones of contention will 
no longer pioneer national strategies and slowly fade out from the global stage as yet another 
evolutionary phenomenon.  
India has been one of the pioneering nation investors in deep seabed mining under the 
auspices of the ISA.60 India got exclusive rights to an area in the central Indian ocean basin 
to explore and develop technologies for mining polymetallic nodules from deep seabed and 
these rights were extended for five more years in 2017.61 These polymetallic nodules are made 
up of almost completely usable minerals whereas the ores mined from land usually yield less 
than 1%. This means a reduction of more than 99% in solid waste and no toxic tailings.62 
However there is a long way to go before this process of extraction from seabed becomes 
economically viable.63 The demand for these minerals is gaining momentum all around the 
world with the convergence of all the technological advancement and countries putting them 
on their critical requirements list.64 Given the Barents region's interest in India, it would be a 
win-win situation for both the parties involved to collaborate on extraction and usage of these 
resources. Though a slightly more far-fetched idea, India’s role could also be significant in 
exploration of the ‘Area’ in the Arctic ocean floor later in the future when conditions allow for 
it. Russia and India are also interested in cooperating over seabed mining, and this would be 
most likely in the Arctic.65  
59 Statement by the chairman of CLCS,  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Delineation of 
the Continental Shelf: Opportunities and Challenges for States: Open Meeting of the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf, Held on 1 May 2000, p 3.  
60 This status of a pioneer investor was granted in 1987. See, Deep Seabed Polymetallic Nodules, Annual Report 
1992-93, Department of Ocean Development, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, available at: 
https://www.moes.gov.in/writereaddata/files/archive/ayr92-93/ar_pmn.htm accessed on 17 March 2021.  
61 PIB Delhi, India’s Exclusive Rights to Explore Polymetallic Nodules from Central Indian Ocean Seabed Basin 
Extended by Five Years, Ministry of Earth Science, Aug 2017. Available at: 
https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1500266 accessed on 18 March 2021.  
62 Polymetallic nodules, DeepGreen Metals. Available at : https://deep.green/nodules/ accessed on 18 March 2021. 
63 See, Aswathi Pacha, ‘Explained | What is India's Deep Ocean Mission’, August 04, 2019, The Hindu. Available 
at: https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/why-is-india-pulled-to-deep-sea-mining/article28809029.ece 
accessed on 18 March 2021.  
64 Hein, J.R., Koschinsky, A. & Kuhn, T. Deep-ocean polymetallic nodules as a resource for critical materials. Nat 
Rev Earth Environ 1, 158–169 (2020).  
65 “We will develop joint strategies to harness the potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of deep-
sea exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources, polymetallic nodules, and other marine resources 
utilizing strengths in the field of maritime research and training to develop mutually beneficial cooperation”. See, 
Ministry of External Affairs India, Saint Petersburg Declaration by the Russian Federation and the Republic of India: 
A vision for the 21st century June 01, 2017, St Petersburg. Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/28507/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_by_the_Russian_Federation_and_the_Republic_of_In
dia_A_vision_for_the_21st_century#:~:text=The%20Declaration%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership,issues%2C
%20as%20well%20as%20close accessed on 19 March 2021.  
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Section 4.4 India and the right of passage/navigation in the Arctic under the law of the 
sea convention.  
4.4.1 The theory of legality of the arctic passages under the LOS convention: 
The right of passage issues manifest in the arctic mainly in the northeastern (specifically the 
northern sea route, NSR) and the northwestern passage (NWP) contiguous to the Russian 
and the Canadian Arctic respectively. Though both the routes have certain similarities vis-a-
vis their legal status under international law, it would be important to analyse them separately 
in context of their utility for India. To begin with let us find similarities between them.66 Both 
pass through maritime zones, parts of which are claimed to be internal waters, territorial seas 
and EEZs by their respective coastal states, however it is difficult to determine precisely which 
segment of the route falls under which maritime zone because of the varying routes taken due 
to changing ice conditions and other factors prevalent at the time of the voyage. Rather than 
consider each segment of the route individually, this part shall deal with the route as a whole 
and touch upon segments wherever relevant. Both contiguous states claim similar titles to the 
waters of the route and the underlying reasons seem to be similar as well. Authors belonging 
to a particular state take the stand which they consider to be the most advantageous to their 
homeland.67 The international law applicable to both the routes is similar and hence it would 
be necessary to scrutinize them under the relevant international law of the sea.  
4.4.1.1 The Northwest passage: 
Starting with the North-western passage, two of the most substantive examinations have been 
done by the Canadian authors Donat Pharand68 and Mark Killas69. What should be determined 
about the NWP is i) if it can fall under one maritime zone and if yes, which Canadian maritime 
zone does it fall under? ii) what is the status of the NWP under international law? As far as the 
status of the NWP under Canadian jurisdiction vis-a-vis the LOS convention, it is claimed by 
Canada that all the passages that comprise the NWP come under internal waters of Canada 
and hence Canada exercises unrestricted sovereignty over them same as it would exercise 
on Canadian land. This claim has to be tested under the elaborated regime of the international 
law of the sea. This claim of internal waters comes from its claim over these waters of the 
NWP as a historic title70 and directly from the fact that in 1985 Canada drew its baseline around 
the whole of Canadian Arctic Archipelago claiming the baseline as “the outer limits [for its] 
historic internal waters”71. To consider Canada’s claim as a historical title, we should delve 
into the history of the concept and see if Canada’s claim is justifiable. The concept of ‘Historical 
title’ over waters has been derived from the concept of ‘Historical waters’ which in turn finds 
its origins in ‘historic bays’. In the early 20th century, in the North Atlantic Fisheries case 
66 To know the similarities in detail, read and compare, DONAT PHARAND, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest 
Passage: A Final Revisit, Ocean Development & International Law, 38:3–69, 2007 & Philipp Kastner, International 
legal dimensions of the Northern Sea Route, Marcus Matthias Keupp (Ed.) The Northern Sea Route, Springer 
Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015 pp 39-52.  
67 Generally observing, Authors of the contiguous state conclude that their state enjoys sovereign rights of the 
highest order in respect of the arctic passage in question, whereas the contrary is observed when authors of the 
competitive states write about the same arctic passage. For example, see American authors views on the NWP, 
James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage, The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, Vol 22, No 2 Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007 & Canadian author views, DONAT PHARAND, The Arctic 
Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit, Ocean Development & International Law, 38:3–69, 2007.  
68 Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit, Ocean Development & 
International Law, 38:3–69, 2007.  
69 Mark Killas, The Legality of Canada's Claims to the Waters of its Arctic Archipelago, 1987 19-1 Ottawa Law 
Review 95, 1987 CanLIIDocs 20, <https://canlii.ca/t/2bsn>, retrieved on 2021-03-30.  
70 Supra note 68 at p 4.  
71 Statement in the House of Commons by Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, Canada, House of 
Commons, Debates, 6462–6464, 10 Sept. 1985, reproduced in Dep’t. of External Affairs, Statement Series 85/49 
and in 24 Canadian Yearbook of International Law, p 418.  
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between the UK and US, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) for the first time 
propounded a clear test to determine titles over historic bays.72 The PCA observed that “a 
State could claim a historic bay when sovereignty is asserted with the acquiescence of 
other states over areas that have particularly important national security, 
geographic, or economic characteristics”.73 In this case UK’s historic title to certain bays 
off the Newfoundland coast was recognized. John Westlake also cited the bays of 
Chesapeake and Delaware and the Bay of Cancale as similar examples of historic 
sovereignty based on "recognised immemorial usage”.74 In 1951 in the Anglo Norwegian 
fisheries case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave this definition for historic 
waters. “By "historic waters" are usually meant waters which are treated as internal waters 
but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic title”.75 
The court laid down a five part definitive test {(1) jurisdiction as internal waters over the 
claimed area (2) over a long period of time (3) without opposition from other States 
(4) continuously pursued and (5) notoriously asserted}76 to determine claims of a coastal 
state over its historic waters which has been largely subscribed by the international 
community at large till date. The secretariat of the UN in 1958, recognized the broader 
scope of historic waters and that historic bays were a part of historic waters.77 Therefore 
from the above it can be concluded that in order for a successful claim of a historical title 
to an area as internal waters, the coastal state must pass the five-part test laid down by the 
ICJ.  
For the convenience of easier understanding without losing the essence of the five-part test, 
we can boil it down to a one liner: Whether the coastal state has enjoyed effective78 and 
regular79 sovereignty over the area for a substantial length of time80 and had a notorious81 
acquiescence82 of other affected states83?84  
72 Mirasola, Christopher. "Historic Waters and Ancient Title: Outdated Doctrines for Establishing Maritime 
Sovereignty and Jurisdiction." Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, vol. 47, no. 1, January 2016, p 35.  
73 N. AtI. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910)  at 197, 206-207.  
74 John Westlake, International Law, pp 191-192 (2d edition 1910). 
75 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. p 130.  
76 Id at pp 130 & 136-37.  
77 United Nations, Memorandum prepared by the UN Secretariat on Historic Bays: Doc. A/Conf. 13/1 (1957) p 2. 
78 Effective sovereignty would amount to commanding such authority over the area as to taking such steps as 
necessary to assert and carry out its ownership and control over any land territory it has. See Donat Pharand,  
‘Historic Waters in International Law with Special Reference to the Arctic’, The University of Toronto Law Journal, 
Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 1971), p 7.   
79 More commonly known as continuity of possession, “the real criterion for the continuity of possession is its 
regularity, i.e., its conformity with what is commonly regarded as regular practice in respect of the type of territory 
in question. The ascertainment of regular sovereignty is fact intensive and hence varies on a case-to-case basis”. 
See Yehuda Blum, Historic Titles in International Law (1965) p 111. 
80 “As a general rule, it may be said that the length of time must be very substantial, without being necessarily 
immemorial”. See supra note 68 at p 7.  
81 Notoriety and acquiescence are mingled up such that the latter is not enforceable without the earlier. There ought 
to be widely available knowledge in public about the area so claimed under a historic title. See, D.H.N. Johnson, 
Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L., (1950)   p 347. Furthermore, notoriety is sufficient 
when it could be determined that the claimant state has exercised effective and regular sovereignty over the area 
and that other states had constructive knowledge of such an exercise of sovereignty. See supra note 79 at pp 144-
145. 
82 The criterion for acquiescence is fulfilled when there is no real protest. A real protest will “be made by all 
reasonable and lawful means, and the nature of the means and the vigour with which the protest is made will 
depend upon the gravity of the threat and the nature of the rights violated”. See supra note 68 at p 8.  
83 It is important to note here that the area under consideration i.e., the NWP is being acted upon in the present, 
but these actions are highly founded upon what this area entails in the future i.e., melting of ice and removal of 
barriers to shipping and usage of the Arctic passages. In such a case, affected states are all those states that are 
directly affected (for example the US) as well as those which anticipate their relevance to the affected area in the 
future, which might not be relevant at present (for example China in this case).  
84 This one liner encompasses jurisprudence of decades and hence is very wide in scope. To condense and use it 
for the purpose of this paper, the interpretation of individual concepts is taken from discussions by various authors 
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The author would like to agree with Donat Pharand here in stating that Canada is not in a 
position to pass the one liner test formulated above.85 As stated by Donat, historically, neither 
the British nor the Canadian explorers ever claimed or took possession of the Arctic waters 
over Canada and it was only in 1973 that the claim for historic internal waters was made in 
respect of the Canadian Arctic waters. This shows the lack of enjoyment of sovereignty for a 
substantial length of time. Furthermore, the US and the European Commission (EC) member 
states sent notes of protest over such a claim by Canada.86 The US and the EC states 
maintained that there was no basis in international law to sustain the Canadian claim and that 
they reserved the right to exercise their rights in those waters according to international law 
respectively. Hence the affected states have not given acquiescence to Canadian claims and 
transit of US vessels shows that the protests are real.87 Canada has also failed to exercise 
effective sovereignty when it failed to subject foreign vessels to prior authorization before 
entering the NWP.88 This concludes the appraisal of the claim of Canada on the NWP on 
ground of a historical title and we see that Canada does not have a historical title to the waters 
of the NWP. Hence Canada can’t claim the NWP to be its internal waters on the basis of 
historical title.  
Next in the line of appraisals is the claim that the NWP is Canadian internal waters on the 
basis of the straight baselines drawn by it around the Canadian archipelago. UNCLOS took 
into account the peculiar circumstances of states with highly indented and cut into coastlines 
and states with fringes of islands along the coast and under article 7 allowed them to draw 
straight baselines. Canadian method of delimitation of baselines indicates that it considers its 
coastline as deeply indented and its islands to be “a fringe of islands along the coast in its 
immediate vicinity” under article 7 (1) rather than an archipelagic state under part IV of the 
LOS convention.89 Hence its method of drawing baselines will be scrutinized under the regime 
of article 7 of the UNCLOS.    
The ICJ in Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case held that, generally, two geographical features 
which warranted usage of straight baseline method were a deeply indented coast and an 
archipelago bordering a coast (a fringe of islands). The same concepts were then incorporated 
under article 7 (1) of the LOS convention. The concepts of ‘deeply indented coast’ and ‘an 
archipelago bordering a coast’ were broadly interpreted and not defined in detail by the court. 
It merely gave illustrations to reference the Norwegian coast of Eastern Finnmark and 
Skjaergaard as types of localities where the straight baseline method could be used.90  
 
as stated in the aforementioned notes, but significantly from ‘Interpreting Requirements for Historic Waters’ by 
Christopher Mirasola supra note 72 at pp 60-67.  
85 Supra note 68 at p 13.  
86 The EC states’ note of protest mentioned objections to drawing of straight baselines that the criterion for general 
direction of the coast was not met. The US note of protest also maintained the straight baselines to be “contrary to 
established principles of international Law of the Sea” and hence not valid.  See, US department of state, Bureau 
of oceans and international environment and scientific affairs, Limits in the seas no. 112, United States response 
to excessive national maritime claims, 9th March 1992, pp 29-30. Available at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/LIS-112.pdf accessed on 20 March 2021.  
87 US vessels transited through the NWP in 1969 and 1985 forcing both states to reach a practical agreement 
wherein both agreed to stand by their positions on legality of the passage. Moreover, the US agreed to ask for 
permission for future transits and Canada agreed to grant permission. See, Canada and United States of America, 
Agreement on arctic cooperation. Signed at Ottawa on 11 January 1988 & Steinberg, Philip E. "Steering between 
Scylla and Charybdis: The Northwest Passage as Territorial Sea." Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 
45, no. 1, 2014, p 97.  
88 Supra note 68 at pp 9-13.  
89 Baselines of the territorial sea, fisheries and oceans canada, government of canada, 2018. Available at: 
https://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/hydrography-hydrographie/canada-territorial-waters-eng.html accessed on 21 
March 2021.  
90 Supra note 75 at pp 129-130.  
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On the other hand, the usage of the word ‘immediate vicinity’ in the LOS convention would 
warrant close geographical proximity of the islands to the mainland. Some authors are of the 
view that the Canadian archipelago is too large to be called a “fringe”.91 A reading of the official 
US position on article 7 (1) indicates that the US would also be against classifying the 
Canadian archipelago as a ‘fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity’.92 
Judge Read in his dissenting judgement specifically mentioned Canada as having coastlines 
that are comparable to the northern coast of Norway.93 In concurrence with Donat Pharand, 
Professor William Burke (an American scholar) and  Bruce McKinnon, the author is of the view 
that applying the criteria laid down by the court in fisheries case and giving a liberal 
interpretation to article 7 (1), it can be concluded that the Canadian Arctic archipelago is ‘a 
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity’.94 Hence Canada fulfils the 
geographical requirements to draw straight baselines around its Arctic archipelago.95  
Now we shall see if Canada has rightfully applied the criteria for drawing straight baselines. 
The ICJ, in the Anglo Norwegian fisheries case held that the method of straight baselines was 
not an exception to the rule of drawing baselines but a specific application of a general rule96 
whereas language of article 5 of the UNCLOS makes it clear that the straight baseline method 
is an exception to the normal baseline i.e., low-water line. However, some scholars agree with 
the views of the ICJ and are of the view that the underlying basis of the general rule is that the 
baseline should follow the general direction of the coast. As long as the general direction of 
the coast is maintained, the straight baseline rule is just a specific application of the general 
rule.97 The author also subscribes to this notion.  
However, these straight baselines are “[i)] not [to] depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast, and [ii)] the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters”98. These two 
conditions are to be compulsorily fulfilled in order for the state to be able to draw straight 
baselines. This doctrine of straight baselines was additionally warranted by historical title of 
these states on these waters and supported by considerations of geography and economics.99 
Hence article 7 (5) allows for consideration “of economic interests peculiar to the region 
concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage”. This 
is an optional criterion which a state may not fulfill. The above three criteria are derived from 
the Anglo Norwegian fisheries case and shall be used to test if Canada has rightfully applied 
the criteria for drawing straight baselines. The aforementioned three criteria test will be useful 
in this case; however, the third criterion is optional and hence need not be examined. It is 
relevant here to note that a coastal state has the ultimate sovereignty to draw baselines around 
 
91 Sternheim, Michael. "Regulating the Northwest Passage." Loyola Maritime Law Journal, vol. 10, no. 1, Fall 2011, 
pp 184-185.  
92 Limits in the seas no. 106, United States response to excessive national maritime claims, US department of 
state, Bureau of oceans and international environment and scientific affairs, 9th March 1992, pp 16-26.  
93 Supra note 76 at p 193.  
94 Supra note 69 at pp 16-17.  
95 As mentioned in note 68 that authors of the contiguous state conclude that their state enjoys sovereign rights of 
the highest order in respect of the arctic passage in question, here that factor is mitigated when an American 
scholar and a judge of the ICJ are of similar point of view as Canadian authors. For the view of the authors 
mentioned see, supra note 69 at pp 16-17.  
96 Supra note 75 at pp 129-131. 
97 Supra note 68 at p 14.  
98 Article 7 (3) UNCLOS 1982.  
99 Supra 72 at p 49. 
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its coast but the validity of such a baseline in regard to other states will depend upon 
international law.100  
Firstly, in regard to the general direction of the coast, it is observed by the court that departure 
from general direction should be within reasonable limits such that it is not a distortion of the 
general direction. While applying this criterion, the general direction of a coast is determined 
by not looking at only one sector of the coast but rather the general direction of the coast on 
a small scale map, except in cases of blatant abuse.101 As observed by both Pharand and 
Killas, the author agrees that this criterion has been broadly interpreted by the court and the 
underlying reason to include it in the LOS convention was to prevent blatant abuse of the 
straight baselines method by laying unjustified claims on large sea areas102. In Fact the 
purpose of the whole exercise of interpretation is to establish the objective intentions of the 
parties.103 Further as Pharand points out that this criterion of general direction of the coast is 
fulfilled when using the ‘Robinson projection’ rather than the commonly used  ‘Lambert conic 
projection’.104 The author seconds this conclusion and hence is of the opinion that, in spite of 
contrary views by the US and the EC member states, the Canadian coast satisfies the general 
direction of the coast criterion insofar as it qualifies the purpose for introduction of this article 
in the LOS convention.  
Coming to the second compulsory part of the test, the court upheld the primity of land over 
water and said that the real test would be to determine if the areas of water lying within the 
straight baselines “are sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime 
of internal waters”105. As regards to this part of the test, the same can be concluded as the 
first part i.e., the court interpreted the rule liberally and in agreement with Pharand, the author 
concludes that Canada fulfills the second part of the two-part test as well. To sum it up, 
Canadian straight baselines fulfill the geographical requirements for drawing straight 
baselines. One last point for consideration is the length of the straight baselines. Even though 
article 10 of the LOS convention provides a 24 NMs limit for bays, article 10 (6) exempts 
straight baselines drawn under article 7 from such a limit. One last look at the observations of 
the ICJ indicates that the court had a liberal approach in interpreting baseline lengths and held 
that a coastal state was in a better position to determine those lengths after judging local 
conditions and as long as there was no manifest abuse, there could be no maximum lengths 
set for straight baselines.106 Hence it can be concluded that the straight baselines drawn by 
Canada satisfy the tests of article 7 of the LOS convention and waters of NWP are internal 
waters of Canada.  
However, the real bone of contention and a question of broader international significance is 
the legal status of the NWP. It has to be determined whether i) there exists the right of innocent 
passage under article 8 (2) or ii) it is a strait used for international navigation and hence the 
right of innocent/transit passage exists or iii) both or iv) neither? 
To begin with, let us determine whether under article 8 (2) of the UNCLOS, there exists a right 
of innocent passage. Under article 8 (2), if the straight baselines led to making of new internal 
waters which were not designated as such earlier, there shall be a right to innocent passage 
 
100 Supra note 75 at p 132.  
101 Supra note 68 at p 18.  
102 Supra note 69 at p 119.  
103  Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties, Oxford university press, 2014, p 56.  
104 Supra note 68 at pp 18-19.  
105 This quote from supra note 75 at p 133 was used to phrase a part of article 7 (3) of the UNCLOS.  
106 Supra note 75 at pp 131-132.  
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in those waters. In such a case, it would be indispensable to determine the status of the waters 
of the NWP before they were declared internal waters by Canada. As seen in the previous 
sections, Canada’s claim to the NWP waters as a historic title does not stand under 
international law and hence Canada has drawn its straight baselines on the basis of article 7 
of the LOS convention. Barring the claim of historic waters, Canada, under no other provision 
can claim that the Arctic archipelagic waters were internal waters before it drew the straight 
baselines (and this claim failed our test previously). Hence, we see that the waters of the NWP 
were in part territorial seas of Canada before the drawing of straight baselines in 1985. 
Consequently, in agreement with Pharand, the author also opines that there existed the right 
of innocent passage through parts of NWP which were territorial seas of Canada before 1985 
and the right of passage through the parts that were high seas.107  
Next comes the question whether there exists the right of innocent passage after the straight 
baselines drawn in 1985. Here the author would like to take a different stream of approach 
than Pharand. Pharand claims that Canada drew the straight baselines in accordance with 
customary law applied by the ICJ in the fisheries case. The author has already clarified and 
would like to reiterate that Canada drew straight baselines under article 7 of the LOS 
convention. The author would like to emphasize here the reasoning of Judge Hackworth who 
agreed with the operative part of the judgement (that Norway was acting rightfully under 
international law in drawing straight baselines) but for the reason that Norway proved historic 
title to the disputed areas of water.108 Therefore in the view of the author, under customary 
law, a state can draw straight baselines only if it satisfies the test for a historic title to waters 
as discussed in the previous paragraphs. In the present case, Canada failed to satisfy the test 
and hence cannot draw straight baselines under customary international law. Furthermore, 
under article 18 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, Canada is obliged to refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it had already signed 
the treaty.109 The third line of reasoning110 taken by Pharand to reach his conclusion that no 
right of innocent passage exists after the 1985 drawing of straight baseline goes against article 
18 of the VCLT. As rightly pointed out by Steinberg, according to Kraska, there lies another 
problem with seeking to deny the right of innocent passage by claiming special status of 
straight baselines drawn before the LOS convention came into force for the coastal state 
drawing such baselines.111 Kraska has denounced this approach as opening the floodgates 
for such claims all around the world and defeating the purpose of the LOS convention as one 
gigantic package deal to govern the oceans.112 Therefore to sum up, there exists a right of 
innocent passage through NWP under article 8 (2) of the LOS convention.  
Moving to the question whether the NWP can be considered to be a strait used for international 
navigation and hence the right of innocent/transit passage exists. Part III of the UNCLOS 
stipulates the rights of the coastal states and the freedoms enjoyed by other states in straits 
used for international navigation. There are certain qualifications to the provisions mentioned 
therein which will be dealt with in this part. Even though the LOS convention does not define 
what is meant by ‘a strait used for international navigation’, article 37 simply states straits used 
 
107 Supra note 68 at pp 42-43.  
108 Supra note 75 at p 144.  
109 Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.  
110 “Canada did not become a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (which entered into force in November 
1994) until 2003, nearly 20 years after drawing its Arctic baselines”. Supra note 68 at p 43.  
111 Philip E. "Steering between Scylla and Charybdis: The Northwest Passage as Territorial Sea." Ocean 
Development and International Law, vol. 45, no. 1, 2014 p. 90.  
112  Kraska, James. "The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage." International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, vol. 22, no. 2, June 2007, p 272.  
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for navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas 
or an EEZ. Kraska and Pharand differ as to what criteria should an international strait meet in 
order to be brought under part III and hence the right of transit passage be exercised therein. 
James Kraska is of the opinion that under conventional international law, a strait needs to 
satisfy only geographical criterion whereas Pharand, relying authority on the ICJ case in Corfu 
channel, contend that under customary international law, a strait has to satisfy both the 
geographical as well as functional criteria. Pharand has gone as far as saying that customary 
international law is the only law applicable to this question.113 Both Kraska and Pharand agree 
that the geographical criterion is met for the NWP to be an international strait.114 As far as the 
functional criterion is concerned, Pharand is of the opinion that in the Corfu channel case, the 
court devised the test of historically useful maritime routes. In order for a strait to be called an 
international strait under part III of the LOS convention, it should satisfy the functional criterion 
whereunder a strait should have had “a history as a useful route for international maritime 
traffic”115. On the other hand, Pharand also agrees that the burden of proof under functional 
criterion in the Corfu channel case was fairly high and that in relation to the NWP, the same 
burden of proof would be relatively lower because of peculiar conditions such as absence of 
alternative route, difficulty of navigation and remoteness of the region.116  
The author finds the argument convincing that the NWP is an international strait under part III 
of the UNCLOS. Under the LOS convention there is no mention of the functional criterion as 
relied upon by Pharand and hence a strait needs to satisfy only the geographical criterion. 
Furthermore, UNCLOS is the codification and progressive development of the customary 
International law of the law of the sea. The aim of the law of the sea is to balance sovereign 
rights of a coastal state with the shared interests of the global community.  
Assuming arguendo that both geographical and functional tests have to be met, using the 
approach of liberal interpretation of criteria used in the aforementioned paragraphs and as 
rightly pointed out by Pharand, it can be deducted that the threshold for meeting the functional 
criterion would be lower in the NWP due to peculiar conditions of the region. It is important to 
note that the number of transits more than tripled in a decade from 1999 till 2009 and remained 
one short of double from 2009 to 2019.117 Pharand notes in his 2007 article that 69 transits 
had taken place over the last 100 years.118 However in about one tenth of the time period, 
more than double transits have taken place between 2007 and 2019.119 This threshold would 
be met by the accelerating transits happening through the NWP in recent years. Hence to 
conclude, it can be said that the NWP is ‘a strait used for international navigation’ under part 
III of the LOS convention and hence a right of transit passage exists through the NWP.  
To conclude this study and answer the original questions, it can be said that the waters of the 
NWP are internal waters of Canada and the NWP is an international strait under part III of the 
UNCLOS and there exist both the right of transit passage as well as the right of innocent 
passage through the NWP.  
 
113 Supra note 68 at p 36. 
114 Kraska, James. "The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage." International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law, vol. 22, no. 2, June 2007, p 275 & Supra note 68 at p 36.  
115 Supra note 68 at p 35.  
116 Ibid at p 44.  
117 Transits in 1999 were 4. Transits in 2009 were 13 and in 2019 there were 24 transits. See R. K. Headland and 
colleagues, ‘Transits of The Northwest Passage to End of the 2019 Navigation Season, Atlantic Ocean ↔ Arctic 
Ocean ↔ Pacific Ocean’, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, Lensfield Road, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom, CB2 1ER, 17 March 2020.  
118 Supra note 68 at 37-38.  
119 Supra note 117.  
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4.4.1.2 The Northern Sea Route:  
Undertaking a similar study for the NSR, questions will be answered as to i) whether the NSR 
can fall under one particular maritime zone of Russia and if yes, which zone?; ii) Is the claim 
of internal waters to the waters of NSR by drawing straight baselines rightful under 
international law? iii) what is the legal status of the NSR under international law and whether 
there exist/s the right/s of innocent passage and/or transit passage through it?  
It would be relevant to first designate the geographical extent of the NSR for the purpose of 
this study. Contrary to the relatively clear 7 routes120 of the NWP, in general there are three 
navigational routes i.e. coastal, middle and transit that vessels take sailing through the NSR.121 
For the purpose of this study, we shall demarcate the NSR to be what it is defined under 
Russian domestic law. The eastern limit of the NSR is Provideniya Bay in the Bering Strait 
and the western limit is entrance to the Kara Gate Strait.122 The southern limit is of course the 
northern landmass of Russia bordering those waters. As far as the northern limit is concerned, 
it varies according to sea ice and other conditions and the route consists of 58 different 
possible strait connections.123 Therefore it is difficult to determine the northern limit of the 
route. However, it would be reasonable to conclude that it traverses through multiple maritime 
zones of Russia and hence it is not possible to say that the NSR falls under one particular 
maritime zone of Russia. Since the northern limit of the route can go as far as the North pole 
and beyond124, for the purpose of this study we shall confine the route to waters that Russia 
has claimed to be internal waters after it drew straight baselines enclosing the archipelagos 
along the route in 1985.125  
Following the same process of scrutiny as utilized in the earlier part regarding NWP, we shall 
first determine whether Russia has drawn straight baselines rightfully i) under the claim of a 
historic title to the NSR waters or ii) under article 7 (1) of the LOS convention.   
Firstly, analyzing the historic title of Russia over the waters of NSR, we shall have to see if 
this claim passes the one liner test arrived at after summarizing the five-part test by the ICJ in 
the previous part. To rewrite the test, whether Russia has enjoyed effective and regular 
sovereignty over the area for a substantial length of time and had a notorious acquiescence 
of other affected states?126 We shall analyse every part of the test vis-a-vis the Russian claim 
and utilise the theory ‘the whole is a sum of its parts’. As far as effective sovereignty is 
concerned, prima facie it seems that Russia has exercised effective sovereignty over waters 
of the NSR throughout history. Right from the discovery of the route127, to its utilization and 
 
120 Supra note 68 at pp 29-30.  
121 Caitlyn Antrim, Geography and Jurisdiction in The Maritime Arctic, Geographical Review 107 (1): p 42, January 
2017.  
122 Alexander Vylegzhanin, Ivan Bunik, Ekaterina Torkunova & Elena Kienko (2020) Navigation in the Northern 
Sea Route: interaction of Russian and international applicable law, The Polar Journal, 10:2, p 286. 
123  Lawson W. Brigham et al, The Natural and Societal Challenges of The Northern Sea Route, Central Marine 
Research and Design Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia, p3, 1999.  
124 Ibid  
125 Supra note 123 at p 297. See Russian straight baselines enclosing the archipelagos along the route at, Russia: 
Straight Baseline Claim, The Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, US Navy. Available at: 
https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/RussiaChart.pdf accessed on 22 March 2021.  
126 For detailed analysis on the method of arriving at this one liner test, see notes 79-85 and the text thereof.  
127 The achievement of discovering the NSR belongs to Russian seamen of the 16th and the 17th century. See, 
Ola Johannessen & Vitaly Alexandrov et al, Remote Sensing of Sea Ice in the Northern Sea Route: Studies and 
Applications, 2007, Springer-Praxis Books in Geophysical Sciences, p 6. Furthermore, the right of discovery was 
enough to claim ownership under the then existing international law. See Viatcheslav V. Gavrilov (2015) Legal 
Status of the Northern Sea Route and Legislation of the Russian Federation: A Note, Ocean Development & 
International Law, 46:3, p 258.  
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subsequent claim of ownership and actual control128 make Russian claim as one exercising 
effective sovereignty. Russian regulations governing the NSR have failed to categorically 
claim it in its entirety under internal waters.129 Only the Dmitrii Laptev and Sannikov straits 
have been specifically claimed as internal waters. There have been inconsistencies between 
different regulations issued on the recognition and governance of the NSR waters vis-a-vis 
their legal status under the Russian maritime zones.130 This shows that the element of regular 
sovereignty is missing from the claim.  
The next part of the test is determining whether Russia has enjoyed a notorious acquiescence 
from other affected states. Russia has published its domestic laws regarding the regulation of 
areas of the NSR numerous times over the past century, but other states have generally not 
objected to such laws and regulations131, except for the consistent US notes of protest132. 
However, an important incident to note is the successful passage of the US icebreakers 
through NSR in the 1960s and a subsequent challenge by Russia leading to cancellation of 
the future American plans for passage.133 A few states protested initially when Russia drew 
straight baselines but these protests have fainted away as Russia has solidified its position on 
the NSR.134 Another important thing to note is that the legal regime governing the NSR itself 
notes of foreign use in these areas.135  
In conclusion to the test of historic title, it is difficult to establish that Russia has a historic title 
to the waters of the NSR so as to categorize them as ‘internal waters’. The protests of the US 
in the past can be considered to be ‘real protests’. Moreover, presence of foreign vessels and 
inconsistencies in claims also inhibit bestowing of such a historic title. As the International Law 
commission notes, “the scope of the historic title emerging from the continued exercise of 
sovereignty should not be wider in scope than the scope of the sovereignty actually 
exercised”.136 Therefore the waters on which sovereignty was formerly exercised as territorial 
sea cannot be later claimed as ‘internal waters owing to a historic title over those waters’. 
Hence the Russian claim to the waters of NSR as internal waters based on a historic title is 
unsuccessful and Russia is not in a position to draw straight baselines claiming historic title to 
the waters of the NSR.    
 
128 Russia (former USSR) has identified the NSR as a national maritime transportation route since the early 20th 
century and has constantly developed its governance and navigational regime as internal waters. See supra note 
122 pp 286-293 & supra note 123 at pp 222-223.   
129 Jan Jakub Solski, ‘Navigational rights of warships through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – all bark and no 
bite?’ May 31 2019, The blog of the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea, University of Tromso. Available at 
https://site.uit.no/nclos/2019/05/31/navigational-rights-of-warships-through-the-northern-sea-route-nsr-all-bark-
and-no-bite/ accessed on 23 March 2021 & Gudev P.A. The Northern Sea Route: Problems of National Status 
Legitimization Under International Law. Part I. Arktika i Sever [Arctic and North], 2020, no. 40, p 127.  
130 R. Douglas Brubaker, The Russian Arctic Straits. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, pp 34-35.  
131  For example, the act of 1932 establishing a special legal status of the NSR. There was also no objection to the 
decree establishing the sector lines in the Arctic in 1926. See supra note 122 at pp 286-289.  
132 For example, in 1965 and later in 2015. See Kamil Bekyashev, Russia’s New Rules for Northern Sea Route 
Violate International Law, March 12, 2019, Polygraph.Info. Available at: https://www.polygraph.info/a/fact-check-
russia-claim-arctic/29817535.html accessed on 25 March 2021 & Gavrilov, 2015, supra note 128 at p 259.  
133 In the early 1960s US icebreakers made repeated passage through the NSR, however in 1967 a refusal by the 
USSR led to cancellation of planned voyages of the US icebreakers. After this 1967 incident, neither the US nor 
other states have overtly challenged Russia’s claim on NSR. See Philipp Kastner, International legal dimensions 
of the Northern Sea Route, Marcus Matthias Keupp (Ed.) The Northern Sea Route, Springer Fachmedien 
Wiesbaden 2015 pp 46-47.  
134 Id at p 41.  
135 N. Koroleva, V. Markov and A. Ushakov, Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic, INSROP Working 
Paper No. 94 - 1997, IV.3.1, pp. 23-24.  
136 Documents of the fourteenth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly, Yearbook 
of The International Law Commission, 1962 Volume II p 23.  
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Moving on to the next part, we shall now see if Russia has drawn straight baselines rightfully 
under article 7 (1) of the LOS convention. The Russian position vis-a-vis the NSR is more 
coherent than the Canadian position vis-a-vis the NWP137 If by liberally interpreting article 7 
(1) & 7 (3) and applying the criteria laid down by ICJ in the fisheries case, Canada can fulfill 
the criteria, Russia is in a stronger position to fulfill the same criteria. It is relevant to note that 
the doctrine of straight baselines was additionally warranted by historical title of states on 
these waters and supported by considerations of geography and economics.138 Hence Russia 
has drawn straight baselines rightfully under article 7 (1) of the LOS convention.     
Now we shall conduct the final part of the study in determining what is the legal status of NSR 
under international law. At this stage it would be relevant to say that previously we have 
demonstrated that Russia has rightfully drawn straight baselines under article 7(1) of the LOS 
convention. However, the claim of straight baselines under a historic title could not be 
established to the entire NSR waters which reflects in the straight baselines drawn by 
Russia.139 Now as far as the right of innocent passage goes through the waters of the NSR, it 
can be concluded that there exists such a right. Since the Russian claim to the waters as 
internal waters on the basis of a historic title has failed our test, there is a right of innocent 
passage under article 8 (2) of the LOS convention. This is further supported by the explicit 
recognition of the right of innocent passage of all vessels through territorial waters under a 
1989 agreement between the US and the USSR.140  
Next is the determination whether the straits through which the NSR passes, are straits 
considered to be ‘a strait used for international navigation’ under part III of UNCLOS and hence 
the right of innocent/transit passage exists? Drawing conclusions on analogous stream of 
reasoning as used for NWP141, the author is of the view that the straits through which the NSR 
passes are international straits within the meaning of part III of the UNCLOS and hence the 
right of transit passage exists through those straits. Firstly, the geographical function is met. 
Secondly the growth in volume of transits should be sufficient to pass the proportionally lower 
threshold of the functional test laid down in the corfu channel case.142  
Hence to conclude this part, we can see that the Arctic passages cannot be treated as historic 
waters and hence do not qualify for a historic title for their respective states. However, Canada 
and Russia have rightfully drawn straight baselines under provisions of UNCLOS but the right 
of innocent passage and transit passage under part III of the UNCLOS exist through those 
passages. This concludes the theory of legality of the Arctic passages.  
 
4.4.2 The practical aspect of the Arctic passages: determining legality of arctic 
passages’ regulations vis-a-vis article 234 of UNCLOS. 
In the previous part we assessed the legal status of the arctic passages vis-a-vis the 
international law of the sea. However, we see that the situation on ground level is not what 
 
137 Geographically speaking all the islands enclosed by Russia in its straight baselines are far closer in distance to 
the Russian mainland than the islands enclosed by Canada in its straight baselines. The Russian islands are also 
closer to being a ‘fringe’ as defined by the ICJ in the fisheries case. See note 90 and the text thereof.  
138 Supra 72 at p 49. 
139 Furthermore, these straight baselines cannot be drawn according to customary law as some authors have 
suggested. For the reasons, refer to note 109 and the text thereof.  
140 Lowe, Vaughan. "USA/USSR." International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, vol. 
6, no. 1, February 1991, p. 73-76.  
141 Refer to notes 113-119 and the text thereof.  
142 Atle Staalesen, Shipping on Northern Sea Route breaks record, December 22 2020, the Barents observer. 
Available at: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2020/12/shipping-northern-sea-route-breaks-record 
accessed on 25 March 2021.  
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came out as a result of our tests of legality. In fact, both Russia and Canada regulate 
international transits through these Arctic passages substantially owing to article 234 of the 
LOS convention. Before delving into the details of Article 234, it is important to have a brief 
look at the chain of events and regulations that led to the inclusion of Article 234 in the LOS 
convention. After the incident of passage of the American vessels through the Arctic passages 
in the late 1960s, the Canadian government passed stricter regulations for controlling marine 
pollution by vessels in the Arctic waters. At the time it was felt that the regulations were in 
excess of the authority provided to a coastal state under International law of the sea. It became 
generally accepted in scientific populace143 and was necessitated during the negotiation of the 
LOS convention144 that the polar regions needed stricter regulations. The Arctic, owing to its 
fragile ecosystems and vulnerability to pollutants and other adversely affecting substances 
and phenomena, needed even more urgent attention.145 Rapidly depleting ice and opening up 
of these Arctic passages to international navigation further warranted such regulations. Hence 
Article 234, also known as the Arctic provision was introduced in the LOS convention. It reads, 
“Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations 
for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas 
within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions 
and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or 
exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment 116 could cause 
major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations 
shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment based on the best available scientific evidence”.146 It has been widely debated 
whether the applicability of this article is confined to the EEZ of the coastal state or includes 
all maritime zones landward of the EEZ including the EEZ.147 The author would like to argue 
that this article empowers the coastal states to govern all maritime zones landward of their 
EEZ in relation to controlling maritime pollution.148 The reasoning in support is two folded. 
Firstly, had article 234 not been applicable to territorial seas and internal waters, it would 
defeat the entire purpose of including this article under the LOS convention. It would mean 
that the coastal state is able to exercise greater power in the EEZ than the territorial sea, which 
would be absurd.149 A combined reading of articles 21 (2), 24 (1) and 234 of the UNCLOS 
suggests that article 234 empowers states to override some of the restrictions imposed on the 
rights of innocent passage through its territorial sea.150 Secondly, analogous to the provision 
 
143 See Climate change in the Arctic, Norwegian Polar Institute. Available at:    
https://www.npolar.no/en/themes/climate-change-in-the-arctic/#toggle-id-4 accessed 27 March 2021 & Climate 
Change in the Arctic, All About Arctic Climatology and Meteorology, National Snow and Ice Data Center, 4 May 
2020, University of Colorado, Boulder, USA. available at: https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-
meteorology/climate_change.html accessed 28 March 2021.  
144 The need was recognized by most of the states. See, Roman Dremliuga, A Note on the Application of Article 
234 of the Law of the Sea Convention in Light of Climate Change: Views from Russia, Ocean Development & 
International Law 2017, Vol. 48, No. 2, p 129.  
Private and direct negotiations between USSR, the US and Canada before inclusion of this article. See, Jan Jakub 
Solski (2021): The Genesis of Article 234 of the UNCLOS, Ocean Development & International Law, pp 12 -16. 
145 See Ryan O’Leary, Protecting the Arctic Marine Environment: The limits of Article 234 and the need for 
multilateral approaches, Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 23:3 2012, pp 289-290.  
146 Article 234, UNCLOS 1982. 
147 For interesting in-depth debates see for example, Kristin Bartenstein, The “Arctic Exception” in the Law of the 
Sea Convention: A Contribution to Safer Navigation in the Northwest Passage? Ocean Development & 
International Law, 42:2011 pp 28-29 & supra note 130 at pp 56-57.  
148 This article is enforceable in internal waters, territorial seas and the EEZ. see supra note 68 at p 47.  
149 R.D. Brubaker, Environmental Regulation in the Russian Arctic, INSROP Working Paper 79-1997, pp 8-9.  
150 For example, 21 (2) does not allow regulations regarding innocent passage to apply to the attributes of a ship 
except under accepted international rules and standards whereas 234 is broader in scope and hence allows 
regulation of ships’ attributes as well. See further, Kristin Bartenstein, supra note 147 at p 45.  
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on salmon fishing, article 234 was also drafted by these three Arctic states and its operative 
language was intended to embrace all waters landward of the EEZ.151  
Next, we would give interpretation to qualifiers that the areas so intended to be governed 
should be under ice cover for most of the year and there should be prevalent severe climatic 
conditions. There have been numerous discussions on the temporal scope of this article and 
interpretation of the term “where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of 
ice covering such areas for most of the year”.152 Even though the narrower interpretation of 
this word would mean its enforcement would be warranted only if severe conditions exist and 
would be more consistent with the regime under article 211, 218-220 establishing regulations 
for pollution control from vessels153, this interpretation is not practically viable154. Furthermore, 
the changing ice cover does not affect the application of article 234 when it is interpreted taking 
into account its implementation by states, objectives sought to be achieved during the 
negotiations and the relevant provisions of VCLT.155 
More importantly it is necessary to ascertain the effect of article 234 on the rights of innocent 
passage and transit passage available through the Arctic passages. The only effect this article 
has had is a stringent regime of regulations in the waters where it applies, wherein the vessels 
sailing through these waters have to abide by these stricter restrictions which have slightly 
modified the rights of innocent passage and transit passage in these waters. Or in other words 
this article has tilted the balance slightly towards pollution control vis-a-vis freedom of 
navigation in areas where it is required. Hence to conclude, though there exist rights of 
passages through both the Arctic passages, the regulatory regimes of the coastal states 
governing these Arctic regimes are well under their legal limits as prescribed by international 
law of the sea. However, there is a part of the puzzle missing which shall be elaborated on in 
the next chapter. The stringent regulations regarding vessel source pollution usually “must be 
adopted by the coastal State, when ‘acting through the competent international organisation 
or diplomatic conference’”.156 This adoption of regulations in the Arctic will be discussed in the 
upcoming chapter.  
4.4.3 International Passage and Indian state practice:  
Delving briefly into the Indian state practice, the maritime zones of India act requires that 
foreign warships give prior notice to the central government before passing through India’s 
territorial waters.157 Vide notifications issued by the Central Government of India under the 
maritime act, India has banned the entry of foreign vessels (save some exceptions) into its 
maritime zones.158  These provisions seem to be contrary to the LOS convention which allows 
the freedom of innocent passage to foreign warships provided the underwater vehicles 
navigate on the surface and show their flag.159 India under its declaration upon ratification, 
claims UNCLOS does “not authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone 
and on the continental shelf military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular those involving the 
use of weapons or explosives without the consent of the coastal State.” 
 
151 Bernard Oxman, in “Legal Regimes of the Arctic,” 40 American Society of International Law Proceedings 315–
334, at 334 (1988).  
152 See, Kristin Bartenstein, supra note 147 at pp 30-31 & supra note 130 at pp 54-55.  
153 Supra note 130 at pp 54-55.  
154 Kristin Bartenstein supra note 147 at p 31.  
155  Roman Dremliuga, supra note 144 at p 133.  
156 Supra 130 at p 54.  
157 Supra 52.  
158 Inter alia, SO135E, ‘Prohibition of any ships’, Ministry of External Affairs Notification New Delhi, The 13th 
January, 2009.  
159 Section 3, Innocent passage in the territorial sea, UNCLOS.  
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The LOS convention also allows greater freedom of navigation in the EEZ. The US has 
protested and conducted operational assertions regularly to demonstrate its non-recognition 
of this claim.160 The Indian Act allows for suspension of innocent passage rights “in the 
interests of the peace, good order or security of India" whereas UNCLOS provides the power 
of suspension of innocent passage only in the interest of security of the coastal state. 
Therefore, prima facie the Indian Act seems to be broader in scope, but a reasonable 
interpretation can be made that the term ‘security’ is comprehensive enough to include ‘peace' 
and ‘good order’.161 
As far as historic waters go in the Indian context, it is important to note the sole case wherein 
India’s claim to the waters in Palk Bay and the subsequent maritime delimitation agreement 
with Sri Lanka mention the waters in question as historic waters. Delving into the legality of 
this claim as historic waters is beyond the purview of this paper since it has no direct 
correlation with the objectives sought to be achieved by this paper. There is no imminent utility 
of the NWP for India due to geographical reasons and hence all of India’s efforts in the Arctic 
are being focused on the Northeast passage.162  
 
 
160 US Navy, 2016. Available at https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/India2016.pdf accessed 
on 29 March 2021. 
161 Supra note 22 at p 363.  
162 Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, the US 
Congress, February 1 2021 R41153 p 54.  Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf accessed on 29 
March 2021.  
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Section 4.5 Sustainable shipping in the Arctic: safety of life and marine pollution.  
4.5.1 International legal framework:  
Continuing with the application of article 234 in the arctic, as mandated by the LOS 
convention1 as well as opinionated by the ITLOS2 and academicians3 that states should 
cooperate while framing regulations concerned with shipping. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) is the obvious choice as an ideal forum for international cooperation in this 
area.4  
Formerly known as the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the 
IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) which was established with the 
adoption of the Convention establishing the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO) at the Geneva conference of 1948. It took another 10 years before the 
convention came into force after the required conditions were fulfilled. The main reason for 
this delay in coming into force was the hesitation of some states regarding the objectives the 
organization sought to achieve. These states feared that their ratification of the convention 
might lead to a “dangerous interference in [their] practice of free enterprise” and “interference 
with their own national shipping industries and laws”.5 
For the want of a better understanding of the mechanism of functioning of the IMO, it would 
be relevant to look at its organizational structure and functions of its organs. The IMO originally 
consisted of three major organs viz the Assembly, the Council and the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC). The Assembly, as any other international assembly of states, carries out 
mainly legislative functions. All member states of the IMO are the members of the Assembly 
and its main tasks are to vote on finances, work towards achieving the objectives set for the 
agency and to adopt the resolutions submitted to it by the Council and the MSC. The Council 
which consists of 40 members elected by the Assembly, works mainly as an executive body 
and as a bridge between the MSC and the Assembly. The real technical work is carried out 
by the MSC which is also an elected body consisting of all member states. This inclusion of 
all member states in the MSC was vital in ensuring equal participation of the under-developed 
states.6  
At the time of establishment, the main objectives of the organization, inter alia, were to 
modernize and standardize safety requirements at sea and provide technical assistance in 
matters of international shipping and hence only one working committee i.e. the MSC was 
created. First historic success of the IMO was the successful negotiation and adoption of the 
International Conventional on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1960. With the 
development of maritime shipping in general and in the wake of the 1969 Torrey Canyon oil 
spill, it was realized that the prevention and curbing of marine pollution had become an 
imminent challenge to be tackled. Two new committees, the Legal Committee (to solidify the 
international system for assessment of liability and compensation for oil spill damage) and the 
 
1 Article 197 explicitly requires regional and global cooperation.  
2 In Ireland vs UK, the ITLOS has held that the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle under marine 
environment protection. See, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); The Mox Plant case (Ireland v. 
United Kingdom) (2002), 41 I.L.M. 405, p 82. 
3 Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2010), p 343.  
4 Blanco-Bazan, Agustin. "Specific Regulations for Shipping and Environmental Protection in the Arctic: The Work 
of the International Maritime Organization." International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 24, no. 2, 2009, 
p 381.  
5 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, The IMO. available at: 
https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Convention-on-the-International-Maritime-Organization.aspx  
accessed on 30 March 2021.  
6 Ibid & Structure of IMO, The IMO. Available at: https://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Structure.aspx accessed 
on 1 April 2021.  
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Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) (to handle environmental issues) were 
created. The status of these two committees was elevated to that of the MSC showing the 
importance these issues had gained. The most important work that came out of these newly 
established committees was the successful adoption of the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its modification by protocol of 1978 (MARPOL).7 
Another International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties was adopted in 1969. This convention provided for a coastal state to take 
such measures in its high seas as appropriate to “prevent, mitigate or eliminate danger to its 
coastline or related interests from pollution by oil or the threat thereof, following upon a 
maritime casualty”.8  
There are a few other important conventions adopted by the IMO which will be relevant for the 
purpose of this chapter. In the past accidents at sea, it was observed that the seafarers lacked 
the knowledge and skills for implementation of safety measures and procedures. Therefore, 
to fill this gap in knowledge and execution, the International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) was adopted in 1978 which 
entered into force in 1984. Along with the SOLAS and the MARPOL, STCW was the third key 
maritime convention.9 With the revision in 1995, the convention which mainly consisted of the 
basic regulations was supplemented and expanded by the adoption of a new STCW Code. 
Part A of the code is mandatory whereas part B is recommended. Another major change in 
this revision was the requirement that the parties demonstrate that they have complied with 
and implemented the convention. Usually, the parties are themselves responsible for 
implementation of the conventions. This was the first time IMO was called upon to act towards 
compliance and implementation. Another revision in 2010, known as the Manila amendment 
was made to further streamline and address the issues that either emerged in the recent past 
or were likely to emerge in the near future.10  
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 
(OPRC) was signed in 1990 and came into force in 1995. As the name suggests, it provides 
a global framework for international cooperation to combat marine oil pollution. 11 
Another important convention was the International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue (SAR) adopted in 1979 and came into force in 1985. This was the first global 
agreement covering all the maritime areas of the world making it the first international SAR 
plan. It divided the oceans in 13 search and rescue areas and each area consisted of separate 
SAR regions under a particular coastal state’s responsibility. However, the number of 
ratifications of the convention had been relatively quite low due to the high infrastructural 
burden it placed on states individually. A revision was made in 1998 which emphasized 
regional approach and coordination between maritime and aeronautical SAR operations. 
Pursuant to this approach, the IMO and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
 
7 Ibid & Brief History of IMO, The IMO. Available at: 
https://www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx accessed on 1 April 2021.  
8 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969, 
IMO. Available at: https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-Relating-to-
Intervention-on-the-High-Seas-in-Cases-of-Oil-Pollution-Casualties.aspx accessed on 1 April 2021.  
9 List of IMO Conventions, The IMO. Available at:    
https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/ListOfConventions.aspx  accessed on 2 April 2021.     
10 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), The 
IMO. Available at: https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Standards-of-
Training,-Certification-and-Watchkeeping-for-Seafarers-(STCW).aspx accessed on 2 April 2021.  
11 Pollution Preparedness and Response, The IMO. Available at: 
https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Pollution-Response.aspx  accessed on 2 April 2021.  
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jointly developed and published the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual.12  
It is relevant to mention here that the ICAO is another specialized agency of the UN and is the 
IMO equivalent in terms of regulating international aviation. The ICAO was established by the 
adoption of the Chicago Convention on International Aviation in 1944. This convention also 
laid the guiding principles and arrangements for future aviation development.13  
So far, we have highlighted the international legal framework tackling marine pollution and 
enabling sustainable usage of maritime regions. Due to its special needs as talked about 
previously, the Arctic region has seen a tailored maritime protection framework of its own 
derived from the overarching international framework.14 Historically a bipolar approach has 
been taken towards regulating the poles though the differences between the poles have also 
been considered. Wherever relevant, a comparison and context will be made to the regulations 
in the Antarctic. To provide a succinct summary, three agreements majorly govern the Arctic 
specific maritime protection framework. The specifications of this tailoring shall be discussed 
and analysed in the following paragraphs.   
 
4.5.2 The Polar Code:  
4.5.2.1 The failed attempt at the first polar code and the subsequent adoption of the 
polar code 2017:  
Even though the polar code entered into force in 2017, the groundwork was laid in the 1990s 
focusing on the Arctic.15 By the early 1990s there were fragmented rules by different coastal 
states and ship classification societies governing fractured maritime Polar areas which led to 
a lot of confusion and uncertainty.16 Germany and Russia approached the IMO for developing 
supplemental rules for the Polar areas within the SOLAS, MARPOL and other relevant 
regimes.17 The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil pollution accident in Alaskan waters also proved to be 
an imminent factor.18 Since then, under Canadian leadership, a ‘harmonization process’ for 
polar ships was underway to standardize rules and specifications applicable in the Arctic. This 
process of harmonization was carried out mainly by the Outside Working Group (OWG) 
established by the IMO. Unlike the LOS convention, this harmonization process was led by 
polar experts (as part of the OWG) which drafted polar rules while legal and diplomatic experts 
were also present. With a long-term vision and an integrated approach, the strategy of the 
OWG was two folded. First was to build upon the existing regime of regulations namely the 
MARPOL, the SOLAS and the STCW. Second was to separate the drafting of more generic 
polar rules from the parallel work of the International Association of Classification Societies 
(IACS)19 on the detailed specifics of hull and machinery requirements. The former could 
 
12 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), The IMO. Available at: 
https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Maritime-Search-and-Rescue-
(SAR).aspx  accessed on 2 April 2021. 
13 The History of ICAO and the Chicago Convention, The ICAO. Available at: https://www.icao.int/about-
icao/History/Pages/default.aspx accessed on 2 April 2021 & the preamble to the convention, Convention On 
International Civil Aviation Done At Chicago On The 7th Day Of December 1944. Available at: 
https://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf  accessed on 2 April 2021.  
14 Supra note 4 pp. 381-383.  
15 Vidas, Davor. Protecting the Polar Marine Environment. Cambridge University Press, 2000 p 254. 
16 Id at p 248. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Weidemann, Lilly. International Governance of the Arctic Marine Environment. Vol. 27, Springer International 
Publishing AG, 2014 p 110.  
19 IASC is a not-for-profit membership organization of classification societies establishing and materializing 
minimum standards and requirements for maritime safety. It is the principal technical advisor to the IMO and has 
established rules and requirements which are followed by more than 90% of the world's cargo carrying tonnage.  
See, about IACS, Introduction, the International Association of Classification Societies, London England. Available 
at: https://www.iacs.org.uk/about/ accessed on 3 April 2021.  
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remain constant whereas the latter could adapt to the changing technology over time. Another 
key feature was the working of a subgroup on the navigation and training elements of the 
code. This harmonization process also saw the birth of the new Circumpolar Advisory Group 
on Ice Operations (CAGIO). CAGIO was established by the coastal states which already 
administered their ice-covered waters and was a unique forum for discussing bipolar 
navigation issues. Hence in essence, this process of harmonization was a comprehensive 
global cooperation initiative among the IMO, the OWG, the IASC and the CAGIO to bring 
together public and private organizations to develop maritime safety in the Polar regions.20 
In 1998, Canada submitted the ‘International Code of Safety for Ships in Polar Waters’ on 
behalf of the OWG to the IMO’s Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE). This 
was the first attempt to adopt a polar code. This code was criticized by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties (ATCP) for being Arctic centric and not taking into sufficient consideration 
the differences between the Arctic and the Antarctic. Finally, even after the efforts of the ATCM 
and the committees of the IMO, the deadlock could not be broken and subsequently this draft 
polar code was approved as non-mandatory ‘Guidelines for ships operating in Arctic ice-
covered waters’ in 2002.21  
In 2004, South Africa on behalf of the ATCP proposed to the IMO that an amended version of 
the Arctic guidelines be made applicable to the Antarctic as well.22 This matter was handled 
by the DE subcommittee that was of the view that the Arctic guidelines also needed significant 
update and hence a decision to completely revise the guidelines was approved.23 With the 
sinking of the cruise ship MV Explorer off King George Island in Antarctica in 2007, it was 
increasingly realized that the Antarctic waters also needed the same stringent regulations like 
the Arctic.24 Furthermore The Arctic Council Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report 
also recommended the strengthening, harmonization and regular updation of the “international 
standards for vessels operating in the Arctic”.25 Once more under the coordination of Canada, 
the new ‘Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters’ were approved by the DE 
subcommittee and adopted by the Assembly of the IMO in 2009.26  In 2010, the DE 
subcommittee agreed to establish a correspondence group under the coordination of Norway 
to draft a mandatory Polar code.27 Keeping in mind the lessons from the past, this time an 
innovative strategy was utilized. A goal based/risk-based approach was formalized along with 
functional requirements and prescriptive provisions to achieve the requirements.28 It was also 
decided that goal-based standards (GBS) would provide the benchmarks against which the 
safety of the ships will be tested.29 
Consequently, the International Code for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code) with an 
introduction and two separate parts were adopted. The parts concerning maritime safety (Part 
I) and marine pollution (Part II) and two sub parts with functional requirements (Part I A and II 
A) (mandatory) and prescriptive provisions (Part I B and II B) (recommendatory) were adopted 
 
20 supra note 15 at pp 248-250.  
21 Supra note 18 at pp 110-111.  
22 Supra note 18 at 111.  
23 Supra note 18 at pp 111-112.  
24 Hildebrand, Lawrence P, et al. Sustainable Shipping in a Changing Arctic. Vol. 7, Springer International 
Publishing AG, 2018, p 18. 
25 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. Arctic Council, April 2009, second printing, p 6.  
26 Supra note 17 at 112.  
27 IMO, Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 53rd session, Agenda item 26, 15 March 
2010, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO Doc. 53/26, p. 38. 
28 IMO, Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 53rd session, supra note 459, IMO, 
Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 54th session, Agenda item 23, 17 November 
2010, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO Doc. DE 54/23, p. 25.   
29 IMO, Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 54th session, Agenda item 
13, 27 July 2010, Risk-based concept, Submitted by Germany, IMO Doc. 54/13/1, p. 1. 
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by the respective committees (the MSC and the MEPC) in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The 
pertinent amendments to the SOLAS30 and MARPOL31  to make the code mandatory also 
came into force in 2017 hence bringing the code in force starting 1 January 2017.32 The 
amendments to the STCW33 for the training and qualifications of seafarers in the Polar waters 
were adopted by the MSC in 2016 and came into force in 2018. It has to be emphasized here 
that the Polar Code has been adopted within the framework of the already existing regulatory 
regime under SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW and hence is not a separate instrument but an 
extension of the existing regime. Therefore, all the definitions and application criteria for the 
Polar Code are the same as the SOLAS and the MARPOL unless expressly provided 
otherwise. The definition of ‘Polar Waters’ in which the code is applicable, is the same under 
both the conventions.34 The application of the Code to ships varies by Part. Part I on safety is 
applicable to ships certified under the SOLAS i.e. all cargo ships of 500 tons or more and all 
passenger ships.35 Hence we can say that it applies to cargo ships, oil tankers, bulk carriers, 
container ships and cruise ships but does not apply to fishing vessels, warships and other 
government vessels used only in government non-commercial service and pleasure yachts.36  
The Part II on environmental regulations and pollution control is applicable to all the ships 
certified under the MARPOL annexes I, II, IV and V respectively.37 Hence we see that the 
scope of application of Part II is greater than Part I and fishing vessels which might be 
exempted from complying with the safety part of the code will have to comply with the 
environmental part.38  
4.5.2.2 Salient features and achievements of the Polar Code in the context of the 
Arctic.  
As stated by the Polar Code, its goal is to provide that extra safety and environmental 
protection which is not currently provided by the existing international regime. To experience 
the peculiar challenges present in the Arctic/Polar areas as compared to anywhere else in the 
world see the coverage by the Norwegian broadcaster NRK (Norsk rikskringkasting AS) of the 
 
30 Chapter XIV was added to the SOLAS convention to make the Polar Code mandatory. See supra note 24 at pp 
28-29. Also see, Chapter XIV, SOLAS 2018 Consolidated Edition.  
31 Annexes I, II, IV and V of the MARPOL were amended to make the Code mandatory. See supra note 24 at p 29. 
For amendments see, Report of The Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Eighth Session, Marine 
Environment Protection Committee 68th session Agenda item 21 MEPC 68/21 29 May 2015 pp 44-47.  
32 IMO, Marine Environment Protection Committee, 68th session Agenda item 21, 5 June 2015, IMO Doc. 
68/21/Add.1 Annex 10, page 7 & supra note 24 at p 19.  
33 Both the convention and the Code have been amended. All the seafarers going to the Polar waters have to be 
trained for specifications as added into the Code and hold a certificate for appropriate training under the convention. 
See supra note 23 at p 31. For amendments see, Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory 
Instruments, Amendments to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended, & the Seafarers' Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping (STCW) Code, Maritime Safety Committee 97th session Agenda item 3 MSC 97/3/2, 15 August 
2016.    
34 Deggim, H. (2018). The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code). WMU Studies in 
Maritime Affairs, p 29. While the definition of the Antarctic area is relatively easy, i.e., sea area south of latitude 60 
degrees South, the ‘Arctic waters’ are defined in a rather complicated way to exclude a major part of what is 
understood to be the Arctic under other definitions (for example north of the Arctic circle). See Chapter XIV, SOLAS 
2018 Consolidated Edition. For an easier understanding see the area definition on the global map in supra note 24 
at p 30.   
35 Chapter XIV defines applicability to be the same as under chapter I of SOLAS. Refer to chapter XIV and 
regulations 1,2 and 3 of Chapter I of the SOLAS.  
36 Ibid & Supra note 24 at p 198.  
37 For details on the amendments see, Consideration and Adoption Of Amendments To Mandatory Instruments, 
Draft amendments to MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV and V to make use of environment-related provisions of the Polar 
Code mandatory, Marine Environment Protection Committee 68th session Agenda item 6 MEPC 68/6 21 January 
2015.   
38 PAME, The Polar Code, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment. Available at: 
https://pame.is/projects/arctic-marine-shipping/the-arctic-shipping-best-practices-information-forum/the-polar-
code accessed on 4 April 2021 & Introduction, IMO Polar Code, DNV (Det Norske Veritas). Available at: 
https://www.dnv.com/maritime/polar/index.html accessed on 4 April 2021.  
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grounding of MS Northguider in the Svalbard area.39 One unique feature of the Code is the 
utilization of the risk-based/goal-based approach to regulations rather than the traditional 
prescriptive rules and repercussions-based model. The flexibility provided by the GBS 
regulations had a positive impact on adoption and compliance with the code given the historic 
fallout during the earlier attempt to agree on a Polar Code. It was also easier to agree on GBS 
regulations rather than prescriptive regulations.40 Pursuant to its risk-based approach, in the 
introduction, sources of hazard peculiar to the Polar regions have been identified. Pursuant to 
GBS standards, Part I A on safety measures has been divided into chapters and each chapter 
consists of the overall goal, the functional requirements to fulfill the goal and regulations under 
that chapter. Under this part the major requirements to be fulfilled are i) there shall be a Polar 
Ship Certificate (PSC) on board all the vessels in Polar waters. A PSC is a statutory certificate 
demonstrating that the vessel is compliant with safety regulations under the Code. It is issued 
by the flag state administration or any other entity it41 authorizes under the SOLAS regulations. 
A PSC classifies ships into three categories A, B and C such that the first indicates enhanced 
ice-navigation capabilities while B indicates medium capabilities and C with the lowest 
capabilities.42 Lastly, in order to get a PSC, a vessel has to perform certain risk assessments 
and verifications of compliance along with developing and carrying a Polar Water Operations 
Manual (PWOM) on board. ii) All personnel shall carry appropriate certificates of qualification, 
training and experience in compliance with the STCW convention and Code as mentioned 
under chapter 12.  iii) lastly before every voyage, voyage planning shall be conducted taking 
into account the PWOM and other factors as mentioned under chapter 11.43 Part I B provides 
additional guidance on fulfilling obligations under part I A and introduction to the Code.44  
Under Part II A, marine pollution prevention, each chapter consists of definitions, operational 
requirements and structural requirements. Under this part it is prohibited to discharge in the 
Polar waters, in any form, the pollutants including oil and oily mixtures (except the discharge 
of clean and segregated ballast in the Arctic), noxious liquid substances (NLS), sewage waters 
(unless done in accordance with MARPOL requirements mentioned therein) and garbage 
(unless carried out in accordance with MARPOL requirements mentioned therein). Part II B 
provides additional guidance on fulfilling obligations under part II A and introduction to the 
Code, inter alia, for ballast water management, antifouling and biofouling.45 
 
4.5.2.3 Addressing the shortcomings of the code in the context of Arctic; Polar Code 
phase II:  
Even though a mandatory regulatory regime for shipping in the Arctic is a much needed and 
welcome step, this regime is still at its nascent stage. Since the implementation of the Polar 
Code, a number of loopholes and gaps especially in the context of the Arctic have been 
 
39 Though written in Norwegian, in-browser translation with google or any other translator works good enough. 
Astrid Rommetveit, Anders Nøkling. Alene mot Barentshavet (Alone towards the Barents Sea) 3. FEB. 2019. 
Available at: https://www.nrk.no/vestland/xl/alene-mot-barentshavet-1.14381609  accessed on 4 April 2021.  
40 Lisell A. Donatello Bang, Is the Polar Code living up to its purpose? A case study of the Polar Code as regulating 
Arctic shipping, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, pp 3-4 & 60-61. Available at: 
https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/18657 accessed on 4 April 2021.  
41 Mostly classification societies such as the Norwegian DNV. See more at: https://www.dnv.com/about/index.html  
accessed on 4 April 2021.  
42 See Polar Code definitions.  
43 Originally adopted as Arctic guidelines in 2008 by the assembly of the IMO, Guidelines on Voyage Planning for 
Passenger Ships Operating in Remote Areas served as the background for voyage planning under the Polar Code. 
see Resolution A.999(25) Adopted on 29 November 2007 Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships 
Operating in Remote Areas, IMO Assembly.  
44 Hasebe, Masamichi. "New Developments and Challenges in Arctic Navigation and the Polar Code." Revue Belge 
de Droit International / Belgian Review of International Law, vol. 51, no. 2, 2018, p. 347-349. 
45 Id at p 349.  
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identified. In the following paragraphs, the gaps of particular concern shall be enumerated 
upon and discussed.  
Under SOLAS, the code is only applicable to international voyages wherein a vessel makes a 
voyage to a port outside the country. This definition leaves some scope of interpretation and 
a lot of voyages can be considered to be outside the scope of the Code. For example, a trip 
by a Russian vessel on the NSR from some port on the east (say Beringovsky) to the west 
(say Murmansk) would not be covered by the Code and hence need not comply with the safety 
part of the Code. Furthermore, whether a Norwegian vessel voyaging from Norwegian 
mainland to Svalbard, or the Antarctic Norwegian claimed territory has the obligation to comply 
with the Code is not very clear.46 In the two aforementioned instances both the respective 
countries have clarified such doubts47 but such instances of doubt are bound to occur in the 
future. Hence it would be in the interest of safety and avoidance of multiple interpretations that 
the limits of application of the Code are further clarified and updated. The MSC has already 
agreed that the geographical scope of application of the safety features of the Code to non-
SOLAS ships should not be limited to international voyages.48 The MSC has also agreed to 
consider including non-SOLAS vessels particularly fishing vessels, pleasure yachts above 300 
gross tonnage not engaged in trade and cargo ships above 300 (currently 500) gross tonnage 
under the scope of the Code.49 As noted above these vessels are currently beyond the 
coverage of the Code.  
Furthermore, the Code is not applicable to many areas of the Arctic that require its application. 
Currently the southern Bering Sea, and large parts of the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea 
and the northern Atlantic Ocean around the coasts of Iceland are left out of the purview of the 
Code. A lot of these areas can be categorized as ‘ice-covered areas’ mentioned in the sources 
of hazard under the introductory part of the Code but have been excluded from the scope of 
the Code. Due to growing shipping activity in the region and underlying inherent risks, it would 
be critical to “cover the part of the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk to sea ice edge 1981– 
2010 line instead of an arbitrary line”.50 
Another major challenge is the loose regulation of Heavy fuel oil (HFO) and Black Carbon 
(BC) in the Arctic. HFO is a major source of pollution51 and poses greater risk52 to vulnerable 
areas like the Polar regions. In 2015, incomplete combustion of HFO was responsible for two 
thirds of Black Carbon emissions from shipping operations in the Arctic.53 In the Arctic, Black 
Carbon is one of the most potent climate change inducers and also adversely impacts health 
of the coastal communities.54 For these reasons, the use and carriage of HFO in every form 
 
46 Supra note 40 at pp 62,68-69.  
47 Norway considers such trips as International and Russian domestic regulations for NSR are apparently stricter 
than the Polar Code safety regulations. See supra note 40 at p 69.  
48 Maritime Safety Committee 99th session Agenda item 22 MSC 99/22* 5 June 2018 Report of The Maritime 
Safety Committee on Its Ninety-Ninth Session p 43.  
49 Id at p 44.  
50 Meric Karahalil, Burcu Ozsoy & Ozgun Oktar, ‘Polar Code application areas in the Arctic’, WMU Journal of 
Maritime Affairs (2020) 19: pp 230-232. https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.ulapland.fi/content/pdf/10.1007/s13437-
020-00200-4.pdf accessed on 4 April 2021.  
51 It produces airborne emissions, ozone depleting substances as well as greenhouse gases and particles. See, 
Zhen Sun, International Regulation of Heavy Fuel Oil Use by Vessels in Arctic Waters, the International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 34 (2019) pp 516-517, Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019. 
52 Difficult to clean after a spill and has significant negative impacts on the marine environment. See id at pp 517-
518.  
53 Supra note 51 at p 520.  
54 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Methane and Black Carbon Impacts on the Arctic: Communicating the 
Science, 2016 pp 4-9. Available at: https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
09/documents/arctic-methane-blackcarbon_communicating-the-science.pdf accessed on 4 April 2021.  
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is banned in the Antarctic55 whereas in the Arctic its use is discouraged56. Given the growing 
shipping activity and the amount of black carbon it generates, a ban on HFO in the Arctic is 
imperative.  
The MEPC delegated the task of assessing a ban on HFO in the Arctic to the subcommittee 
on Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR). PPR in turn formed a working group on HFO in 
Arctic waters and the working group developed a working definition of HFO in the context of 
the Arctic. The next step was to seek an impact assessment report from the Arctic coastal 
states regarding the effects of such a ban on the coastal communities and their Arctic regions 
in general.57  
Every coastal Arctic state except Russia has been in favour of banning HFO in the Arctic. 
Russian concerns extend to the wellbeing of the Arctic coastal communities lest the higher 
cost of fuels will have an adverse impact on the livelihood of these communities. According to 
Russia “It is envisaged that the matter of impact assessment should be the financial burden 
which would come upon local communities and the region as a whole rather than the benefits 
related to the unspent costs for response and clean-up of an unlikely spill”. It is important to 
note here that HFO is cheaper than the other fuels used in shipping. Recently the working 
group submitted a report recommending a ban on HFO in the Arctic starting July 1 2024 and 
the ban was approved by the MEPC58. However, the ban will be subject to certain reservations. 
Adding to the ban in the Antarctic, the ban in the Arctic shall not be applicable to vessels 
engaged in SAR operations and oil spill preparedness and response. Furthermore, at Russia’s 
behest, coastal states may waive the ban for vessels flying their own flag and operating in 
their sovereign waters until July 1, 2029.59  
As far as regulating BC emissions goes, the IMO is making progress towards first developing 
a standardised sampling, conditioning, and measurement protocol for BC emissions60 and 
then making commensurate policy decisions to effectively mitigate it. India has also been 
playing an active role in the discussions on mitigating BC in the Arctic at IMO’s subcommittee 
on PPR.61 However, according to certain environmentalists the ban on HFO is too weak and 
the regulations continue to be loose.62  
It is relevant to mention here that the opinions of the Indigenous people are taking centre stage 
at these discussions at the IMO63 which follows from the fact that the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
 
55 Marine Environment Protection Committee 60th session Agenda item 5 MEPC 60/5 14 September 2009 
Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments.   
56 Additional guidance to chapter 1, Part II B, Polar Code.   
57 Supra note 51 at pp 525-530 & supra note 44 at pp 351-353.  
58 Isabelle Gerretsen, UN shipping body approves Arctic heavy fuel oil ‘ban’, delayed for a decade, 20/11/2020, 
Climate Home News. Available at: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/11/20/un-shipping-body-approves-
arctic-heavy-fuel-oil-ban-delayed-decade/ accessed on 4 April 2021.  
59 Mia Bennett, Ban on Heavy Fuel Oil in Arctic Shipping Moves Ahead, The Maritime Executive 02-23-2020. 
Available at: https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/ban-on-heavy-fuel-oil-in-arctic-shipping-moves-ahead  
accessed on 5 April 2021.  
60 Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response, 8th Session Agenda Item 5 PPR 8/INF.3, Reduction of 
The Impact on The Arctic Of Emissions of Black Carbon from International Shipping International Technical 
Working Group on the Development of a Standardized Sampling, Conditioning and Measurement Protocol for Black 
Carbon Emissions from Marine Engines, 15 January 2021.  
61 Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response, 8th session Agenda item 5 PPR 8/5, Reduction of The 
Impact on The Arctic Of Emissions of Black Carbon from International Shipping, 18 December 2020.   
62 Anna Barford & James Gamble, Ban on heavy fuel oil in the Arctic is too weak, April 13, 2021, Policy Options. 
Available at: https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/april-2021/ban-on-heavy-fuel-oil-in-the-arctic-is-too-weak/ 
accessed on 5 April 2021.  
63 Supra note 59.  
43 
 
(ICC) has applied for consultative status with the IMO which will enable even greater 
participation in future decision making. A decision by the IMO is expected in July 2021.64    
Another criticism of the Polar Code is the criticism of the GBS approach. Even though the GBS 
approach is quite flexible and suitable for most of the states, it has some inherent flaws which 
are likely to manifest at the level of execution of standards by various states. There remains 
an element of subjectivity vis-a-vis interpretation of functional requirements and the 
procedures used to achieve the goals set therein.65 Usage of words like ‘sufficient’ and 
‘adequate’ leaves scope for reaching different conclusions in similar scenarios and hence the 
level of a coastal state’s or classification society’s knowledge and experience in Polar waters 
plays a critical role. For example, the granting of a PSC by the Indian classification society, 
Indian Register of Shipping (IRClass) would follow different technical measurements and 
procedures compared to the Norwegian DNV because of the difference in knowledge and 
experience both the societies have in Polar waters. It is more likely that the certificate issued 
by DNV is closer to actual risk mitigation in the Arctic than the one issued by IRClass. Similar 
is the case with certificates of training of the vessel crew for Polar waters.66 From the Arctic 
maritime safety perspective, experience acquired by the crew of Arctic coastal states is far 
more critical than relatively inexperienced non-Arctic states like India making their entry into 
the Arctic waters. While building its Polar vessel and training its crew, it would be of vital 
significance that India emphasizes on prior knowledge and experience in Polar waters and 
opts its ship builder/s and crew trainers accordingly and has crew members who have previous 
experience in Arctic sailing.67  
This element of special knowledge and expertise in the context of Arctic waters makes cruise 
ships extra-vulnerable. Also referred to as “low probability, high consequence accident” 
presence of a large number of people on cruise ships makes it an additional challenge for 
SAR operations.68 During the three Arctic SAR exercises from 2016-2017, it was 
demonstrated that the current SOLAS-certified life-saving appliances approved for Arctic 
waters do not satisfy the functional requirements of the Polar Code.69 Hence there is a need 
for betterment of survival equipment to meet the functional requirements of the Polar Code 
and companies are already working on the same.70  
Another work left to the states and not made mandatory by the Code is the prevention of Arctic 
waters from foreign invasive species. The instances of marine bio invasions in the Arctic are 
growing with the growth of shipping in the region. Moreover ecological theory and evidence 
suggest that the relatively low biological diversity of the Arctic marine environment results in 
low biotic resistance hence making it susceptible to bio invasions.71 Hence there is a need to 
control this invasion happening mainly through ballast water or biofouling of the ships.72  Even 
though the Code acknowledges the risk of invasive aquatic species transfers via biofouling, it 
 
64 The ICC, ICC Presents Case for Consultative Status to IMO Council, March 1, 2021 – Ottawa, Canada. Available 
at: https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/icc-presents-case-for-consultative-status-to-imo-council/  accessed on 
6 April 2021.  
65 Espen Engtrø, Ove Tobias Gudmestad & Ove Njå. “Implementation of the Polar Code: Functional Requirements 
Regulating Ship Operations in Polar Waters” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 11, 2020, p 61.  
66 Supra note 40 at pp 65-66.  
67 Supra note 40 at pp 60-61.  
68 Supra note 40 at pp 62-64.  
69 Supra note 40 at pp 54-57.  
70 Mia Bennett, The Polar Code, One Year On, 04-06-2018, The Maritime Executive. Available at:  
https://www.maritime-executive.com/magazine/the-polar-code-one-year-on accessed on 6 April 2021.  
71 Marine Environment Protection Committee, 69th session Agenda item 4 MEPC 69/INF.17, ‘Harmful Aquatic 
Organisms in Ballast Water Ship-mediated bioinvasions in the Arctic: pathways and control strategies’, Submitted 
by FOEI, p 37, 9 February 2016.  
72 Hendrik Schopmans, Revisiting the Polar Code: Where Do We Stand? June 11, 2019, The Arctic Institute. 
Available at: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/revisiting-polar-code/ accessed on 6 April 2021.  
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leaves up to the vessels to adopt measures to prevent it.73 While the Code bans discharge of 
oil or oily mixtures from any ship, discharge of clean or segregated ballast is allowed. The 
2004 IMO convention for the Control and Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments 
entered into force in 2017. It remains to be seen if the convention on Ballast waters is sufficient 
to protect invasion of foreign species in the Arctic.74  
Another important issue that the Code is silent about is the noise from commercial shipping 
and its adverse impacts on marine life in the Arctic. Though the IMO has implemented 
recommendatory guidance on the reduction of underwater noise from commercial shipping, 
these guidelines are not sufficient for the Arctic. The plying of icebreakers poses additional 
threats to Arctic mammals.75  
Apart from the Polar Code, two additional legally binding agreements have been concluded to 
strengthen the safety and pollution control regime in the Arctic.  
 
4.5.3 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic:  
Though there exist other multilateral and bilateral SAR agreements in the Arctic76 the first 
legally binding pan-Arctic SAR agreement was signed among the 8 Arctic states in 2011 in 
Nuuk Greenland and came into force in 2013. It was also the first legally binding agreement 
in the Arctic under the auspices of the AC and takes precedence over other instruments in the 
Arctic.77 In the 2009 Tromso declaration, the AC established a task force on search and rescue 
(TFSR) to develop and complete negotiation of an international instrument on cooperation on 
search and rescue operations in the Arctic.78  The agreement is derived from the emphasis on 
regional SAR agreements under the 1998 revision to the International SAR convention of 
1979, the Chicago convention, article 98 of the LOS Convention and the IAMSAR manual as 
mentioned above.79 Noting the key features of the agreement, all the states have demarcated 
their geographic zone of responsibility without prejudice to the delimitation of boundaries 
between them under international law. Such demarcation of zones brings efficiency in 
emergency response and removes possible confusions.80 The parties have also earmarked 
their respective agencies and functions under a three-layered command system.81 The regime 
for entering each other's territories has been simplified under the agreement and cooperation 
measures have been identified.82 This cooperation under the agreement has been actively 
demonstrated by the states. As stipulated by article 9 of the agreement, this implementation 
of cooperation has focused on multilateral institution building and joint training exercises. A 
significant achievement in institution building has been the establishment of the Arctic Coast 
 
73 Part II B 4.3 of the Polar Code.  
74 Submission to the Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information Forum May 2017, Circumpolar Conservation Union, 
p 12. Available at: https://wwf.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Submission-to-the-Arctic-Shipping_May-2017.pdf 
accessed on 7 April 2021.  
75 Trevor Riley & Shanna Hollich, The Arctic: Anthropogenic Noise, Shipping, Impact on Marine Mammals, & Future 
Management, U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office of Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Research NOAA Central Library – Silver Spring, Maryland, pp 24-34.   
76 See supra note 82 at pp 58-59.  
77 Natalia Loukacheva, The Arctic Council and “Law-Making” The Northern Review 50 (2020): p 119.   
78 Tromsø Declaration On the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of The Arctic Council, 29th April 2009, 
Tromsø, Norway p 5.  
79 The preamble, Arctic SAR agreement.  
80 Supra 82.  
81 The top political layer is mentioned as ‘competent authorities’, the middle layer mentions functionally and 
territorially competent units of the governments as ‘agencies and the bottom layer/executional responsibility lies 
with the ‘rescue coordination centers’. See, A.K. Sydnes et al. ‘‘International Cooperation on Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic.’’ Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 8, 2017, pp. 109-136.  
82 Natalia Loukacheva editor, Polar Law Textbook II, Nordic Council of Ministers, pp 57-60, 2013. 
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Guard Forum (ACGF) in 2015 which brings together personnel from the coast guards and 
other SAR agencies of the Arctic states to conduct workshops, training, and annual meetings. 
The AC working group on EPPR acts as a facilitator for implementation of the agreement and 
has established a permanent SAR Experts Group to monitor and promote the implementation 
of the SAR Agreement.83  
However certain criticisms of the agreement remain to hold weight. The agreement is closer 
to an MoU rather than a legally binding agreement and can be said to be the “least-binding 
international legal agreement that a state can sign''. Furthermore, the agreement does not 
specify any resources that a party is obliged to provide or procure, and the implementation is 
subject to availability of relevant resources.84  
As far as India and cooperation on SAR is concerned, the AC counterpart of the Indian Ocean 
is the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).85 India has been a founding member of the IORA 
and concluded an MoU with it for closer cooperation in SAR activities in the region.86 One 
interesting thing to note here is the difference between the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and the 
Arctic Ocean Region (AOR) in context of SAR operations. Whereas in the IOR, besides the 
coast guards, navies of the maritime states also conduct SAR operations and joint exercises87, 
in the AOR, SAR operations and joint exercises are mainly under the jurisdiction of the Coast 
guards. Even though the navies of AOR states cooperate on SAR with the Coast guards of 
other states88, navies of two or more states have never held joint SAR exercises. Given the 
military infrastructure the Arctic states have created over the years, it would certainly help 
mitigate the issue of lack of SAR resources in the region if the navies of the AOR states also 
started cooperating like the IOR. In the words of the co-chair of the TFSR, the military 
infrastructure and cooperation among the Arctic states would surely be additional assets in 
the practical implementation of the SAR and other emergency response operations.89  
Therefore, in the interest of a safer Arctic, it would be a progressive step forward if the AOR 
navies also cooperated and held joint exercises in context of SAR operations i.e., conducted 
military cooperation and defence diplomacy in SAR operations in the Arctic.90 
 
4.5.4 Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic:   
The structure of the agreement is similar to that of the Arctic SAR agreement91 and hence the 
structure of this section is similar to the previous one. Differences will be highlighted and 
 
83Joachim Weber ed., Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic, Springer Nature Switzerland AG (2020), 
pp 283-284. 
84 Svein Vigeland Rottem (2015) A Note on the Arctic Council Agreements, Ocean Development & International 
Law, 46:1, pp 50-59. 
85 As approved at the Council of Ministers (COM) (IORA Secretariat Durban, eThekwini, South Africa) 2 November 
2018, p 1, Charter of The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).  
86 Welcoming India as the 14th Signatory of the IORA MoU on Search and Rescue, Disaster Risk Management, 
24 September 2020. Available at: https://www.iora.int/en/events-media-news/news-updates-folder/welcoming-
india-as-the-14th-signatory-of-the-iora-mou-on-search-and-
rescue#:~:text=Mauritius%2C%2024%20September%202020%3A%20The,in%20the%20Indian%20Ocean%20R
egion accessed on 8 April 2021.  
87 Under the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) IOR navies conduct joint SAR exercises. See, Ankit Panda, 
‘Indian, Chinese Navies to Participate in Search-and-Rescue Naval Drill’, August 14, 2017, the Diplomat. Available 
at: https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/indian-chinese-navies-to-participate-in-search-and-rescue-naval-drill/ 
accessed 8 April 2021.  
88 U.S. Coast Guard conducts joint Arctic operations, scientific research off Greenland, Kate Kilroy and Sara Muir, 
U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, DVIDS/DMA (Defense Media Activity) . available at: 
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/379674/us-coast-guard-conducts-joint-arctic-operations-scientific-research-off-
greenland accessed 8 April 2021.  
89 Supra note 82 at p 63.  
90 Heather Exner-Pirot (2012) Defence diplomacy in the Arctic: the search and rescue agreement as a confidence 
builder, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 18:2, 195-207. 
91 Supra note 84.  
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analysed wherever relevant. Though there exist other multilateral and bilateral Marine Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response (MOPPR) agreements in the Arctic92 the first legally 
binding pan-Arctic MOPPR agreement was signed among the 8 Arctic states in 2013 in Kiruna, 
Sweden and entered into force in 2016. It was the second legally binding agreement in the 
Arctic under the auspices of the AC and takes precedence over other instruments in the Arctic. 
In the 2011 Nuuk declaration, the AC established a task force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response to develop and complete negotiation of an international 
instrument on cooperation on MOPPR in the Arctic.93 The agreement is derived from the 
relevant provisions of the LOS convention (primarily article 234), the 1990 convention on OPR 
and the 1969 convention on Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 
as mentioned above.94 Interestingly the agreement also makes mention of the environmental 
law principle ‘polluter pays’.95  
Noting the key features of the agreement, all the states have demarcated their geographic 
zone of responsibility without prejudice to the delimitation of  boundaries between them under 
international law.96 However this demarcation is different from the SAR agreement as in the 
SAR agreement, the northern limits of the jurisdiction end at the north pole, whereas in the 
present agreement, the northern limits might go beyond the national jurisdiction under LOS 
convention, but it should be consistent with International law.97 Hence we see that while SAR 
operations in the High seas of the AOR are guaranteed under the SAR convention, the present 
agreement is equivocal on MOPPR in the High seas of the AOR. The present agreement also 
utilises a tripartite national system, one organ of a state not necessarily functioning under the 
other. The national competent authorities (not necessarily political but also administrative and 
other agencies).98 The agreement mandates 24-hours operational contact points to receive 
and transmit oil pollution reports. Though round the clock functional points were already 
established before the agreement was discussed, this obligation comes as a strengthening of 
the present legal regime on the Arctic MOPPR.99 Similar to the SAR agreement, movement 
across borders has been tried100 to be simplified101 and cooperation measures have been 
identified, inter alia,  on notifying other concerned parties in case of a spill102, joint monitoring 
of oil pollution incidents especially in cases of transboundary impacts103, exchanging 
information and making it public wherever possible104, and the obligation to cooperate and 
assist in case assistance is sought to respond to an incident105. The EPPR, in 2016, created 
 
92 Ingvild Hoel Rise, The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic, June 2014, UiT, pp 35-49. 
https://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/6629/thesis.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y accessed 9 April 2021 & 
EPPR, 2019, Legal issues related to the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (MOSPA) - Summary Report, Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response (EPPR) 
p 6.  
93 Nuuk Declaration On the occasion of the seventh Ministerial Meeting of The Arctic Council, 12 May 2011, p 4.  
94 The preamble, Arctic MOPPR agreement.  
95 Ibid.  
96 Article 3 read with article 26 of the agreement.  
97 Article 3 of the agreement.  
98 Ibid.  
99 Kristian Cedervall Lauta, ‘A Drop in the Ocean’, Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 5, 2/2014 p 241.  
100 The provisions do not oblige but merely encourage states to grant permissions for foreign states’ personnel and 
equipment to enter their jurisdictional waters. See EPPR, 2019, Legal issues related to the Agreement on 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA) - Summary Report. 
Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response (EPPR).  p 7.  
101 MOSPA Article 9.  
102 MOSPA Article 6.  
103 MOSPA Article 7.  
104 MOSPA Article 12.  
105 MOSPA Article 8.  
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the Marine Environmental Response Experts Group to promote the implementation of EPPR’s 
activities related to the marine oil pollution agreement.  
Though there are other features of the agreement that emphasize its cooperative nature, it 
has been argued that this agreement adds very little to none and rather symbolic value to the 
already existing International OPRC convention. The criticism of the agreement remains that 
the provisions of the agreement are so worded as to leave substantial discretionary margin for 
the parties and the agreement is in fact a regional agreement under article 10 of OPRC though 
it makes no such reference.106  
The South Asian counterpart of the AC is the South Asia Co-operative Environment 
Programme (SACEP)107 and the south Asian non-legally binding counterpart of the Arctic 
MOPPR agreement is the Regional Oil Spill Contingency Plan of 1989. India has signed an 
MoU with SACEP for cooperation on OPPR in the south Asian seas.108  
 
4.5.5 Conclusion:  
Hence, we see that the jurisprudence of International Environmental Law in the Arctic is at its 
nascent stage. As far as environmental protection goes, the Arctic also suffers, slightly, from 
a vicious circle with two elements i.e., lack of infrastructure to enforce strict regulations and 
inability of the Arctic states to make strict regulations. On the optimistic side though, Arctic 
rulemaking has come quite far from where it started, and we see continuous progress here 
despite the same states regressing in cooperation elsewhere in the world. As concluding 
words, it would be relevant to talk about the future of Environmental rulemaking in the Arctic 
and what scope lies ahead. Coming back to the first element of the vicious cycle mentioned 
above, the lack of port reception facilities in the Arctic contributes to loose regulations and 
enhanced risk since without infrastructure, it is impossible to enforce strict regulations.109 For 
example the effective implementation of port state control under the Polar Code is 
compromised because of lack of port reception facilities. Furthermore, lack of reception 
facilities makes it impossible to implement stringent rules on dumping and discharge of harmful 
land-based waste and sewers.110 One such measure being adopted to tackle the problem of 
shortage of port reception facilities is the adoption of Regional Reception Facilities Plan 
(RRFP) in the Arctic.111  
A viable starting point for further Environment protection in the Arctic could be to get a status 
of Special Area under MARPOL or Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) under IMO. As 
pointed out by the DNV report, due to its superior adaptability features that cater to a variable 
Arctic, establishment of a PSSA in the Central Arctic Ocean along with associative protective 
measures (APMs)112 of a VTS (vessel traffic system) with SRS113 (ship reporting system) 
 
106 For example, the provisions on joint exercises and training remain short of laying down scope, ambition, 
frequency, or extent of such activities and mentions it such that the “success of the exercises is entirely reliant on 
the implementation of the parties, rather than the fulfillment of the legal obligation”. See supra note 99 at p 243-
244.    
107 About Us, South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP). http://www.sacep.org/about-us  
108 India okays MoU to tackle oil spills, 12 May 2018, ANI news. Read more at: 
https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/india-okays-mou-to-tackle-oil-spills201805121540410004/  accessed 10 
April 2021.  
109 Supra note 24 at p 317-318.  
110 Supra note 40 at pp 47-48.  
111 PAME, Regional Waste Management Strategies for Arctic Shipping Regional Reception Facilities Plan (RRFP) 
and Proposal for IMO Consideration, PAME. Available at: https://pame.is/document-library/pame-reports-
new/pame-ministerial-deliverables/2017-10th-arctic-council-ministerial-meeting-fairbanks-alaska-usa/279-
regional-reception-facilities-plan-and-draft-submission-for-imo-for-approval/file accessed on 9 April 2021.  
112 APMs are indispensable vis-a-vis a PSSA because mere declaration of PSSA serves no purpose unless some 
special protective measures are also applied to protect that area. See supra note 114 at p 68.  
113 VTS is a shore sided system which utilizes SRS, among others, as a useful tool in remote areas for a timely 
response to an emergency. For example, the Norwegian VTS at Vardø. See supra note 114 at pp 49-50 & 70-71 
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would be the preferred choice.114 An SRS in the Barents area between Norway and Russia is 
already mandatory.115 Furthermore, the Polar Code imposes stricter regulations in the Arctic 
than general MARPOL restrictions in spite of a scarcity of availability of Port reception facilities 
and makes it a Special Area without expressly saying so.116  
In view of the author, the Arctic does present significant challenges and needs extra 
environmental protection but lack of international shipping at the moment gives good enough 
reason to the coastal states to defer application of stricter regulations. However, as we have 
seen this situation is going to change in the future and with increased traffic in the Arctic, the 
environmental protection regime will also have to respond accordingly. It remains to be seen 
whether this regime will play the game of catching up as the international regime has 
historically done (major regulations came up after major marine accidents which angered and 
agitated humanity) or will it set up a precedent of proactive preventive measures. In certain 
Arctic issues however, this precautionary principle has been put to practice which shall be 
talked about in the next chapter on fisheries.  
Lastly as far as India’s role in the Arctic is concerned, it should play a more active role in the 
discussions leading up to the Polar Code II because it is a party to the Antarctic treaty, has 
already entered the Arctic and its interaction with the Arctic is growing by the day. However, 
this active role by India is subject to availability of resources and priorities, currently which is 
clearly not to participate in the strengthening of the Arctic environmental law regime but of its 
own surrounding waters of the IOR. Therefore, the realistic way out is to make sure all the 
future Polar activities and expeditions are built upon experiences of the Arctic states rather 
than its own limited view of the Polar regions.  
 
& The Vardø Vessel Traffic Service, NOR VTS Norwegian Oceanic Region Vessel Traffic Service, Norwegian 
Coastal Administration. https://www.kystverket.no/globalassets/om-
kystverket/brosjyrer/vardovtsbrosjyre_en_hr.pdf  accessed on 9 April 2021. 
114 Det Norske Veritas Report No./DNV Reg No.: 2013-1442 / 17JTM1D-26 REV 2 Report, Specially Designated 
Marine Areas In The Arctic High Seas. pp 56-60. https://pame.is/document-library/shipping-documents/arctic-
marine-shipping-assessment-documents/recommendation-iid/343-specially-designated-marine-areas-in-the-
arctic-part-ii/file accessed on 9 April 2021. 
115 Barents SRS, Norwegian Coastal Administration. https://www.kystverket.no/en/EN_Maritime-
Services/Reporting-and-Information-Services/barents-ship-reporting-system/ accessed on 9 April 2021. 
116 Supra note 24 at p 60.  
 
 
Section 4.6 The Svalbard treaty; international law or a classical diplomatic tug of war:  
The Arctic Wild west could best be seen in the case of Svalbard.1 Different European powers 
struggled to dominate the area2 but with the advent of civilization and the LOS regime, it was 
decided to work-out a solution acceptable to every state. Though a few different options were 
considered, finally it was decided that for the purpose of certainty of regulations and clear 
demarcation of rights and obligations of all the parties involved in the area which was terra 
nullius, Norway would have full and absolute sovereignty over the area subject to the ‘rights 
of access’ of other parties.3  
The author firmly believes that International law is less about law and more about diplomacy. 
Whereas law is supposed to govern the relationship between a sovereign and its subject/s, 
the former being unable to govern itself for the greater good of the society and is hence 
subjugated by the latter. However, what happens when two sovereigns want to achieve 
greater good for society is not law but diplomacy because subjugation is not acceptable to 
both. The Svalbard treaty is an arrangement reached among the contracting parties wherein 
the rest of the parties recognize the sovereignty of Norway over Svalbard in exchange for 
Norwegian recognition of non-discriminatory rights for the rest of the parties.4 It is also a 
classical example of an oxymoron under International Law.5  
The treaty established an equitable regime both in terms of how the treaty treated Norway vis-
a-vis the other contracting parties with respect to Svalbard6 as well as how Norway treated 
the other contracting parties while administering Svalbard7. This will be elaborated upon under 
relevant sections.  
4.6.1 Analysing the treaty vis-à-vis International Law:  
Three interpretations of the treaty have come up so far. The Norwegian interpretation that the 
treaty does not apply to the new maritime zones and that Norway is competent to establish 
these zones under international law and the treaty does not restrict it. The second one held 
previously by some states stated that Norway is bound strictly by the words of the treaty and 
since the treaty talks only about land and territorial waters, Norway cannot establish these 
additional maritime zones and therefore there is no question of regulating these areas or right 
of access in these areas of the other parties.8 This interpretation runs contrary to the modern 
developments in the LOS convention. The third and most widely accepted interpretation is that 
Norway is competent to establish these new maritime zones and as far as Norwegian 
 
1 Torbjørn Pedersen, The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries, Ocean 
Development & International Law, 2006 37:339–358, p 341.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Supra note 1 at p 345.  
4 Generally, the Svalbard Treaty, 1920, particularly articles 1-8.    
5 The usage of terms ‘Qualified yet full and absolute sovereignty' to describe the status of Norway under the treaty 
sounds linguistically paradoxical. See Rossi, Christopher R. "A Unique International Problem: The Svalbard Treaty, 
Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History." Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2016, p. 110.  
6 D. H. Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard, Ocean Development 
& International Law, 40:374-375, 2009.  
7 Candidate Number: 228, ‘The Non-Discrimination Requirement and Geographical Application of the Svalbard 
Treaty, Decisions by the Norwegian Supreme Court’, University of Bergen, Master’s thesis, pp 23-29. Available at: 
https://bora.uib.no/bora-xmlui/bitstream/handle/1956/11481/142089224.pdf?sequence=1 accessed on 10 April 
2021.  
8 It has been viewed that the Svalbard treaty is Lex specialis to UNCLOS and hence deprives Norway from 
establishing new maritime zones around Svalbard under UNCLOS.  See, Sarah Wolf, Svalbard’s Maritime Zones, 
their Status under International Law and Current and Future Disputes Scenarios, Working Paper FG 2, 2013/Nr. 




regulations and rights of access of other parties in the new zones are concerned, the treaty 
applies to these new zones as well.9  
The main issues for consideration regarding the Svalbard treaty are i) The meaning and extent 
of Norway’s sovereignty under the treaty, ii) the meaning and extent of the non-discriminatory 
rights of the other contracting parties and iii) what is the relationship between the two? 
Answering these three will lead to the author's views about the three interpretations mentioned 
above and state which interpretation does the author agree with. Sub Issues emerging out of 
the issues will be examined wherever relevant.  
 
(i)The meaning and extent of Norway’s sovereignty under the treaty:  
As mentioned above, because of the oxymoron it is tricky to determine the meaning and extent 
of Norway’s sovereignty under the treaty. As seen in the case of the Arctic passages, the same 
stands true here. Norwegian authors take stands/reach conclusions that are less detrimental 
to the interests of Norway10 while Non-Norwegians do according to their particular state 
interests. This is another reason to believe that International law is less about law and more 
about diplomacy. Even the Supreme Court of Norway has been ‘diplomatic’ while deciding 
cases involving the Svalbard treaty.11  
The mere fact that Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard was endowed by a treaty rather than 
customary law states that Norwegian sovereignty is not the same in character as any other 
sovereign state (in absence of the treaty the territory would continue to be terra nullius rather 
than a Norwegian territory). In fact, it is weaker because of the concessions mechanism 
adopted by both the sides that led to the making of the treaty. Hence the author would like to 
disagree here with Fleischer12 and state that Norwegian sovereignty vis-a-vis Svalbard is 
restricted and not absolute as any other state which derives sovereignty from customary law.13 
However in agreement with Fleischer the author agrees that Norwegian sovereignty is “full 
and absolute” in the sense that Norway is the sovereign authority to decide on matters not 
stipulated under the treaty and uphold the treaty provisions throughout its decisions and 
regulations.14  
(i)(a) Does Norwegian sovereignty under the treaty allow establishment of additional maritime 
zones: The treaty is silent about additional maritime zones except for territorial waters and 
does not prohibit establishment of these additional zones. Since the treaty was originally 
 
9 Torbjørn Pedersen, The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries, Ocean 
Development & International Law, 2006 37:339–358, pp 344-346.  
10 The Norwegian author subscribes to a position most advantageous to Norway. See, Peter Thomas Örebech, 
‘The Geographic Scope of The Svalbard Treaty and Norwegian Sovereignty: Historic - Or Evolutionary - 
Interpretation?’ CYELP 13 [2017] pp 53-86.  
11 Candidate Number: 228, ‘The Non-Discrimination Requirement and Geographical Application of the Svalbard 
Treaty, Decisions by the Norwegian Supreme Court’, University of Bergen, Master’s thesis, p 30. 
https://bora.uib.no/bora-xmlui/bitstream/handle/1956/11481/142089224.pdf?sequence=1 accessed on 11 April 
2021.  
12 Carl August Fleischer, The New International Law of the Sea and Svalbard Professor, The Norwegian Academy 
of Science and Letters 150th Anniversary Symposium, January 25 2007, University of Oslo, pp 2-4.  
13 For example, Norway does not have the right to dispose of Svalbard under the treaty since sovereignty is granted 
specifically to Norway and Norway has assumed a duty under international law to exercise sovereignty over 
Svalbard. Norway is also restricted in ways it could use Svalbard, inter alia, not for belligerent military purposes. 
See Øystein Jensen, The Svalbard Treaty and Norwegian Sovereignty, Arctic Review on Law and Politics Vol. 11, 
2020 82–107 p 86 & article 9 of the Svalbard treaty.  
14 Carl August Fleischer, The New International Law of the Sea and Svalbard Professor, The Norwegian Academy 
of Science and Letters 150th Anniversary Symposium January 25, 2007, University of Oslo, pp 4-5 & D. H. 
Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard, Ocean Development & 




signed, Norway has benefitted from the development of the International law of the sea and 
owing to its sovereignty over Svalbard, successfully established the new maritime zones of a 
Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) and the Continental Shelf around it.15 Over the due course of 
time Norway amended the baselines and the geographical limits of the territorial waters of 
Svalbard to conform to the prevailing norms at the time contemporary with the norms and the 
non-discriminatory rights of the other contracting parties were also extended to these 
amendments.16 Hence we see that the concept of ‘territorial waters’ is evolutionary17 and so 
are the ‘rights of access’ provided to other contracting parties therein.18  
Under the LOS convention article 121, all islands capable of sustaining human habitation 
generate maritime zones including an EEZ and Continental Shelf. Had Norway not been able 
to establish these new maritime zones around Svalbard, such a position would be inconsistent 
with LOS convention.     
Though Norway initially claimed that Svalbard generated only an EEZ and not a continental 
shelf and that the entire continental shelf between Svalbard and Norway is an extension of the 
Continental Shelf of the Norwegian mainland, over subsequent years Norway has possibly 
abandoned that position and agrees that Svalbard generates both an EEZ as well as a 
Continental Shelf.19 The state practice of various parties to the treaty has also shown so far 
that they agree that Svalbard generates these additional maritime zones (under UNCLOS) 
and Norway has rightfully established these zones.20 The successful delimitation of Norwegian 
Continental Shelf by CLCS also shows Norway is well within its sovereign powers in 
establishing Continental Shelf around Svalbard.21   
(i)(b) Can Norway regulate these new maritime zones under the treaty: If it has been 
established that the treaty allows for Norway to establish these new zones, consequently 
under the treaty Norway has also been granted the authority to regulate these zones and 
hence can make laws and regulations for the new zones as well. Iceland, Russia and Spain 
have indicated that the contracting parties should be involved in deciding on legislation and 
that they would be competent as flag states to enforce the regulations. However, such an 
application of the principle of equal treatment will conflict with Article 61 of UNCLOS.22 It would 
defeat the purpose of the treaty if more than one state decided on regulations governing the 
area since the treaty was made to solve the problem of anarchy that existed then and hence 
 
15 Sarah Wolf, ‘Svalbard’s Maritime Zones, their Status under International Law and Current and Future Disputes 
Scenarios’, Working Paper FG 2, 2013/Nr.02 January 2013, SWP Berlin, p 17.  
16 D. H. Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard, Ocean 
Development & International Law, 40:374-375 pp, 2009. p 376.  
17 Peter Thomas Örebech, The Geographic Scope of The Svalbard Treaty and Norwegian Sovereignty: Historic - 
Or Evolutionary - Interpretation? CYELP 13 [2017] 53-86, p 59.  
18 D. H. Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard, Ocean 
Development & International Law, 40:374-375 pp, 2009 p 376.  
19 Norway has used the Svalbard Continental Shelf rather than the mainland Continental Shelf to delimit maritime 
boundaries with neighbouring states. See,Churchill, Robin and Ulfstein, Geir, The Disputed Maritime Zones around 
Svalbard (October 3, 2011). CHANGES IN THE ARTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, Panel IX, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010 & Candidate Number: 228, ‘The Non-Discrimination Requirement and 
Geographical Application of the Svalbard Treaty, Decisions by the Norwegian Supreme Court’, University of 
Bergen, Master’s thesis, p 13.  
20 Successful maritime delimitations between, for example, Norway-Russia and Svalbard/Norway-
Greenland/Denmark. See, Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’, p 
559-562. Available at: http://ulfstein.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ChurchillUlfstein20101.pdf accessed on 12 
April 2021.  
21 Pedersen, Torbjorn, and Tore Henriksen. "Svalbard's Maritime Zones: The End of Legal Uncertainty." 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 24, no. 1, 2009, p. 141-162 & Sarah Wolf, ‘Svalbard’s Maritime 
Zones, their Status under International Law and Current and Future Disputes Scenarios’, Working Paper FG 2, 
2013/Nr.02 January 2013, SWP Berlin, p 20-21.  
22 T Pedersen and T Henriksen, 'Svalbard's Maritime Zones: The End of Legal Uncertainty’ The International 




needed one definitive regulatory regime. Articles 2 and 3 clearly state the same. Furthermore, 
all the parties to the treaty have accepted Norwegian regulations over the years which shows 
Norway has rightfully exercised regulatory control over these zones. Furthermore, applying 
the rules of interpretation under VCLT to the Svalbard treaty, the treaty has to be interpreted 
in the light of the development of the LOS convention which has enabled coastal states to 
declare and regulate these additional maritime zones.    
(ii) the meaning and extent of the non-discriminatory rights of the other contracting 
parties: The treaty guarantees equally to all the nationals of the contracting parties the right 
to carry out  maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations (including fishing and 
hunting) on the land and the territorial waters of Svalbard subject to local laws and regulations, 
hereinafter referred to as non-discriminatory rights.23 The treaty is silent on maritime zones 
beyond the territorial seas (erstwhile territorial waters as written in the treaty) because the 
concept of the new maritime zones i.e. the EEZ and the continental shelf did not exist when 
the treaty was signed. However, with the development of the LOS convention, Svalbard also 
generated EEZ and the continental shelf. Now the question is whether the non-discriminatory 
rights also apply to these new maritime zones of EEZ (Fisheries Protection Zone, FPZ) and 
the Continental Shelf. Hence the major task here is to interpret “territorial waters” as mentioned 
in the treaty and whether ‘territorial waters’ include the additional maritime zones.  
(ii)(a) Do these rights of access apply to the newly formed maritime zones: Norway and some 
of its authors claim that the treaty is vague about restricting rights of Norway and hence a 
restrictive interpretation of the treaty should be done.24 While interpreting a treaty restrictively, 
the principle of ‘In dubio mitius’ would apply which would mean that Norway’s sovereignty over 
Svalbard will prevail over ‘rights of access’ of the other contracting parties.25 Furthermore, the 
treaty is also very clear about limiting the rights of the other parties to ‘territorial waters’ and 
hence Norway has exclusive jurisdiction over the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of Svalbard.  
It has to be noted that the ‘object, intention of the parties and purpose of a treaty’ take primacy 
over ‘rules of interpretation’ while deciding upon a question vis-a-vis the treaty. In other words, 
while deciding a particular issue with respect to a treaty, added weight is assigned to the 
ascertainment of ‘object, intention of the parties and purpose of a treaty’ rather than deciding 
whether to interpret the treaty restrictively or liberally. Hence if the ‘object, intention of the 
parties and purpose of a treaty’ are determined, it is irrelevant/inconsequential/secondary 
whether the treaty is interpreted liberally or restrictively.26  
This view has been held by various International courts and tribunals and finds its source in 
the Rules of Interpretation under VCLT. Even though Norway is not a party to VCLT, VCLT 
forms a part of customary international law and hence Norway is bound by it.27 Furthermore, 
a dynamic approach to treaty interpretation has been favoured by courts when such an 
interpretation can better synchronize the original intent of the parties with the developments 
in International Law.28  
 
23 A combined reading of article 1, 2 and 3. See also, D. H. Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the 
Maritime Areas Around Svalbard, Ocean Development & International Law, 40:374-375, p 376 2009.  
24 Molenaar, E. J. "Fisheries Regulation in the Maritime Zones of Svalbard." International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, vol. 27, no. 1, 2012 3-58, pp 13-15.  
25 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’, pp 565-567. Available at: 
http://ulfstein.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ChurchillUlfstein20101.pdf accessed on 13 April 2021.  
26 In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”) Railway, (Belgium and the Netherlands), 24 May 
2005, para. 53. Available at: https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/478 accessed on 14 April 2021.  
27 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard, pp 565-567. 
http://ulfstein.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ChurchillUlfstein20101.pdf accessed on 14 April 2021.  
28 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2009, p. 213, 




The object and purpose and the intention of the parties to the Svalbard treaty has to be 
determined. At the time of conclusion of the treaty, ‘territorial waters’ was the only recognized 
international maritime zones and other zones were established later on and the waters beyond 
the territorial waters were considered high seas. Hence it can be said that the intention of the 
parties was to make the treaty applicable to all the maritime zones that existed at that time 
and there was no reason to stipulate anything about the high seas of the time because all 
states had rights therein. Hence territorial “waters” refers to all maritime zones between the 
high seas and the coast wherein the coastal state has any sort of jurisdiction.  
Reading into the preamble also awakens the reader to the scope of the treaty which reads 
‘equitable regime’ which means terra nullius rights for other parties and sovereignty for 
Norway. This also aligns with the ‘context’ in which the treaty was signed i.e. states were 
desirous of giving legal certainty to a previously terra nullius land while at the same time 
preserving their rights thereto. Hence under this equitable regime the sovereignty of Norway 
is coextensive with the terra nullius rights of the other parties.29 
Had these rights not been applicable to these new maritime zones, it would lead to a situation 
against reason and basic principle of the LOS that a coastal state’s rights weaken as one goes 
seawards from the coast. As far as ‘subsequent practice’ in the application of the treaty is 
concerned under article 31 (3) of the VCLT, the fact that Norway did not establish an EEZ but 
an FPZ and that “Norway does not have exclusive fishing rights in this FPZ but administers 
the distribution of fishing quotas to other countries” can be a reference to the classical maxim 
‘res ipsa loquitur’ and show that in fact these rights apply to these new zones.30   
(ii)(b) The prohibition on discrimination on the basis of nationality and the scope for application 
of differential treatment:  A reading of the provisions of the treaty leads to the conclusion that 
prohibition on discrimination at its core is on the basis of nationality.31 A reading of the 
preamble may further help in establishing the scope and purpose of the treaty for the purpose 
of this section. The treaty establishes the regime to be “equitable” in terms of treatment by 
Norway of the other contracting parties. In other words, the treaty prohibits differential 
treatment on the basis of nationality. However, differential treatment based on other criteria 
might still be discriminatory under the treaty.  It is important to note here that sometimes 
differential treatment will be considered non-discriminatory insofar as there is no discrimination 
in substance.  
A careful reading of article 2 (2) prohibits discrimination in ‘pith and substance’ and not only 
as an incidental effect of provisions concerning Svalbard. This prohibition shall extend to 
rendering not just formal equality but also rendering non-discriminatory actual effects of the 
measures taken. Sometimes to render non-discriminatory actual effects, differential treatment 
will be necessary and hence would not be discriminatory under the treaty. Hence the preamble 
and the text of the treaty allow for differential treatment to render non-discriminatory actual 
effects where it is clear that non-differential treatment will lead to discriminatory actual 
 
29 Candidate Number: 228, ‘The Non-Discrimination Requirement and Geographical Application of the Svalbard 
Treaty, Decisions by the Norwegian Supreme Court’, University of Bergen, Master’s thesis, pp 16-17.  
30 Ragnhild Groenning, ‘The Norwegian Svalbard Policy – Respected or Contested?’ November 22, 2017, the 
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31 For example, articles 2 & 3. See also, candidate number 228, The Non-Discrimination Requirement and 
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effects.32 Furthermore, Article 62 (3) of the UNCLOS also mandates paying due consideration 
to historical fishing habits of the states in EEZs.  
Now we shall see if differential treatment can be applied to achieve an objective goal without 
being necessarily discriminatory. The provisions of the treaty, again, stipulate the prohibition 
of discriminatory provisions while making rules for preserving nature but do not give guidelines 
about differential treatment. For this purpose, we shall again look into the context and the 
object and purpose of the treaty. Even though Norway’s regulatory powers and the rights of 
access of other states have been given equal priority, it can be inferred that unconditionally 
established claims of violations of the terra nullius rights would hinder effective regulation of 
the area and hence a regime proposing achievement of certain objective goals would be 
desirable. However, the contrary remains to be true that in pretext of achievement of an 
objective goal, certain discriminatory regime/provisions might be introduced and hence this 
process is abused in violation of the rights of access of the other parties. As Ulfstein and the 
Norwegian Supreme Court have pointed out, the test of proportionality would be a sound 
benchmark to evaluate these provisions.33  
Therefore, the regulatory regime of Svalbard is well within the prescribed limits of Norwegian 
sovereignty and does not encroach upon the terra nullius rights of the other contracting parties. 
In the interest of certainty and dispute free Svalbard, it is important to harmonize the treaty 
with LOS convention. This harmonization dictates that the third interpretation be upheld i.e., 
the treaty allows for establishment and regulation of the new maritime zones around Svalbard 
and the rights of access of other parties are also applicable to these new zones.  
(iii) the relationship between the two; a package deal: The author would like to draw an 
analogy to the sport of tug of war and argue that the two are counterparts/co-equals forming 
two equal parts of the same rope being pulled with equal tension by the sovereignty of Norway 
on one side and the non-discriminatory rights of the other parties on the other.34 Equal and 
opposite tension on the treaty that keep the treaty alive and stretched out straight and not let 
it fall to the ground and hence apart. However, we see that as a part of International diplomacy, 
both the sides pull the rope on their side sometimes as and when according to their 
convenience and strategies. In some cases, to maintain that balance is simply impossible. So 
far, the parties have not taken their game in front of a referee and assume themselves mature 
enough to keep the balance because the ultimate aim of a side is not to win but to work towards 
greater good of the society.    
4.6.2 Projecting into the future and India’s role:  
As said above, the balance between the two is simply impossible in some cases. One such 
case is the delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the water column between mainland 
Norway and Svalbard. The question remains whether Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard 
be used for the advantage of Norway or the advantage of the other contracting parties.35 As 
far as the water column is concerned, the FPZ seems to be a decent solution acceptable to 
 
32 Ulfstein, Geir, The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty (Oslo 1995), pp. 246-252.  
33 Candidate Number: 228, ‘The Non-Discrimination Requirement and Geographical Application of the Svalbard 
Treaty, Decisions by the Norwegian Supreme Court’, University of Bergen, Master’s thesis, pp 33-36.  
34 The treaty provisions provide for a fair and balanced compromise for both the sovereign and other parties. See, 
D. H. Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard, Ocean Development 
& International Law, 40:374-375 pp, 2009.  




all but the Continental Shelf has already generated undesirable incidents36 and holds potential 
for greater conflict.  
The issue of snow crabs between the EU and Norway is just the tip of the iceberg. Norway 
and its adversaries to the treaty are already starting to buttress their claims for the future 
domination of Svalbard Continental Shelf.37 The real dispute is regarding the rights over 
continental shelf and hence not only its sedentary living resources but more importantly oil 
and gas under the seabed.38 For now Norwegian sovereignty over the Continental Shelf of 
Svalbard seems to be holding strong.39  
The treaty prohibits Norway imposing any tax in surplus of that needed for administration and 
regulation of the area.40 Owning to historic fishing habits in the FPZ of Svalbard, Norway 
applied differential treatment to prevent discrimination under the treaty but such historic rights 
do not exist in case of Continental Shelf exploration and hence it would be burdensome for 
Norway to lay exclusive claims over the Svalbard continental shelf and exploit its resources.41 
Unless indispensable, Norway would prefer not to open the pandora’s box over the questions 
of Svalbard’s Continental Shelf and hence keep a halt on oil and gas exploratory activities 
therein.    
India has been a founding contracting party and hence has its permanent research station in 
Svalbard. However as far as resources go, Indian ratification of the treaty has been of nominal 
value. India has also been silent on issues of international law concerning the area primarily 
because Norway is a good ally and at present, India doesn't have much to gain from getting 
involved in the controversy/taking a particular stand over it.  
 
Section 4.7 The rights of the Indigenous people and IUU fishing; contextualizing the 
Arctic and Indian coasts:  
Indigenous people have been vulnerable to labour exploitation and hence ILO was the first 
organization to take actions to safeguard their rights. The first step towards this was the 
adoption of convention 107 in the 1950s called the Convention on Protection and Integration 
of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries. This 
convention was interpreted as assimilationist and paternalistic by the states and a temporary 
measure when these goals of integration were achieved. Over the course of the next few 
decades the shortcomings of this convention were realized, and it was emphasized that the 
Indigenous people were not to be integrated and made like everyone else, rather their 
distinctive identities were to be protected and let flourish. Convention 169 of the ILO, 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries was then adopted to 
preserve and recognize their identity, rights to the resources and subsistence activities 
 
36 For example, protests from other treaty parties when Norway made unilateral moves on the Svalbard Continental 
Shelf. See, Torbjørn Pedersen, The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries, 
Ocean Development & International Law, 2006 37:339–358 p 347.  
37 Kait Bolongaro, “Oil Lurks beneath EU-Norway Snow Crab Clash,” Politico, June 18, 2017. Availalbe at:  
www.politico.eu/article/of-crustaceans-and-oil-the-case-of-the-snow-crab-on-svalbard accessed on 15 April 2021.  
38 Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik, ‘Why Is the European Union Challenging Norway Over Snow Crab? 
Svalbard, Special Interests, and Arctic Governance’ Ocean Development & International Law 2019, Vol. 50, Nos. 
2–3, 190–208 p 196.  
39 Alister Doyle, Gwladys Fouche, ‘Abide by the claw: Norway's Arctic snow crab ruling boosts claim to oil’ February 
14, 2019, Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-eu-snowcrab/abide-by-the-claw-
norways-arctic-snow-crab-ruling-boosts-claim-to-oil-idUSKCN1Q3115  accessed on 16 April 2021.  
40 Article 8.   
41 Torbjørn Pedersen, The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries, Ocean 




thereon42. Norway is the only Arctic country which has ratified the convention, neither has 
India ratified the convention.43  
Article 118 of the UNCLOS mandates regional cooperation among states and setting up of 
regional fisheries organizations in order to conserve and manage living resources in the high 
seas. UNCLOS also grants coastal states with extensive regulatory powers to ensure 
sustainable exploitation of living resources in their EEZs. In 1995, the UN Agreement on 
Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was adopted to implement the provisions of the 
UNCLOS agreement. Pursuant to this, there have been set up a few different regional fisheries 
management organizations in the Arctic such as the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC) and the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC). “There is no other high seas 
area where we’ve decided to do science first”.44 This statement comes in the backdrop of 
adoption of the agreement banning unregulated commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean 
hence putting the precautionary approach first. Indigenous people and their knowledge have 
been made a significant part of the agreement and shall be utilized while implementing this 
agreement.45   
Both the Arctic and India, consist of significant fishing communities that have carried out 
artisanal fishing from time immemorial. The regime of combating illegal, unregulated, and 
unauthorized (IUU) fishing46, though benevolent for sustainable fisheries development, could 
adversely impact these artisanal fisheries. It has been argued that the concept of IUU fishing 
is disputed and applicability of IUU fishing on vulnerable groups like the Arctic indigenous 
people curtails, inter alia, their food security rights.47 In furtherance to this vulnerability of the 
artisanal fisheries, India at the WTO has proposed to exclude these fisheries from the ban on 
harmful fisheries subsidies.48 Given the vulnerability of the Arctic indigenous communities, it 
should be ensured that their subsidies are not affected by this fisheries subsidy ban being 
negotiated at the WTO.  
 
42 Part II of ILO 169.  
43 Athanasios Yupsanis, ‘ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries 1989–2009: An Overview’, Nordic Journal of International Law 79 (2010) pp 433–438.  
44 Scott Highleyman as quoted by Hannah Hoag, ‘Nations agree to ban fishing in Arctic Ocean for at least 16 
years’, Dec. 1, 2017, Sciencemag. Available at: https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/12/nations-agree-ban-
fishing-arctic-ocean-least-16-years accessed on 16 April 2021.  
45 Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.  
46 It is believed to be one of the biggest hurdles that undermine sustainable maintenance of fisheries around the 
world. See, FAO, what is IUU fishing?, United Nations. Available at: http://www.fao.org/iuu-
fishing/background/what-is-iuu-fishing/en/  accessed on 18 April 2021.  
47 Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Mercedes Rosello, ‘IUU Fishing as a Disputed Concept and Its Application to 
Vulnerable Groups: A Case Study on Arctic Fisheries’ International Community Law Review 22 (2020) 410–427.   
48 Amiti Sen, WTO and fisheries subsidies: India’s proposal for exempting poor countries gains traction, The 
Hindu Businessline, September 18 2020, available at: https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/agri-
business/wto-and-fisheries-subsidies-indias-proposal-for-exempting-poor-countries-gains-




Chapter 5 India’s bilateral relations with the Arctic states in the Arctic context:  
India has deep and historic bilateral ties with almost all the arctic countries. Ranging from 
business to academia to entertainment, India’s bilateral relations with the arctic countries have 
been constructive and are strengthening over time. While it took China 7 years to get the 
observer status to the AC1, India decided to apply for this status at the last moment in 2013 
and got it immediately.2 It shows the positive relations and trust India enjoys with the Arctic 
states.   
India’s look far east policy and strengthening bilateral ties with Russia in the context of 
Arctic: India’s relations with the Arctic countries are seen at its best in the case of Indian-
Russia historical partnership which continues to evolve and strengthen over time. The strength 
of the Indo-Russian partnership can be weighed from the statement by the Russian foreign 
minister that Russia is the “only partner that indeed transfers to India, cutting edge military 
technologies”.3  Changing global geopolitical dynamics and global warming have given an 
interesting turn to these relations. Traditionally a defence-based partnership, Indo-Russian 
relations are now reaching far beyond to include, inter alia, scientific research and energy 
supplies. In the context of Russian Arctic, the northeast passage, as of yet, is not as attractive 
for India as it is for the other Asian AC observers primarily due to geographical reasons.4 
However, India is looking towards developing its usage for two major reasons. Firstly, to be 
able to ship oil and gas from eastern Russian Arctic to diversify its supply chains given the 
uncertainties in the middle east and North Africa.5 Secondly, to strengthen its presence in the 
South China sea which is dominated by China.6 India is also in the process of signing a crucial 
military Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support (ARLS) with Russia to get access to 
Russian Arctic ports.7 Russia is also interested in developing its Arctic energy collaborations 
with India lest it shall rely heavily on Chinese demand alone which gives China an upper hand 
in negotiations with Russia.8 This win-win situation for both Russia and India has been gaining 
ground over the last decade as manifested in agreements between energy companies9 and 
 
1 Qin, Tianbao. "Dispute over the Applicable Scope of the Svalbard Treaty: A Chinese Lawyer's Perspective." 
Journal of East Asia and International Law, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 2015, p 159.  
2 Joachim Weber Ed., Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020, 
p 151.  
3 Transcript of Joint Presser by External Affairs Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
(April 06, 2021), April 07 2021, Ministry of External affairs India. Available at:  
https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/33774/Transcript_of_Joint_Presser_by_External_Affairs_Minister_and_Minister_of_Foreign_
Affairs_of_the_Russian_Federation_April_06_2021  accessed on 22 April 2021.  
4 Nivedita Kapoor and Gayathri Iyer, “East Meets East: An Assessment of the Proposed Chennai-Vladivostok 
Maritime Corridor,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 286, December 2020, Observer Research Foundation & Lassi 
Heininen, Alexander Sergunin and Gleb Yarovoy, Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War, 
Valdai Discussion Club, Russia. Available at: https://www.uarctic.org/media/857300/arctic_eng.pdf accessed on 
19 April 2021.  
5 Bhagwat J., ‘Russia and India in the Arctic: A case for greater synergy’ Arktika i Sever [Arctic and North], 2020, 
no. 38, pp. 63-64.  
6 Mahika Sri Krishna, The Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor: The Implications for China, 22 November 2019, 
Institute for Security & Development Policy. Available at: https://isdp.eu/vladivostok-chennai-maritime-corridor/ 
accessed on 19 April 2021.  
7 Manu Pubby and Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘India, Russia defence logistics sharing pact likely to be signed by 
year-end’, The Economic Times, July 22 2020. Available at: 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-def-logistics-sharing-pact-by-year-
end/articleshow/77094253.cms?from=mdr  accessed on 19 April 2021.  
8 Stanislaw Skarzynski and Daniel Wong, ‘Is Putin’s Russia Seeking a New Balance Between China and the West?’ 
The Diplomat, August 28 2020. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/is-putins-russia-seeking-a-new-
balance-between-china-and-the-west/ accessed on 19 April 2021 & supra note 4.  
9 Press release, Rosneft Signs Contract with Indian Oil to Supply 2 Million Tonnes of Oil to India, Rosneft 
Information Division, 05 February 2020. Available at: https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/199701/ 




bilateral declarations of both the countries10. The significance of the Chennai-Vladivostok 
maritime corridor is being increasingly felt by India and is being supported by Russia and 
Japan who want to keep Chinese influence in check. Even though the Chennai-Vladivostok 
maritime corridor is beyond the scope of the NSR, Russia’s proposed Vostok Oil project, in 
the northern Russian Krasnoyarsk Territories, will utilize the NSR to transport oil eastwards 
and India has already principally agreed to be a part of the project.11 Hence India is 
materializing its ‘look far east’ policy bit by bit by strengthening its position all along the 
proposed Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor.12  
The multi-mode equivalent (through sea, rail and road) of the eastern maritime corridor on the 
western side is the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) joining Russia and 
India. It passes through “the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran and 
is then connected to St. Petersburg and North Europe via Russia. The grouping was formally 
expanded to include ten other countries, being Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus, then 
north and west to Turkey, Belarus, Syria and Bulgaria, Oman in the middle east, as well as 
north and east to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Studies have shown cost savings 
of 30% with a 40% less delivery time by using the INSTC route to Russia rather than the 
standard routing through sea from Mumbai to St Petersburg”.13  
The importance of this transport corridor is underscored by the fact that “a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to be on 
the cards this year, according to statements made by several Kremlin sources. Such a deal 
would be a major boost for India and Russia – the EAEU includes Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia”.14Therefore to conclude, we see India and Russia have 
come together and are signing deals literally left and right to exploit the resources in the 
Russian Arctic. 
India is keen on partnering with Russia on the Arctic Migratory Birds Initiative (AMBI) 
programme of the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group of the Arctic 
Council.15 Other fields of scientific research collaboration have also been identified but nothing 
 
10 There have been regular diplomatic exchanges and declarations. For example, see, India - Russia Joint 
Statement during visit of Prime Minister to Vladivostok, September 05 2019, India-Russia Joint Statement during 
visit of President of Russia to India, October 05, 2018, joint Declaration between the Republic of India and the 
Russian Federation on Deepening the Strategic Partnership to meet Global Challenges December 2009.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Joint oil exploration in south China sea in Vietnamese waters by Indian and Russian companies. See supra note 
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one with Vietnam is under negotiations. See, Abhijnan Rej, India and Japan Sign Military Logistics Agreement for 
All to See, The Diplomat. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/india-and-japan-sign-military-logistics-
agreement-for-all-to-see/ accessed on 19 April 2021. 
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13 Russia Briefing, Russia Connecting with India Via International North-South Transport Corridor, May 22 2017, 
Dezan Shira & Associates. Available at:  https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-connecting-india-via-
international-north-south-transport-corridor.html/  accessed on 19 April 2021.            
14 India Briefing, India-EAEU FTA Appears in Sight, Moscow Signals Support, January 8 2021, Dezan Shira & 
Associates. Available at:  https://www.india-briefing.com/news/india-eaeu-fta-appears-in-sight-positive-signal-
russia-21475.html/ accessed on 19 April 2021  & Eurasian Economic Commission, EAEU and India began formal 
negotiations on a free trade agreement, March 6 2017. Available at: 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/3-06-2017.aspx accessed on 19 April 2021. 
15 India is an observer to the Arctic migratory birds initiative (AMBI) programme of the Conservation of Arctic Flora 
and Fauna (CAFF) working group of the Arctic Council. See,  Gopal B Kateshiya, India and Russia propose to 
collaborate for conservation of migratory arctic birds, February 20 2020, the Indian express. Available at: 
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significant has been done on it this far.16 Furthermore, India is focused on Arctic scientific 
research collaboration mainly with its already time-tested partnering nation which shall be 
dealt with in the next section.     
 
India and Norway bilateral relations in the Arctic context; focusing on scientific 
research: The principal partner in India’s scientific endeavour in the Arctic is Norway. In fact, 
a former Norwegian foreign minister has said that “Science is the backbone of Indo-Norwegian 
cooperation in the Arctic” and that “India would be an ideal partner in international efforts on 
integrated ocean management and environmental protection”.17 The first Norwegian project in 
India was in 1952 involved with fisheries in the state of kerala. Since then both the countries 
have had more than 100 research projects together.18 India used a vessel chartered from a 
Norwegian firm to make its first voyage to the Norwegian claimed Antarctic land. Since then, 
the relations have been flourishing into research and logistical collaborations. Both the 
countries decided to extend these relations to the Arctic as well19 and in 2007, India launched 
its first scientific expedition to the Arctic from the international research facility at Ny-Alesund, 
Spitsbergen, Norway. A permanent Indian research centre called Himadri was established at 
Ny-Ålesund Island in 2008.20  
In 2014, an MoU on cooperation in the field of Earth System Sciences was signed between 
the Ministry of Earth Sciences India and the Norwegian Research Council.21 These research 
collaborations are carried out by institutions, inter alia, the Indian National Centre for Polar 
and Ocean Research (NCPOR), the Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI), the Nansen 
Environmental Research Centres (India and Norway) and the University Centre in Svalbard 
(UNIS). The Indian NCPOR is also a member of the Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth 
Observatory System (SIOS) and the Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee (NySMAC).22    
India and Canada bilateral relations in the Arctic context: India-Canada relations in the 
context of Arctic are at a very nascent stage. Besides the interesting over the north pole flight 
connections, The Indian NCPOR and the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) 
signed an MoU regarding collaboration on research in polar areas.23  
 
16 Yuri Sychev, as quoted in, ‘Russia, India plan to cooperate in Arctic research’, 29 MAY 2018, TASS Russian 
news agency. Available at: https://tass.com/economy/1007085 accessed on 19 April 2021. 
17 Børge Brende, ‘From the Third pole to the North Pole’, the Hindu, OCTOBER 15 2014. Available at: 
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/from-the-third-pole-to-the-north-pole/article6500998.ece accessed on 
19 April 2021. 
18 Nils Ragnar Kamsvåg interviewed by Omair Ahmad, India-Norway cooperation from the Arctic to the monsoon, 
December 4, 2018, the Third Pole. Available at: https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/climate/india-norway-cooperation/    
accessed on 19 April 2021. 
19 See, the High North, Norwegian Embassy in Delhi, Government of Norway. Available at: 
https://www.norway.no/en/india/values-priorities/high-north/  accessed on 19 April 2021. 
20 Arctic Expedition, 8/14/2018, ministry of earth sciences India. https://www.moes.gov.in/programmes/arctic-
expedition  accessed on 19 April 2021. 
21 Memorandum of Understanding between India and Norway, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, 14 
October 2014. Available at: https://moes.gov.in/writereaddata/files/MoU%20%20-%20%2015%20-
%20RCN%2C%20Norway%20-%202014.pdf accessed on 19 April 2021. 
22 The Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observatory System, ‘New SIOS member!’ June 14, 2019. Available at: 
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Committee, National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research (NCPOR), India. Available at: 
https://nyalesundresearch.no/members/national-centre-for-polar-and-ocean-research-ncpor-india/  accessed on 
19 April 2021. 
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India and Sweden bilateral relations in the Arctic context: In 2015, a Letter of Intent (LoI) 
was signed between the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES), India and the Ministry of 
Education and Research, Sweden on cooperation in Polar and Ocean Science research.24 
This LoI was later given the shape of an MoU in 2019.25 Recently the prime ministers of both 
the countries highlighted the progress made under the MoU by the Indian NCPOR and the 
Swedish Polar Research Secretariat and emphasized the need for a stronger collaboration 
under the framework of the AC.26  
India and Finland bilateral relations in the Arctic context: India’s bilateral relations with 
Finland in the Arctic context have been rather weak. The most the two countries have done to 
work together on Polar issues is a joint statement by the prime ministers of both the countries 
highlighting the potential of polar research collaboration.27   
India and Denmark bilateral relations in the Arctic context: Analogous to Finland, India’s 
relations with Denmark in context of the Arctic are limited to joint Prime Ministers’ declarations 
on Arctic cooperation within the framework of AC.28 The Innovation Centre of Denmark 
underscores the need for Denmark and India to enter into agreements/MoUs over scientific 
research collaboration on the verge of India-Sweden and India-Norway agreements.29 
India and Iceland bilateral relations in the Arctic context: India has no meaningful 
engagement with Iceland in the context of Arctic. The closest both countries get is a joint 
statement by the ministers of 25 countries during the first-ever Arctic Science Ministerial 
including India and Iceland to assert the importance of collaboration in scientific research in 
the Arctic.30 
India and the US bilateral relations in the Arctic context: The USA is India’s main 
international partner in polar research.31 This statement is likely true in the context of 
Antarctica but given India’s brief presence in the Arctic thus far and collaborations with 
Norway, its validity is doubtful in the case of the Arctic. However, India and the US have deep 
and strategic bilateral relations which are growing stronger by the day. India and the US have 
a number of MoUs on scientific research collaboration and a few significant ones are 
mentioned here. In 2008, the Indian Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES) and the American 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) entered into an umbrella MoU for 
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cooperation in earth observation and earth sciences.32 Another similar MoU was done 
between the MoES India and the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR) in 
2014 to collaborate in the field of earth system sciences. The space agencies of both the 
countries have a wide range of collaboration agreements regarding space technologies.33 On 
the defence front, India and the US have signed the three foundational agreements which 
pave the way for closer and intertwined military operations.34 This decision by India has been 
seen by some as moving away from Russia. Owing to the necessity of both India and the US 
to counterbalance growing Chinese global influence, they have joined hands, whereas on the 
other hand, this has not affected the India and Russia military ties and they continue to be the 
same good old allies. Even though none of the aforementioned agreements explicitly mentions 
the Arctic, given the widening scope of the relations between India and the US, it is imperative 
that in the future these collaborations shall be useful for joint research and defence 
cooperation in the Arctic as well.  
Hence, we see that India is interested in scientific research alliance with the smaller Nordic 
Arctic nations whereas military and defence alliance with the bigger superpowers. We see a 
classical example of causality applicable in the case of India in context of the Arctic. Russia 
seems to be the closest ally of India given their historic relations and mutual trust which have 
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Chapter 6 India’s engagement with International and regional organizations in the 
Arctic: 
Even though the majority of decisions impacting the arctic are taken by the eight arctic states 
and their legislative and executive bodies1, a multitude of circum-arctic and regional 
institutions also shape Arctic law and policy.2 The arctic region has become this exemplary 
model of cooperation in policy making wherein all stakeholders, irrespective of their power and 
position, influence the governance of the region. In the following paragraphs, this model of 
cooperation will be examined in detail and India’s role in it will be ascertained. Though there 
are numerous institutions of cooperation operating in the arctic, only the ones with which India 
interacts on some level will be examined for the purpose of this chapter.  
Section 6.1 International Organizations and their legal position under International 
Law:  
Before delving into these organizations, it would be relevant to discuss a bit about the 
theoretical framework around international organizations and their legal position in relation to 
the subjects of international law.  
Draft article 2 (a) of the Draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations 2011, 
defines international organizations as “an organization established by a treaty or other 
instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal 
personality. International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other 
entities”.3  
Under the above definition, to be recognized as an international organization, an international 
entity must fulfil two criteria i.e., firstly, be established by an instrument governed by 
international law and secondly, possess an international legal personality.  
It is noted that an international organization possesses international legal personality if it 
satisfies the following criteria: 
“(1) a permanent association of states, or other organizations, with lawful objects, 
 equipped with organs;  
(2)  distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organization and its 
member states; and  
 
1 Piotr Graczyk, "Observers in the Arctic Council - Evolution and Prospects," Yearbook of Polar Law 3 (2011): 575-
634 pp 598-599.   
2 For example, even though concluded under the auspices of the Arctic council through its task forces, the 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic [Arctic search and 
rescue (SAR) agreement] and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response 
in the Arctic were entered into a legally binding treaty only by the eight arctic states. Refer to the Nuuk declaration, 
7th ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, 12 May 2011, Nuuk Greenland & Kiruna declaration, 8th ministerial 
meeting of the Arctic Council, 12 May 2011, Kiruna Sweden. 
3 International Law Commission, sixty-third session Geneva, 26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 August 2011, 
Responsibility of international organizations, Texts and titles of draft articles 1 to 67 adopted by the Drafting 




(3)  the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely within 
the national systems of one or more states.”4 
The characteristics imputing international legal personality to an international organization 
have been widely debated among international law scholars. Due to the existence of a plethora 
of international organizations with different mandates and objectives, it has never been 
possible to precisely identify whether a particular international organization possesses legal 
personality unless that organization has either expressly exercised or failed to exercise its 
rights and obligations as a legal personality on the international plane.5  
 
A subject of international law is defined as a body with rights and obligations internationally 
which has the capacity to bring claims to maintain its rights and against which claims can be 
brought for breach of obligations.6 Even though some experts of international law differ on the 
meaning of the word ‘subject’ of international law and don’t equate it with international legal 
personality7, the author would like to derive subjectivity under international law from the 
personality of an international institution under international law. In other words, an 
international organization is a subject of international law if it has an international legal 
personality.  
To conclude from the above discussion, mere possession of international legal personality 
makes an entity a subject of international law and hence bestows it with rights and obligations 
under international law. Hence an international organization is a subject of international law if 
it fulfills the criteria to be identified as an international legal personality.  
Section 6.2 The Arctic council, its legal personality and India’s role as an observer:  
The Arctic Council was established as a “high level forum” rather than an international 
organization among the eight arctic states as stated in the declaration establishing the arctic 
council8. Its predecessor, the AEPS was also approved as a political rather than a legal 
commitment. Even though a few elements linked to legal personalities have been bestowed 
upon the council in the past years9, it was expressly established and continues to remain 
without legal personality10. However, there is the other side to the coin. If the AC were to 
 
4 Id at p 157.  
5 See the discussion on ‘presumptive personality’ by Jan Klabbers in supra note 7 at pp 49-50.  
6 Crawford, James, Subjects of international law, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 9th Edition, (p. 
105) 4 (9th July 2019).  
7 For example, Jan Kalbbers distinguishes subjectivity and legal personality under international law. See, Jan 
Klabbers 3rd ed, An Introduction to International Organizations Law, Cambridge pp 41-42. 
8 Declaration on The Establishment of The Arctic Council, Joint Communique Of The Governments Of The Arctic 
Countries On The Establishment Of The Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada September 19, 1996.   
9 A permanent secretariat has been established in Tromso, Norway. A host country agreement between Norway 
and the arctic council secretariat was signed recognizing the secretariat as a legal person having the capacity to 
perform legal functions in Norway. The secretariat has also been granted certain privileges, inviolability and legal 
immunity. Several legally binding agreements have been concluded under the auspices of the AC. A Project 
Support Instrument (PSI) was established to maintain collective funds for the activities of the AC. Further reading: 
Loukacheva, N. (2020). The Arctic Council and “Law-Making”. The northern review, 109–135 & NEFCO, ‘Arctic 
Council Project Support Instrument becomes operational’, 24.09.2014, The Nordic Environment Finance 
Corporation (NEFCO) available at: https://www.nefco.org/news/arctic-council-project-support-instrument-
becomes-operational/ accessed on 21 April 2021.  
10 All speculations about the international legal personality of the Arctic council come to a halt and it is clear that 
the Council possesses no legal personality, since one of the founding member states, the US, agreed only to the 
establishment of a body without legal personality (refer to the ‘will theory’ about creation of international legal 
personalities for example as discussed by Jan Klabbers id 6 at pp 46-47. For more refer to, Evan T. Bloom, 




undergo our international legal personality test, it would have to satisfy all the three criteria 
setup above. The AC satisfies the first criterion since it is a permanent association of states 
with lawful objects and a permanent secretariat. It also satisfies the second criterion since it 
has a distinct personality than its member states. As far as the third criterion is concerned, this 
question has drawn eternal debates whether “existence of legal powers exercisable on the 
international plane” can be categorically answered for a whole lot of International 
Organizations and specifically the AC in this case. As noted above, it is impossible to ascertain 
if a certain international institution has legal powers exercisable on the international plane 
unless the institution has either expressly exercised or failed to exercise them. Same holds 
true for the AC, since there has not been any instance so far where the council has either 
expressly exercised or failed to exercise its powers on the international plane. Hence, we are 
not in a position to definitively answer whether the AC has international legal personality and 
is a subject of International law. However, if the author were to vote, the AC would be without 
a legal personality and hence is not a subject of International Law.  
Continuing the tradition of the AEPS, the AC also invites, as observers, governmental and 
non-governmental organizations and non-arctic states, which the council determines can 
contribute to its work.11 Observers continue to be invited at the meetings and other activities 
of the council and its subsidiary bodies, unless their activities are found at “odds with the 
Council’s declaration or the rules of procedure” at which point their membership is suspended 
by a consensus among the states. Observers have to continue being relevant to the work of 
the Arctic Council and should be able to make meaningful contributions to its work otherwise 
the observer status will be revoked12. The rules of procedure for the working of the AC contain 
rights, obligations and code of conduct of the observers in the meetings of the AC and its 
subsidiaries. The rules of procedure were amended in 2013, removing the confusion between 
permanent or rather ‘recurring’13 and Ad hoc observers and a detailed guideline for 
accreditation and review of the observers was prescribed. It is relevant to note here that the 
role of an ad hoc observer is synonymous to that of an expert and hence doesn't need to be 
mentioned separately. In 2013, the AC published an observer manual for subsidiary bodies to 
“guide the Council’s subsidiary bodies in relation to meeting logistics and the role played by 
Observers”.  
India’s scientific exploration in the Arctic solidified in August 2007 when India launched its first 
scientific expedition to the Arctic which commenced from the international research facility at 
Ny-Alesund, Spitsbergen, Norway. A permanent Indian research centre called Himadri was 
established at Alesund Island in 2008.14 In 2011, India participated in the Arctic science 
summit as an observer and in 2012 it was elected to the International Arctic Science 
Committee (IASC).   India deployed its first underwater moored observatory named IndARC 
 
722 & Piotr Graczyk, "Observers in the Arctic Council - Evolution and Prospects," Yearbook of Polar Law 3 (2011): 
575-634 p. 599. 
11 Arctic Council Rules of Procedure and the annexures.  
12 Ibid.  
13 It would not be appropriate to call them permanent observers since they can be removed quite easily and hence 
there is no permanency in their tenure. Recurring is a better word since their observer status is subject to constant 
approval by the AC. See Jessen H. (2018) Arctic Strategies of the EU and Non-Arctic States: Identifying Some 
Common Elements. In: Hildebrand L., Brigham L., Johansson T. (eds) Sustainable Shipping in a Changing Arctic. 
WMU Studies in Maritime Affairs, vol 7. Springer, Cham.  
14 Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, ‘Arctic Expedition’, available at: 




at Kongsfjorden in Spitsbergen to study the relationship between the Indian monsoon and the 
Arctic region and carry out various other research activities.15 
Owing to its track record on Antarctic (polar) research, contribution in Arctic research and a 
promising future16, at the ministerial meeting of 2013, India was admitted as an observer to 
the Arctic council.17  
Having applied for the observer status of the AC, India agreed to abide by the rules of 
procedure of the AC. India recognized the sovereignty of the Arctic states, their rights and 
acceded to their jurisdiction in the Arctic. It also recognized that the existing legal framework 
(mainly the law of the sea) was a fundamental precept for management of the Arctic ocean. It 
further recognized its willingness and capabilities to respect and contribute to upholding the 
interests of the indigenous and other Arctic inhabitants.18  
Since its inception as an observer, India has carried out numerous research projects in 
consonance with the objectives of the various working groups of the AC viz. studies of Mercury 
Geochemistry in the Sediments of Kongsfjorden and atmospheric aerosols over the Arctic 
under the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Monitoring of Arctic Precipitation and 
glaciers  in Ny-Ålesund and Kongsfjorden system of Arctic region under the Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Programme (AMAP), the study of bacteria diversity and the Arctic Migratory 
Birds Initiative under the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF).19  
6.2.1 Removal of observers; a potential future issue:  
One potential issue concerning removal of observers might arise in the future. According to 
the rules of procedure “Once observer status has been granted, Observers shall be invited to 
the meetings and other activities of the Arctic Council unless SAOs decide otherwise. 
Observer status shall continue for such time as consensus exists among Ministers.  Any 
Observer that engages in activities which are at odds with the Council’s Declaration, or these 
Rules of Procedure shall have its status as an Observer suspended”. As a principle, all 
decisions in the AC are made with consensus.20 Drawing parallels to the decision-making 
procedure of the dispute settlement body of the WTO, where ‘reverse or negative consensus’ 
is also a prevalent mechanism to arrive at decisions.21 In case of the AC though, under the 
‘reverse consensus’, there has to be a consensus of all the members to approve the negative 
 
15 Venkatesan R, Krishnan K, Arul Muthiah M, et al. Indian moored observatory in the Arctic for long-term in situ 
data collection. The International Journal of Ocean and Climate Systems. 2016;7(2):55-61.  
16 See, Navtej Sarna, India: The Third Pole, The Circle WWF Magazine No. 3 2014, pp 18-19.  
https://d2ouvy59p0dg6k.cloudfront.net/downloads/circle_0314_asia_web.pdf accessed on 21 April & Yereth 
Rosen, ‘From the south, keen interest in the Arctic and the Arctic Council’ Alaska Dispatch News May 15, 2017, 
Arctic Today. Available at: https://www.arctictoday.com/from-the-south-keen-interest-in-the-arctic-and-the-arctic-
council/  accessed on 21 April.  
17 Kiruna Declaration Kiruna, Sweden, 15 May 2013. 
18 Arctic Council Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting 
Iqaluit, Canada September 17-18, 1998. Revised by the Arctic Council at the Eighth Arctic Council Ministerial 
Meeting Kiruna, Sweden May 15, 2013. Also see, India’s Engagement with Arctic Council, December 2016, India 
observer activity report to the AC, p.3.  
19 Projects implemented in Arctic, National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, ministry of earth sciences India. 
Available at: http://ncaor.gov.in/arctics/display/391-projects-implemented accessed 19 April 2021 & Chauhan, 
Manish, Republic of India's 2018 Observer Review report, 2019-03, The Republic of India's 2018 Review report to 
the Arctic Council, on participation in Arctic cooperation and AC work.  
20 As written in the Ottawa declaration and rules of procedure.  
21 See more on the decision-making procedure of the dispute settlement body of the WTO. WTO Bodies involved 
in the dispute settlement process, WTO. Available at: 




decision being taken (in this case removal of an observer). The AC has not dealt with such 
sophisticated and complex situations so far which would need a more elaborated procedure 
to make decisions (Unlike the dispute settlement body of the WTO). Even though the AC has 
not removed any observer till date, it would be interesting to see how the word ‘consensus’ 
will be interpreted when it comes to removing an observer.  
From the above discussion it is inferred that observers have a significant22 but restricted23 and 
historically marginalized24and symbolic role to play at the arctic council under the present 
setup of the council. To study the position of observers in the AC, analogy could be drawn by 
the standing/position of the AC in International Law. It would not be incorrect to say that the 
observers are to the Arctic Council what Arctic Council is to International Law.  
The arctic states are not interested in empowering the AC more than what is just enough to 
continue its mandate on sustainable development and environment protection and want to 
deal with potential legal issues bilaterally/multilaterally under the already existing mechanisms 
of the law of the sea.25   
Regulating the Arctic requires a different approach compared to the Antarctic because of the 
geographical differences between the regions as discussed by numerous authors in the past. 
Furthermore, the existing legal regime in the Arctic leaves no scope of a treaty like the 
Antarctic since rights and obligations of the Arctic states are already governed by and settled 
through the UNCLOS and the evolving Arctic regional governance regime with multiple 
institutions involved. India is better off pursuing its ambitions in the Arctic by entering into 
bilateral agreements with the Arctic states which it has been doing26. For example, Indian 
fossil fuel companies signed agreements with their Russian counterparts for exploitation of 
 
22 As observed above, for example, India has carried out significant projects in the arctic which align with the 
objectives of the working groups of the Arctic council. Other observers have also made valuable contributions to 
the environmental research in the arctic. Furthermore, at all the ministerial meetings of the AC, the role of the 
observers is always commended., see Rovaniemi Ministerial Statements Rovaniemi, Finland 7 May 2019.  
23 The membership of the non-arctic state observers is ad hoc since they are not a part of the council due to their 
geographical dispositions. Whenever an observer fails to satisfy the council with the need to remain an observer 
and does not reinforce it time and again, the observer is dropped from the council. The observers stand last in the 
order of priority when it comes to representation at the council proceedings. Even though the observers can initiate 
proposals for research projects, their funding for a project cannot be more than that of a member state, unless 
otherwise agreed by the council. For more discussion on the influence of the observers in the council, see, Andrew 
Chater (2016) Explaining Non-Arctic States in the Arctic Council, Strategic Analysis, 40:3, pp 173-184.  
24 Supra note 1.  
25 For example, under the Arctic SAR agreement and the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA) agreement, the parties have agreed to resolve disputes 
through direct negotiations. Under the Ilulissat declaration passed in 2008, the member states reaffirmed the 
sufficiency of the existing legal framework to deal with disputes and challenges in the Arctic and that no other legal 
framework was required. Furthermore, the council does not deal with issues of military security since the declaration 
discourages raising such issues at the council fora.   
26 Since observers have no rights whatsoever under the AC, they are better off dealing with the Arctic states 
bilaterally. Furthermore, the observer states have full membership and hence decision-making powers in other 
International organizations where also decisions affecting the Arctic are taken. For example, UNCLOS, the UN 
based climate regime, Stockholm POPs convention etc. Shiloh Rainwater, 'International Law and the Globalization 
of the Arctic: Assessing the Rights of Non-Arctic States in the High North ' (2015) 30 Emory Int'l L Rev 115  p136. 
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fossils in the Russian Arctic27. India also has research agreements with Norway such as the 
INDNOR programme28.  
Sensationalized articles and speculations about the exploitation of the Arctic resources by the 
Asian states seem to exaggerate and twist the ground reality in the Arctic.29 Not only is the 
viability of Arctic resource extraction yet to be established, moreover there are better 
alternatives to these potential Arctic “goldmines” when it comes to fossil fuels.30 At the best, 
therefore, India is better off focusing on mineral and seaport development in the Barents 
region.31  
6.2.2 The case for making the observers at par with permanent participants in the AC:   
One suggestion that has circulated in the academic community regarding strengthening the 
position of observers in the AC is to form an advisory body consisting of relevant and interested 
non-Arctic state observers. Even though details about such a body and its precise relationship 
with the council has not been commented upon, it seems to be implausible at the moment that 
the Arctic states would even slightly upgrade the observers’ status in the council.32 With the 
globalization of the Arctic issues and the intertwined nature of Arctic and global phenomena, 
it is important that non Arctic states play a more influential role at the AC.33 The non-arctic 
states should deliver a joint message demanding the setting up of such an advisory committee 
and make it at par with the status of the permanent participants. 
The Arctic Athabaskan council AAC, in the past has mentioned “Increasing the role and 
participation of observer states in activities of the council” as one of its key suggestions as the 
way forward for the AC. The Senior Arctic Officials, in a report recommending improvements 
in the working of the AC, highlighted the importance of expanding the role of the observers.34 
The arctic is covered under international law of the sea. There are regions in the arctic that 
are the high seas and the Area and hence all countries have equal rights of participation to 
make laws for those regions. All countries also enjoy certain rights in the territorial seas, straits 
and the EEZs of the arctic states. If the AC makes rules for those areas and the other countries 
27 Atle Staalesen, ‘New Delhi confirms its stake in the new Arctic oil project’, January 16, 2020, the Barents 
Observer, Available at: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ecology/2020/01/new-delhi-confirms-indian-stake-
rosnefts-new-arctic-oil-project accessed on 19 April 2021.  
28 The Research Council of Norway, The Norwegian Programme for Research Cooperation with India – INDNOR 
Work plan 2018 – 2021, Available at: 
https://www.forskningsradet.no/siteassets/programmer/programplaner/indnor-work-programme.pdf accessed on 
19 April 2021,  
29 Julie Babin & Frederic Lasserre (2019) Asian states at the Arctic Council: perceptions in Western States, Polar 
Geography, 42:3, 145-159. 
30 Ibid & Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Vincent Gallucci, The return of China, post-Cold War Russia, and the Arctic: 
Changes on land and at sea, Marine Policy, Volume 72, 2016, Pages 240-245.  Available at:  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X16302214 accessed on 22 April 2021. Furthermore, 
countries are rapidly progressing towards replacing the current energy sources with renewable energy.  
31 Whitney Lackenbauer, P. ‘India and the arctic: revisionist aspirations, arctic realities’ Jindal Global Law Review 
8, 34 (2017). 
32 ‘Interests And Roles Of Non-Arctic States In The Arctic’ Seminar presented by the National Capital Branch of 
the Canadian International Council and the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, Ottawa,October 5, 2011 Report. 
33 Academicians at large agree that the role of the observers in the AC should be strengthened. For example see, 
Heather Exner-Pirot et al, Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council February 5, 2019, The Arctic 
Institute. Available at: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/form-function-future-arctic-council/ accessed on 21 April 
2021.  
34 Arctic Council, SAOs Report to Ministers on the Review of The Arctic Council Structures, at 4,9, SAO2002/A/8.0 
(May 15, 2002).  
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don't have a right to vote on those decisions, it is against the international law of the sea. 35 
Section 6.3 Other regional organizations in the Arctic and India’s involvement with 
them:   
Arctic Council and Ilulissat, “Arctic 5”: Even though the Arctic 5 have issued separate 
statements in the past36, nothing has materialized from those and the actual work is carried 
out via the Arctic council and other organizations. However, the Arctic 5 is an informal group 
with infinite possibilities and is not bound by any policies or procedures and hence India can 
engage with it outside of the AC.37  
The Arctic Economic Council (AEC) An independent organization formed by the arctic 
council in 2014 to facilitate sustainable economic activities and business development in the 
Arctic Same as the legal nature of the AC. The AEC is the linkage of the AC to businesses in 
the Arctic region as well as businesses outside the Arctic region which are interested in doing 
business with the Arctic region. The AEC also works as the AC’s underlying steer vis-a-vis the 
future economic policy in the Arctic.38 India has not had any interactions with the AEC in the 
past, however, it is likely to do so in the future. For example, FICCI and the AEC. 
The Nordic Council is inter-parliamentary, is led by the secretary general, its members are 
the MPs of the member states and nominated by party groups, it is run by a presidium “two 
annual meetings – the Ordinary Session (held in the country holding presidency of the nordic 
council, to select the president, vice president and the members of the presidium) and the 
Theme Session (held in the country holding the presidency of the nordic council of ministers), 
at which the Nordic politicians make decisions on issues that they call on the Nordic 
governments to implement. Work is done through committees and party groups. The Nordic 
council of ministers is inter-governmental, is led by the PMs of the Nordics, “In practice 
responsibility for the co-operation is delegated to the Ministers for Nordic Co-operation (MR-
SAM) and to the Nordic Committee for Co-operation (NSK)”.  
The Nordic Atlantic Co-operation (NORA) is an intergovernmental agency and part of the 
Nordic Council of Ministers' regional policy programme. Though India has had a few 
interactions with the Nordic Council in the past (first India Nordic summit in 2018), all the Nordic 
council members are the members of the AC too and hence everything Arctic related has been 
discussed at the AC platform.  
Barents Euro Arctic council (BEAC) and the Barents Regional Council (can be considered 
a subsidiary of the BEAC): India attended a special EU Arctic forum organized under the 
Swedish chairmanship of the BEAC in 2019 to “discuss international relations in the Arctic, 
ecology and climate change, investment cooperation, the Internet and communications''. The 
35 Yoshinobu Takei, ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic: 
an assessment’, Aegean Rev of the Law of the Sea (2013) 2:81–109, pp 94-95.   
36 2008 Ilulissat Declaration Adopted in Ilulissat, Greenland on 28 May 2008, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, 
Greenland, 27 – 29 May 2008.   
37 Andreas Kuersten, ‘The Arctic Five Versus the Arctic Council’ Arctic yearbook 2016 briefing notes. Available at: 
https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2016/2016-briefing-notes/205-the-arctic-five-versus-the-arctic-council  
accessed on 22 April 2021.  
38 Arctic Council, Ninth Ministerial Meeting Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada 24 - 25 April 2015, p 24, Information for 
Press. Available at: https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/921/ACMMCA09_Iqaluit_2015_PRESS_BROCHURE_18_April_2015.pdf?se




Barents region is well aware of the potential it has in terms of minerals and ores. It also looks 
towards India as a potential collaborator in terms of extraction and usage of its natural 
resources39.  
In 2012 in recognition of India`s input in exploration of the High North, India was elected to the 
Council of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) which is a nongovernmental 
organization bringing together all countries (despite their geographical location) conducting 
Arctic Research. India is increasingly interacting with research initiatives in the Arctic such as 
the Arctic frontiers and the Arctic circle. India is one of the founding members of Asian Forum 
for Polar Sciences as well as member of International Cooperation in Ridge-crest Studies 
(InterRidge), Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee (NySMAC) and Polar Earth 
Observering Network (POLENET). 
India has no engagement with the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Pacific 
Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), DEEA - the European Parliament's Delegation for 
Northern cooperation, the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) which 
played a key role in the establishment of the Arctic council, the European Polar Board (EPB), 
















39  Barents Euro-Arctic Council, The joint Barents transport plan, p 25. Available at: 




Chapter 7 Concluding remarks and India’s draft arctic policy:  
In this paper, provisions of International treaty law applicable in the Arctic and the disputes 
arising therein have been analyzed in detail. Such an analysis is considered necessary 
because these issues have never been analyzed from India’s perspective before. For 
example, the arctic passages have been analyzed so far by authors from the respective states 
that dispute the passages such as the US and Canada for the NWP and US and Russia for 
the NSR. These passages have never been analyzed from the perspective of India. India’s 
interests are best served when these passages are well regulated by their respective coastal 
states as well as freedom of passage for other states is well maintained. This should be set 
forth in the Arctic policy of India that India firmly stands by the application of the law of the sea 
principles vis-a-vis the arctic passages and recognizes the sovereignty of the coastal states 
under the LOS principles but also stands by the right of passage of the international community 
through these passages. India need not risk alienating the coastal states by questioning their 
sovereignty over these passages but at the same time also assert its right to passage through 
these passages under LOS convention. Extending this analogy to the whole of Arctic, India’s 
official policy towards the Arctic should carve out a middle path between the sovereignty of 
the Arctic states and the right of non-Arctic states to be active in the Arctic with the help of the 
existing provisions the LOS convention and their interpretation. This paper has also analyzed 
India’s state Practice in the foresaid issues, and it has been determined that mutualities exist 
between the two regions which could serve as lessons one could take from another or even 
subjects of future collaboration. We see that most of the actual work on the ground is carried 
out through bilateral efforts and hence India has carefully teamed up with different Arctic states 
in a particular sector where it is most advantageous to both the parties, for example, research 
association with Norway whereas military, energy, and trade association with Russia. There 
are some other Arctic countries (e.g., Finland, Iceland, Canada) with potential future 
collaboration opportunities for India. A recent collaborative project between Finnish and Indian 
Universities to strengthen mutual research and education among indigenous and tribal people 
of both the countries40 is a sign of such opportunities being materialized and is a welcome 












40 Arctic Centre, Finland and India to develop indigenous and tribal peoples' studies, 23.10.2020, Arctic Centre 
University of Lapland. Available at:  https://www.arcticcentre.org/news/Finland-and-India-to-develop-indigenous-






Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, 
ICJ Rep 2009, p. 213, para. 64 ...................................................................................... 4-62 
Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. p 130 ..................................... 4-33 
ICJ Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. 
Norway) (1993) ............................................................................................................... 4-30 
ICJ, Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Judgment of 18 November 
2012, para 118 ............................................................................................................... 4-27 
In the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (“IJzeren Rijn”) Railway, (Belgium and the 
Netherlands), 24 May 2005, para. 53 ............................................................................. 4-61 
Mox Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (2002), 41 I.L.M. 405, p 82 .......................... 4-44 
N. AtI. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910)  at 197, 206-207 4-33 
Statutes 
The Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976, Constitution of India. .......................... 4-29 
the Indian Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, sec. 9 ...................................... 4-29 
The territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, and other maritime zones 
act, 1976. Act no. 80 of 1976, 25th August 1976, section 6 (2), government of India. .... 4-29 
Other Authorities 
332nd Report, Demands for Grants (2020-2021) of the Ministry of Earth Sciences, 
Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, 
Environment, Forests and Climate Change, Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha ............. 3-21 
Bernardo Zuleta, “Introduction”, in The Law of the Sea. United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea ............................................................................................................... 4-24 
CLCS, ‘Note by the Secretariat at Open Meeting of CLCS’, 1 May 2000, Doc. CLCS/26, 20 
January 2005, para. 9. ................................................................................................... 4-27 
Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments, Amendments to the 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW), 1978 ................................................................................................ 4-48 
Consideration and Adoption Of Amendments To Mandatory Instruments, Draft amendments 
to MARPOL Annexes I, II, IV and V to make use of environment-related provisions of the 
Polar Code mandatory, Marine Environment Protection Committee 68th session Agenda 
item 6 MEPC 68/6 21 January 2015 .............................................................................. 4-49 
Documents of the fourteenth session including the report of the Commission to the General 
Assembly, Yearbook of The International Law Commission, 1962 Volume II p 23 ........ 4-40 
First Report of the International Law Association Committee established to study the outer 
continental shelf’ (2004) 23 pp 22-23 ............................................................................. 4-27 
IMO, Marine Environment Protection Committee, 68th session Agenda item 21, 5 June 
2015, IMO Doc. 68/21/Add.1 Annex 10, page 7 & supra note 23 at p 19 ...................... 4-48 
IMO, Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 53rd session, Agenda item 26, 15 
March ............................................................................................................................. 4-48 
IMO, Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 53rd session, supra note 459, IMO, . 4-
48 




Interests And Roles Of Non-Arctic States In The Arctic’ Seminar presented by the National 
Capital Branch of the Canadian International Council and the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security 
Program, Ottawa,October 5, 2011 Report ...................................................................... 6-76 
International Law Commission, sixty-third session Geneva, 26 April–3 June and 4 July–12 
August 2011, Responsibility of international organizations, Texts and titles of draft articles 
1 to 67 adopted by the Drafting Committee on second reading in 2011, A/CN.4/L.778, 30 
May 2011 ........................................................................................................................ 6-71 
Law of the Sea: A Policy Primer, chapter 2,  The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 
Tufts University ............................................................................................................... 4-24 
Lok Sabha, the lower house (house of the people) of the Indian parliament, Unstarred 
Question ......................................................................................................................... 3-21 
Marine Environment Protection Committee 60th session Agenda item 5 MEPC 60/5 14 
September 2009 Consideration and Adoption of Amendments to Mandatory Instruments 4-
51 
Marine Environment Protection Committee, 69th session Agenda item 4 MEPC 69/INF.17, 
‘Harmful Aquatic Organisms in Ballast Water Ship-mediated bioinvasions in the Arctic: 
pathways and control strategies’, Submitted by FOEI, p 37, 9 February 2016 .............. 4-53 
Maritime Jurisdiction and Boundaries in the Arctic Region,” Department of Geography, 
Durham University, July 2019 ........................................................................................ 4-27 
Maritime Safety Committee 99th session Agenda item 22 MSC 99/22* 5 June 2018 Report 
of The Maritime Safety Committee on Its Ninety-Ninth Session p 43 ............................ 4-50 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, The Netherlands .......................................... 4-24 
Report of The Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Sixty-Eighth Session, Marine 
Environment Protection Committee 68th session Agenda item 21 MEPC 68/21 29 May 
2015 pp 44-47. ............................................................................................................... 4-48 
Resolution A.999(25) Adopted on 29 November 2007 Guidelines on Voyage Planning for 
Passenger Ships Operating in Remote Areas, IMO Assembly ...................................... 4-50 
Seafarers' Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code, Maritime Safety 
Committee 97th session Agenda item 3 MSC 97/3/2, 15 August 2016 ......................... 4-48 
Statement by the chairman of CLCS,  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
the Delineation of the Continental Shelf: Opportunities and Challenges for States: Open 
Meeting of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Held on 1 May 2000 .. 4-
31 
Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response, 8th session Agenda item 5 PPR 8/5, 
Reduction of The Impact on The Arctic Of Emissions of Black Carbon from International 
Shipping, 18 December 2020 ......................................................................................... 4-52 
Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response, 8th Session Agenda Item 5 PPR 
8/INF.3, Reduction of The Impact on The Arctic Of Emissions of Black Carbon from 
International Shipping International Technical Working Group on the Development of a 
Standardized Sampling, Conditioning and Measurement Protocol for Black Carbon 
Emissions from Marine Engines, 15 January 2021 ........................................................ 4-52 
Tullio Treves, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 2008 p 3 4-
24 
U.S. Department of the Navy, Annotated Supplement for the Commander’s Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10), paras. 1.5.1 & 2.4.1 .............. 4-25 
UNHCR, Analysis of North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 20 February 1969 ................ 4-26 
United Nations, Memorandum prepared by the UN Secretariat on Historic Bays: Doc. 







U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, 
Rules of Procedure of the Commission, U.N. Doc. CLCS/40/Rev.1 .............................. 4-28 
Arctic Council Rules of Procedure and the annexures ...................................................... 6-73 
Latest Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules, 1959 notification G.S.R. 1288. Government of 
India. ............................................................................................................................... 4-29 
 
Journal articles 
Cavnar, Anna (2009) "Accountability and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf: Deciding Who Owns the Ocean Floor," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 42: 
Iss. 3, Article 4 pp 388-389 ............................................................................................. 4-26 
A.K. Sydnes et al. ‘‘International Cooperation on Search and Rescue in the Arctic.’’ Arctic 
Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 8, 2017, pp. 109-136 ................................................. 4-54 
Alexander Vylegzhanin, Ivan Bunik, Ekaterina Torkunova & Elena Kienko (2020) Navigation 
in the Northern Sea Route: interaction of Russian and international applicable law, The 
Polar Journal, 10:2, p 286 .............................................................................................. 4-39 
Andreas Østhagen and Andreas Raspotnik, ‘Why Is the European Union Challenging 
Norway Over Snow Crab? Svalbard, Special Interests, and Arctic Governance’ Ocean 
Development & International Law 2019, Vol. 50, Nos. 2–3, 190–208 p 196 .................. 4-64 
Anuradha Nayak, ‘Himadri and the Global Politics of Melting Ice: India's Arctic Presence and 
the March towards Global Governance’ (2013) 5 Yearbook of Polar Law (Brill) 651 ..... 1-19 
Athanasios Yupsanis, ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries 1989–2009: An Overview, Nordic Journal of International Law 79 
(2010) pp 433–438 ......................................................................................................... 4-65 
Baker, Betsy. "Law, Science, and the Continental Shelf: The Russian Federation and the 
Promise of Arctic Cooperation." American University International Law Review, vol. 25, no. 
2, 2010, pp 264-265 ....................................................................................................... 4-26 
Bernard Oxman, in “Legal Regimes of the Arctic,” 40 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 315–334, at 334 (1988 .............................................................................. 4-43 
Bjarni Már Magnússon (2017) ‘Can the United States Establish the Outer Limits of Its 
Extended Continental Shelf Under International Law?’, Ocean Development & 
International Law, 48:1, pp 2-5 ....................................................................................... 4-27 
Blanco-Bazan, Agustin. "Specific Regulations for Shipping and Environmental Protection in 
the Arctic: The Work of the International Maritime Organization." International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 24, no. 2, 2009, p 381 ..................................................... 4-44 
Caitlyn Antrim, Geography and Jurisdiction in The Maritime Arctic, Geographical Review 107 
(1): p 42, January 2017 .................................................................................................. 4-39 
Churchill, Robin and Ulfstein, Geir, The Disputed Maritime Zones around Svalbard (October 
3, 2011). CHANGES IN THE ARTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
Panel IX, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010 ................................................................... 4-60 
D. H. Anderson, The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas Around Svalbard, 
Ocean Development & International Law, 40:374-375, 2009 ......................................... 4-58 
D.H.N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L., (1950)   p 
347 ................................................................................................................................. 4-33 
DONAT PHARAND, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit, Ocean 




Espen Engtrø, Ove Tobias Gudmestad & Ove Njå. “Implementation of the Polar Code: 
Functional Requirements Regulating Ship Operations in Polar Waters” Arctic Review on 
Law and Politics, Vol. 11, 2020, p 61 ............................................................................. 4-52 
Evan T. Bloom, Establishment of the Arctic Council, The American Journal of International 
Law, Jul. 1999, Vol. 93, No. 3 pp. 712-722 .................................................................... 6-72 
Gavrilov, V.V. "The LOSC and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean." 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 31, no. 2, 2016, pp. 322-323 ..... 4-27 
Hasebe, Masamichi. "New Developments and Challenges in Arctic Navigation and the Polar 
Code." Revue Belge de Droit International / Belgian Review of International Law, vol. 51, 
no. 2, 2018, p. 347-349 .................................................................................................. 4-50 
Heather Exner-Pirot (2012) Defence diplomacy in the Arctic: the search and rescue 
agreement as a confidence builder, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 18:2, 195-207 .. 4-55 
Hein, J. R., Koschinsky, A., & Kuhn, T. (2020). Deep-ocean polymetallic nodules as a 
resource for critical materials. Nature Reviews Earth & Environment ............................ 4-31 
Hein, J.R., Koschinsky, A. & Kuhn, T. Deep-ocean polymetallic nodules as a resource for 
critical materials. Nat Rev Earth Environ 1, 158–169 (2020). ........................................ 4-31 
James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage, The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol 22, No 2 Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007 4-
32 
Jan Jakub Solski (2021): The Genesis of Article 234 of the UNCLOS, Ocean Development & 
International Law, pp 12 -16 ........................................................................................... 4-42 
Julie Babin & Frederic Lasserre (2019) Asian states at the Arctic Council: perceptions in 
Western States, Polar Geography, 42:3, 145-159 ......................................................... 6-76 
Kristian Cedervall Lauta, A Drop in the Ocean, Arctic Review on Law and Politics, vol. 5, 
2/2014 p 241 .................................................................................................................. 4-56 
Kristin Bartenstein, The “Arctic Exception” in the Law of the Sea Convention: A Contribution 
to Safer Navigation in the Northwest Passage? Ocean Development & International Law, 
42:2011 pp 28-29 & supra note 131 at pp 56-57 ............................................................ 4-42 
Lev Voronkov, The Russian Claim for an Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic, 
Environmental Policy and Law, 47/2 (2017) p 93 ........................................................... 4-28 
Loukacheva, N. (2020). The Arctic Council and “Law-Making”. The northern review, 109–135
 ....................................................................................................................................... 6-72 
Lowe, Vaughan. "USA/USSR." International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law, vol. . 4-41 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Mercedes Rosello, ‘IUU Fishing as a Disputed Concept and Its 
Application to Vulnerable Groups: A Case Study on Arctic Fisheries’ International 
Community Law Review 22 (2020) 410–427 ................................................................. 4-65 
Mark Killas, The Legality of Canada's Claims to the Waters of its Arctic Archipelago, 1987 
19-1 Ottawa Law Review 95, 1987 CanLIIDocs 20 ........................................................ 4-32 
McDorman, Ted L. "The Continental Shelf beyond 200 NM: Law and Politics in the Arctic 
Ocean." Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, vol. 18, no. 2, Spring 2009, p. 185 ..... 4-28 
Meric Karahalil, Burcu Ozsoy & Ozgun Oktar, ‘Polar Code application areas in the Arctic’, 
WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs (2020) 19: pp 230-232 ............................................... 4-51 
Michael Sheng-Ti Gau (2009) ‘Third Party Intervention in the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf Regarding a Submission Involving a Dispute’, Ocean Development & 
International Law, 40:1, 63-64 ........................................................................................ 4-27 
Mirasola, Christopher. "Historic Waters and Ancient Title: Outdated Doctrines for 
Establishing Maritime Sovereignty and Jurisdiction." Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, vol. 47, no. 1, January 2016, p 35. ............................................................. 4-33 
Molenaar, E. J. "Fisheries Regulation in the Maritime Zones of Svalbard." International 




Monahan, Dave; Van de Poll, Robert; and Cockburn, Sara, "Applying the Test of 
Appurtenance Globally: a new inventory of wide margin states from public domain data" 
(2005). International Hydrographic Review p 79 ............................................................ 4-27 
Natalia Loukacheva, The Arctic Council and “Law-Making” The Northern Review 50 (2020): 
p 119 .............................................................................................................................. 4-54 
Øystein Jensen, The Svalbard Treaty and Norwegian Sovereignty, Arctic Review on Law 
and Politics Vol. 11, 2020 82–107 p 86 .......................................................................... 4-59 
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ‘India and the arctic: revisionist aspirations, arctic realities’ (2017) 
8 Jindal Global Law Review 23, 37. ............................................................................... 1-19 
Pedersen, Torbjorn, and Tore Henriksen. "Svalbard's Maritime Zones: The End of Legal 
Uncertainty." International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 24, no. 1, 2009, p. 141-
162 ................................................................................................................................. 4-60 
Peter Thomas Örebech, ‘The Geographic Scope Of The Svalbard Treaty And Norwegian 
Sovereignty: Historic - Or Evolutionary - Interpretation?’ CYELP 13 [2017] pp 53-86 ... 4-59 
Philip E. "Steering between Scylla and Charybdis: The Northwest Passage as Territorial 
Sea." Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 45, no. 1, 2014 p. 90 ................ 4-37 
Philipp Kastner, International legal dimensions of the Northern Sea Route, Marcus Matthias 
Keupp (Ed.) The Northern Sea Route, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015 pp 39-52. 4-
32 
Qin, Tianbao. "Dispute over the Applicable Scope of the Svalbard Treaty: A Chinese 
Lawyer's Perspective." Journal of East Asia and International Law, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 
2015, p 159 .................................................................................................................... 5-66 
Rasmus Gjedssø Bertelsen, Vincent Gallucci, The return of China, post-Cold War Russia, 
and the Arctic: Changes on land and at sea, Marine Policy, Volume 72, 2016, Pages 240-
245 ................................................................................................................................. 6-76 
Roman Dremliuga, A Note on the Application of Article 234 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention in Light of Climate Change: Views from Russia, Ocean Development & 
International Law 2017, Vol. 48, No. 2, p 129 ................................................................ 4-42 
Rossi, Christopher R. "A Unique International Problem: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal 
Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial Temptation from History." Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 15, no. 1, 2016, p. 110 .............................. 4-58 
Ryan O’Leary, Protecting the Arctic Marine Environment: The limits of Article 234 and the 
need for multilateral approaches, Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 23:3 2012, 
pp 289-290 ..................................................................................................................... 4-42 
Shiloh Rainwater, 'International Law and the Globalization of the Arctic: Assessing the 
Rights of Non-Arctic States in the High North ' (2015) 30 Emory Int'l L Rev 115  p136 . 6-75 
Steinberg, Philip E. "Steering between Scylla and Charybdis: The Northwest Passage as 
Territorial Sea." Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 45, no. 1, 2014, p 97 4-34 
Sternheim, Michael. "Regulating the Northwest Passage." Loyola Maritime Law Journal, vol. 
10, no. 1, Fall 2011, pp 184-185 .................................................................................... 4-35 
Svein Vigeland Rottem (2015) A Note on the Arctic Council Agreements, Ocean 
Development & International Law, 46:1, pp 50-59 ......................................................... 4-54 
Torbjørn Pedersen, The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and 
Political Rivalries, Ocean Development & International Law, 2006 37:339–358, p 341 . 4-58 
V.S. Mani, ‘India’s maritime zones and International Law: a preliminary inquiry’, Journal of 
the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July September 1979), p 365 .......................... 4-26 
Venkatesan R, Krishnan K, Arul Muthiah M, et al. Indian moored observatory in the Arctic for 
long-term in situ data collection. The International Journal of Ocean and Climate Systems. 
2016;7(2):55-61 .............................................................................................................. 6-73 
Viatcheslav V. Gavrilov (2015) Legal Status of the Northern Sea Route and Legislation of the 




Yoshinobu Takei, ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic: an assessment’, Aegean Rev of the Law of the Sea (2013) 2:81–
109, pp 94-95 ................................................................................................................. 6-76 
Young, R. (1958). The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf: A First Impression. 
American Journal of International Law, 52(4), p 733 ...................................................... 4-26 
Zhen Sun, International Regulation of Heavy Fuel Oil Use by Vessels in Arctic Waters, the 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 34 (2019) pp 516-517 ....................... 4-51 
Newspaper articles 
Ankit Panda, ‘Indian, Chinese Navies to Participate in Search-and-Rescue Naval Drill’, 
August 14, 2017, the Diplomat ....................................................................................... 4-55 
Abhijit Bhattacharyya, Constitution is the supreme law of the land, Financial Express, 
October 22, 2015 ............................................................................................................ 4-29 
Abhijnan Rej, India and Japan Sign Military Logistics Agreement for All to See, The Diplomat
 ....................................................................................................................................... 5-67 
Alister Doyle, Gwladys Fouche, ‘Abide by the claw: Norway's Arctic snow crab ruling boosts 
claim to oil’ February 14, 2019, Reuters ......................................................................... 4-64 
Amiti Sen, WTO and fisheries subsidies: India’s proposal for exempting poor countries gains 
traction, The Hindu Businessline, September 18 2020 .................................................. 4-65 
Anna Barford & James Gamble, Ban on heavy fuel oil in the Arctic is too weak, April 13, 
2021, Policy Options ...................................................................................................... 4-52 
Aswathi Pacha, ‘Explained | What is India's Deep Ocean Mission’, August 04, 2019, The 
Hindu .............................................................................................................................. 4-31 
Atle Staalesen, ‘New Delhi confirms its stake in the new Arctic oil project’, January 16, 2020, 
the Barents Observer ..................................................................................................... 6-75 
Atle Staalesen, Shipping on Northern Sea Route breaks record, December 22 2020, the 
Barents observer ............................................................................................................ 4-41 
Børge Brende, From the Third pole to the North Pole, the Hindu, OCTOBER 15 2014 .... 5-68 
Gopal B Kateshiya, India and Russia propose to collaborate for conservation of migratory 
arctic birds, February 20 2020, the Indian express ........................................................ 5-67 
H. Bertil Nordin, ‘U-2 and the Vertical Boundary of Sovereign Territory’ ........................... 4-25 
India okays MoU to tackle oil spills, 12 May 2018, ANI news ............................................ 4-56 
India, South Korea seal logistics pact, The Hindu, September 6 2019 .............................. 5-67 
Isabelle Gerretsen, UN shipping body approves Arctic heavy fuel oil ‘ban’, delayed for a 
decade, 20/11/2020, Climate Home News ..................................................................... 4-52 
Kait Bolongaro, “Oil Lurks beneath EU-Norway Snow Crab Clash,” Politico, June 18, 2017 4-
64 
Kamil Bekyashev, Russia’s New Rules for Northern Sea Route Violate International Law, 
March 12, 2019, Polygraph.Info ..................................................................................... 4-40 
Manu Pubby and Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘India, Russia defence logistics sharing pact 
likely to be signed by year-end’, The Economic Times, July 22 2020 ............................ 5-66 
Mia Bennett, 02-23-2020, Ban on Heavy Fuel Oil in Arctic Shipping Moves Ahead, The 
Maritime Executive ......................................................................................................... 4-52 
Mia Bennett, The Polar Code, One Year On, 04-06-2018, The Maritime Executive ......... 4-53 
Navtej Sarna, India: The Third Pole, The Circle WWF Magazine No. 3 2014, pp 18-19 ... 6-74 
Nida Sayed, Vasco’s polar research centre inks MoU with Canadian facility for summer 
collaboration, The Times of India, February 27 2020 ..................................................... 5-68 
Nils Ragnar Kamsvåg interviewed by Omair Ahmad, India-Norway cooperation from the 
Arctic to the monsoon, December 4, 2018, the Third Pole ............................................. 5-68 
Scott Highleyman as quoted by Hannah Hoag, ‘Nations agree to ban fishing in Arctic Ocean 




Shubhajit Roy, Explained: BECA, and the importance of 3 foundational pacts of India-US 
defence cooperation, The Indian Express, New Delhi ................................................... 5-70 
Shyam Saran, ‘India's stake in Arctic cold war’ (The Hindu, February 01 2012) ............... 1-19 
Stanislaw Skarzynski and Daniel Wong, ‘Is Putin’s Russia Seeking a New Balance Between 
China and the West?’ The Diplomat, August 28 2020 ................................................... 5-66 
Yereth Rosen, ‘From the south, keen interest in the Arctic and the Arctic Council’ Alaska 
Dispatch News May 15, 2017, Arctic Today ................................................................... 6-74 
Yuri Sychev, as quoted in, ‘Russia, India plan to cooperate in Arctic research’, 29 MAY 2018, 
TASS Russian news agency .......................................................................................... 5-68 
National government publications 
"Federal Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Administrative Boundaries Extending from the 
Submerged Lands Act Boundary seaward to the Limit of the United States Outer 
Continental Shelf," Federal Register, January 3, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 1) pp. 127–
131 ................................................................................................................................. 4-30 
Russia: Straight Baseline Claim, The Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps, US Navy . 4-39 
About the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, Office of Ocean and Polar affairs, US 
department of state ........................................................................................................ 4-25 
About the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project’, Office of Ocean and Polar affairs, US 
department of state. ....................................................................................................... 4-27 
Active International Agreements by Signature Date (as of June 30, 2020), NASA............ 5-70 
Arctic Expedition, 8/14/2018, ministry of earth sciences India ........................................... 5-68 
Barents SRS, Norwegian Coastal Administration .............................................................. 4-57 
Baselines of the territorial sea, fisheries and oceans canada, government of canada, 2018 4-
34 
Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, the US Congress, February 1 2021 R41153 p 54 ............................................ 4-44 
Chauhan, Manish, Republic of India's 2018 Observer Review report, 2019-03, The Republic 
of India's 2018 Review report to the Arctic Council, on participation in Arctic cooperation 
and AC work ................................................................................................................... 6-74 
Danish Agency for Science and Higher Education, International Opportunities for Danish 
Arctic Researchers, ICDK Outlook No. 6, June 2018, p 46 ............................................ 5-69 
Deep Seabed Polymetallic Nodules, Annual Report 1992-93, Department of Ocean 
Development, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India .................................... 4-31 
High North, Norwegian Embassy in Delhi, Government of Norway ................................... 5-68 
Joint Statement on India - Finland Virtual Summit, Ministry of External Affairs India ........ 5-69 
Joint Statement, India-Sweden Virtual Summit March 2021, Government of Sweden ...... 5-69 
Letter of Intent between India and Sweden, Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, 
June 1 2015 .................................................................................................................... 5-69 
Limits in the seas no. 106, United States response to excessive national maritime claims, US 
department of state, Bureau of oceans and international environment and scientific affairs, 
9th March 1992, pp 16-26 .............................................................................................. 4-35 
Lorne Clark, Deputy Negotiator for Mar. Boundaries (Canada-U.S.A.), House of Commons, 
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and 
Forestry, Apr. 11, 1978, 3d Sess., 30th Parl., 1977-1978, Issue No. 15, at 8 ................ 4-28 
Memorandum of Understanding between India and Norway, Ministry of Earth Sciences, 
Government of India, 14 October 2014. ......................................................................... 5-68 
Memorandum of Understanding between India and the US, Ministry of Earth Sciences, 
Government of India ....................................................................................................... 5-70 
Ministry of external affairs government of India, ‘India and the Arctic’ (Ministry of external 




Ministry of External Affairs India, Saint Petersburg Declaration by the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of India: A vision for the 21st century June 01, 2017, St Petersburg . 4-31 
Ministry of External Affairs Notification, New Delhi, The Gazette of India Extraordinary pt. II, 
s. 3, (30 August 1955). ................................................................................................... 4-29 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Norway, Norway signed maritime delimitation 
agreements with Iceland and Denmark/the Faroe Islands, 30/10/2019 ......................... 4-30 
Ny-Ålesund Science Managers Committee, National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research 
(NCPOR), India .............................................................................................................. 5-68 
PIB Delhi, Cabinet approves Memorandum of Understanding between India and Sweden on 
cooperation in Polar Science, Government of India, 8 JAN 2020 .................................. 5-69 
PIB Delhi, India’s Exclusive Rights to Explore Polymetallic Nodules from Central Indian 
Ocean Seabed Basin Extended by Five Years, Ministry of Earth Science, Aug 2017 ... 4-31 
PIB Delhi, Joint Statement for India-Denmark Green Strategic Partnership, Prime Minister's 
Office, Government of India ........................................................................................... 5-69 
Proclamations Concerning United States Jurisdiction Over Natural Resources in Coastal 
Areas and The High Seas’, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Volume II, Press Release Issued by The 
White House, September 28, 1945, Reprinted from Department of State Bulletin, 
September 30, 1945, P. 484. September 28, 1945 ........................................................ 4-26 
Projects implemented in Arctic, National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, ministry of 
earth sciences India ....................................................................................................... 6-74 
SO135E, ‘Prohibition of any ships’, Ministry of External Affairs Notification New Delhi, The 
13th January, 2009. ........................................................................................................ 4-43 
Statement in the House of Commons by Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, 
Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 6462–6464, 10 Sept. 1985, reproduced in Dep’t. 
of External Affairs, Statement Series 85/49 and in 24 Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law, p 418 ...................................................................................................................... 4-32 
The US, Danish and Russian diplomatic notes submitted with regard to the partial 
submission made by Canada to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ... 4-
28 
The White House, Joint Statement of Ministers, September 28 2016, Washington, DC, USA
 ....................................................................................................................................... 5-69 
Transcript of Joint Presser by External Affairs Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation (April 06, 2021), April 07 2021, Ministry of External affairs India ... 5-66 
Trevor Riley & Shanna Hollich, The Arctic: Anthropogenic Noise, Shipping, Impact on Marine 
Mammals, & Future Management, U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research NOAA Central 
Library – Silver Spring, Maryland, pp 24-34 ................................................................... 4-53 
U.S. Coast Guard conducts joint Arctic operations, scientific research off Greenland, Kate 
Kilroy and Sara Muir, U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, DVIDS/DMA (Defense Media 
Activity) ........................................................................................................................... 4-55 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Methane and Black Carbon Impacts on the Arctic: 
Communicating the Science, 2016 pp 4-9 ..................................................................... 4-51 
US department of state, Bureau of oceans and international environment and scientific 
affairs, Limits in the seas no. 112, United States response to excessive national maritime 
claims, 9th March 1992, pp 29-30 .................................................................................. 4-34 
Other research article 
Andreas Kuersten, ‘The Arctic Five Versus the Arctic Council’ Arctic yearbook 2016 briefing 




Andrew Chater (2016) Explaining Non-Arctic States in the Arctic Council, Strategic Analysis, 
40:3, pp 173-184 ............................................................................................................ 6-75 
Bhagwat J., ‘Russia and India in the Arctic: A case for greater synergy’ Arktika i Sever [Arctic 
and North], 2020, no. 38, pp. 63-64 ............................................................................... 5-66 
Candidate Number: 228, ‘The Non-Discrimination Requirement and Geographical 
Application of the Svalbard Treaty, Decisions by the Norwegian Supreme Court’, 
University of Bergen, Master’s thesis,, pp 23-29 ............................................................ 4-58 
Carl August Fleischer, The New International Law of the Sea and Svalbard Professor, The 
Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters 150th Anniversary Symposium, January 25 
2007, University of Oslo, pp 2-4 ..................................................................................... 4-59 
Deggim, H. (2018). The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar 
Code). WMU Studies in Maritime Affairs, p 29 ............................................................... 4-49 
Devikaa Nanda, ‘India’s Arctic Potential’, ORF Occasional Paper No. 186, February 2019, 
Observer Research Foundation 1-13 .................................................................... 1-19, 7-92 
Devikaa Nanda, ‘India’s Arctic Potential’, ORF Occasional Paper No. 186, February 2019, 
Observer Research Foundation 1-13. ............................................................................ 1-19 
Heather Exner-Pirot et al, Form and Function: The Future of the Arctic Council February 5, 
2019, The Arctic Institute ................................................................................................ 6-76 
Hendrik Schopmans, Revisiting the Polar Code: Where Do We Stand? June 11, 2019, The 
Arctic Institute ................................................................................................................. 4-53 
Ingvild Hoel Rise, The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic, June 2014, UiT, pp 35-49 ......................................................... 4-55 
Lassi Heininen, Alexander Sergunin and Gleb Yarovoy, Russian Strategies in the Arctic: 
Avoiding a New Cold War, Valdai Discussion Club, Russia ........................................... 5-66 
Lisell A. Donatello Bang, Is the Polar Code living up to its purpose? A case study of the 
Polar Code as regulating Arctic shipping, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, pp 3-4 & 
60-61 .............................................................................................................................. 4-49 
Mahika Sri Krishna, The Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor: The Implications for China, 
22 November 2019, Institute for Security & Development Policy ................................... 5-66 
Mark Nevitt, ‘Climate change, Arctic security and why the U.S. should join the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’, September 30, 2020, Penn Law ............................ 4-25 
Michael Lodge, ‘The International Seabed Authority and Deep Seabed Mining’, United 
Nations Chronicle, United Nations. ................................................................................ 4-25 
MOM Ravin, ‘Law of the Sea Maritime Boundaries and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms’, 
United Nations-The Nippon Foundation Fellow Germany, March-December 2005 p 48 2-20 
N. Koroleva, V. Markov and A. Ushakov, Legal Regime of Navigation in the Russian Arctic, 
INSROP Working Paper No. 94 - 1997, IV.3.1, pp. 23-24 ............................................. 4-40 
Nivedita Kapoor and Gayathri Iyer, “East Meets East: An Assessment of the Proposed 
Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 286, December 
2020, Observer Research Foundation ........................................................................... 5-66 
Piotr Graczyk, "Observers in the Arctic Council - Evolution and Prospects," Yearbook of 
Polar Law 3 (2011): 575-634 pp 598-599 ....................................................................... 6-71 
R.D. Brubaker, Environmental Regulation in the Russian Arctic, INSROP Working Paper 79-
1997, pp 8-9 ................................................................................................................... 4-42 
Ragnhild Groenning, ‘The Norwegian Svalbard Policy – Respected or Contested?’ 
November 22, 2017, the Arctic institute ......................................................................... 4-62 
Sarah Wolf, Svalbard’s Maritime Zones, their Status under International Law and Current 
and Future Disputes Scenarios, Working Paper FG 2, 2013/Nr. 02, January 2013, SWP 






International and regional treaties and declarations 
Agreement between Iceland and Norway concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits, 
November 3, 2008 .......................................................................................................... 4-30 
Agreement between the government of the kingdom of Norway on the one hand, and the 
government of the kingdom of Denmark together with the home rule government of 
Greenland on the other hand concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
fisheries zones in the area between Greenland and Svalbard, 2006, UN Treaty collection 
Volume 2378, I-42887 .................................................................................................... 4-28 
Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 22 October 1981 4-30 
Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean .......... 4-65 
Arctic MOPPR agreement .................................................................................................. 4-55 
Arctic SAR agreement .............................................................................................. 4-54, 6-75 
Canada and United States of America, Agreement on arctic cooperation. Signed at Ottawa 
on 11 January 1988 ........................................................................................................ 4-34 
Convention On International Civil Aviation Done At Chicago On The 7th Day Of December 
1944 ............................................................................................................................... 4-46 
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, The IMO ..................................... 4-45 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), The IMO ..................... 4-46 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers (STCW), The IMO .......................................................................................... 4-46 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties, 1969, IMO .................................................................................................... 4-45 
SOLAS 2018 ...................................................................................................................... 4-48 
Svalbard Treaty, 1920 ........................................................................................................ 4-58 
Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, 2010 .............. 4-28 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 .............................................................. 4-37 
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic (MOSPA) .............................................................................................................. 6-75 
Declaration between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation on Deepening the 
Strategic Partnership to meet Global Challenges December 2009 ................................ 5-67 
Declaration on The Establishment of The Arctic Council, Joint Communique Of The 
Governments Of The Arctic Countries On The Establishment Of The Arctic Council, 
Ottawa, Canada September 19, 1996 ............................................................................ 6-72 
Ilulissat declaration 2008. .................................................................................................. 1-19 
Kiruna declaration, 8th ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, 12 May 2011, Kiruna 
Sweden .......................................................................................................................... 6-71 
Nuuk declaration, 7th ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council, 12 May 2011, Nuuk 
Greenland ....................................................................................................................... 6-71 
Rovaniemi Ministerial Statements Rovaniemi, Finland 7 May 2019 .................................. 6-75 
Books 
Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2007) p 6 ...................................................................................................... 4-23 
Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), p 343 ................................................................................................. 4-44 
Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties, Oxford university press, 2014, p 56




Hildebrand, Lawrence P, et al. Sustainable Shipping in a Changing Arctic. Vol. 7, Springer 
International Publishing AG, 2018, p 18 ......................................................................... 4-48 
Jan Klabbers 3rd ed, An Introduction to International Organizations Law, Cambridge pp 41-
42 ................................................................................................................................... 6-72 
Joachim Weber Ed., Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic Springer Nature 
Switzerland AG 2020, p 151 ........................................................................................... 5-66 
John Westlake, International Law, pp 191-192 (2d edition 1910 ....................................... 4-33 
Ola Johannessen & Vitaly Alexandrov et al, Remote Sensing of Sea Ice in the Northern Sea 
Route: Studies and Applications, 2007, Springer-Praxis Books in Geophysical Sciences, p 
6 ..................................................................................................................................... 4-39 
R. Douglas Brubaker, The Russian Arctic Straits. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004, 
pp 34-35 ......................................................................................................................... 4-40 
Ulfstein, Geir, The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty (Oslo 
1995), pp. 246-252 ......................................................................................................... 4-63 
Vidas, Davor. Protecting the Polar Marine Environment. Cambridge University Press, 2000 p 
254 ................................................................................................................................. 4-47 
Weidemann, Lilly. International Governance of the Arctic Marine Environment. Vol. 27, 
Springer International Publishing AG, 2014 p 110 ......................................................... 4-47 
Yehuda Blum, Historic Titles in International Law (1965) p 111 ........................................ 4-33 
Institutional data and publications 
Arctic Centre, Finland and India to develop indigenous and tribal peoples' studies, 
23.10.2020, Arctic Centre University of Lapland. ........................................................... 7-79 
Arctic Council, Ninth Ministerial Meeting Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada 24 - 25 April 2015, p 24, 
Information for Press ...................................................................................................... 6-77 
Arctic Council, SAOs Report to Ministers on the Review of The Arctic Council Structures, at 
4,9, SAO2002/A/8.0 (May 15, 2002). ............................................................................. 6-76 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. Arctic Council, April 2009, second printing, 
p 6 .................................................................................................................................. 4-48 
IORA, As approved at the Council of Ministers (COM) (IORA Secretariat Durban, eThekwini, 
South Africa) 2 November 2018, p 1, Charter of The Indian Ocean Rim Association 
(IORA). ........................................................................................................................... 4-54 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, The joint Barents transport plan, p 25 .................................. 6-77 
Climate Change in the Arctic, All About Arctic Climatology and Meteorology, National Snow 
and Ice Data Center, 4 May 2020, University of Colorado, Boulder, USA ..................... 4-42 
Det Norske Veritas Report No./DNV Reg No.: 2013-1442 / 17JTM1D-26 REV 2 Report, 
Specially Designated Marine Areas In The Arctic High Seas. pp 56-60 ........................ 4-57 
EPPR, 2019, Legal issues related to the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA) - Summary Report, Emergency 
Prevention Preparedness and Response (EPPR)  p 6. ................................................. 4-55 
Eurasian Economic Commission, EAEU and India began formal negotiations on a free trade 
agreement, March 6 2017 .............................................................................................. 5-67 
Gudev P.A. The Northern Sea Route: Problems of National Status Legitimization Under 
International Law. Part I. Arktika i Sever [Arctic and North], 2020, no. 40, p 127........... 4-40 
IACS, Introduction, the International Association of Classification Societies, London England
 ....................................................................................................................................... 4-47 
DNV, Introduction, IMO Polar Code, DNV (Det Norske Veritas) ........................................ 4-49 
Jan Jakub Solski, ‘Navigational rights of warships through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – 
all bark and no bite?’ May 31 2019, The blog of the Norwegian Centre for the Law of the 




Lawson W. Brigham et al, The Natural and Societal Challenges of The Northern Sea Route, 
Central Marine Research and Design Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia, p3, 1999 ......... 4-39 
Natalia Loukacheva editor, Polar Law Textbook II, Nordic Council of Ministers, pp 57-60, 
2013 ............................................................................................................................... 4-54 
NEFCO, ‘Arctic Council Project Support Instrument becomes operational’, 24.09.2014, The 
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) ...................................................... 6-72 
Nuuk Declaration On the occasion of the seventh Ministerial Meeting of The Arctic Council, 
12 May 2011, p 4 ............................................................................................................ 4-55 
PAME, Regional Waste Management Strategies for Arctic Shipping Regional Reception 
Facilities Plan (RRFP) and Proposal for IMO Consideration, ......................................... 4-57 
PAME, The Polar Code, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment .............................. 4-49 
Pollution Preparedness and Response, The IMO .............................................................. 4-46 
Press release, Rosneft Signs Contract with Indian Oil to Supply 2 Million Tonnes of Oil to 
India, Rosneft Information Division, 05 February 2020 .................................................. 5-67 
R. K. Headland and colleagues, ‘Transits of The Northwest Passage to End of the 2019 
Navigation Season, Atlantic Ocean ↔ Arctic Ocean ↔ Pacific Ocean’, Scott Polar 
Research Institute, University of Cambridge, Lensfield Road, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 
CB2 1ER, 17 March 2020 .............................................................................................. 4-38 
Russia Briefing, Russia Connecting with India Via International North-South Transport 
Corridor, May 22 2017, Dezan Shira & Associates. ....................................................... 5-67 
See Climate change in the Arctic, Norwegian Polar Institute ............................................. 4-42 
South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) ........................................... 4-56 
Submission to the Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information Forum May 2017, Circumpolar 
Conservation Union, p 12. .............................................................................................. 4-53 
The History of ICAO and the Chicago Convention, The ICAO. ......................................... 4-46 
The ICC, ICC Presents Case for Consultative Status to IMO Council, March 1, 2021 – 
Ottawa, Canada ............................................................................................................. 4-52 
The Research Council of Norway, The Norwegian Programme for Research Cooperation 
with India – INDNOR Work plan 2018 – 2021 ................................................................ 6-75 
The Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observatory System, ‘New SIOS member!’ June 14, 
2019 ............................................................................................................................... 5-68 
The Vardø Vessel Traffic Service, NOR VTS Norwegian Oceanic Region Vessel Traffic 
Service, Norwegian Coastal Administration ................................................................... 4-57 
Tromsø Declaration On the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of The Arctic Council, 
29th April 2009, Tromsø, Norway p 5 ............................................................................. 4-54 
Welcoming India as the 14th Signatory of the IORA MoU on Search and Rescue, Disaster 
Risk Management, 24 September 2020 ......................................................................... 4-54 
FAO, what is IUU fishing? FAO, United Nations ................................................................ 4-65 
WTO Bodies involved in the dispute settlement process, WTO ........................................ 6-74 
Book Chapters 
Crawford, James, Subjects of international law, Brownlie's Principles of Public International 
Law, 9th Edition .............................................................................................................. 6-72 
Hay, William. (2016). Continental Rise, In the book, Encyclopaedia of Marine geosciences 
pp 122-124 ..................................................................................................................... 4-26 
Jessen H. (2018) Arctic Strategies of the EU and Non-Arctic States: Identifying Some 
Common Elements. In: Hildebrand L., Brigham L., Johansson T. (eds) Sustainable 





Philipp Kastner, International legal dimensions of the Northern Sea Route, Marcus Matthias 
Keupp (Ed.) The Northern Sea Route, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2015 pp 46-47. 4-
40 
 
